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THREE TREATISES

THE FIRST
CONCERNING ART

THE SECOND
CONCERNING MVSIC
PAINTING AND POETRY

THE THIRD
CONCERNING HAPPINESS

BY IAMES HARRIS ESQ.

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THE SECOND EDITION
REVISED AND CORRECTED

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TREATISE THE FIRST

A DIALOGVE CONCERNING ART

TO THE RIGHT HONOVRABLE

THE EARL OF SHAFTESBVRY

CONCERNING ART
A DIALOGVE

TO THE RIGHT HONOVRABLE THE EARL OF SHAFTESBVRY

My Lord,

THE following is a Converſation in its kind ſomewhat uncommon, and for this reaſon I have remembered it more minutely than I could imagine. Should the ſame Peculiarity prove a Reaſon to amuſe your Lordſhip, I ſhall think myſelf well rewarded in the Labour of reciting. If not, you are candid enough to accept of the Intention, and to think there is ſome Merit even in the Sincerity of my Endeavours. To make no longer Preface, the Fact was as follows.

A FRIEND from a diſtant Country having by chance made me a Viſit, we were tempted by the Serenity of a chearful Morning in the Spring, to walk from *Saliſbury* to ſee Lord *Pembroke*'s at *Wilton*. The Beauties of Gardening, Architecture, Painting, and Sculpture belonging to that Seat, were the Subject of great Entertainment to my Friend: Nor was I, for my own part, leſs delighted than he was, to find that our Walk had ſo well anſwered his Expectations. We had given a large Scope to our Curioſity, when we left the Seat, and leiſurely began our return towards home.

AND here, my Lord, in paſſing over a few pleaſant Fields, commenced the Converſation which I am to tell you, and which fell at firſt, as was natural, on the many curious Works, which had afforded us both ſo elegant an Amuſement. This led us inſenſibly to diſcourſing upon ART, for we both agreed, that whatever we had been admiring of Fair and Beautiful, could all be referred

referred to no other Cauſe. And here, I well remember, I called upon my Friend to give me his Opinion upon the meaning of the Word ART: A Word it was (I told him) in the Mouth of every one; but that nevertheleſs, as to its preciſe and definite Idea, this might ſtill be a Secret; that ſo it was in fact with a thouſand Words beſide, all no leſs common, and equally familiar, and yet all of them equally vague and undetermined. To this he anſwered, That as to the preciſe and definite Idea of Art, it was a Queſtion of ſome Difficulty, and not ſo ſoon to be reſolved; that, however, he could not conceive a more likely Method of coming to know it, than by conſidering thoſe ſeveral Particulars, to each of which we gave the Name. It is hardly probable, ſaid he, that Muſic, Painting, Medicine, Poetry, Agriculture, and ſo many more ſhould be *all called by one common Name, if there was not ſomething in each, which was common to all.* It ſhould ſeem ſo, replied I.

What then, ſaid he, ſhall we pronounce this to be? At this, I remember, I was

under ſome ſort of Heſitation. Have Courage, cried my Friend, perhaps the Caſe is not ſo deſperate. Let me aſk you—Is Medicine the Cauſe of any thing? Yes ſurely, ſaid I, of Health. And Agriculture, of what? Of the plentiful Growth of Grain. And Poetry, of what? Of Plays and Satires, and Odes, and the like.

And is not the ſame true, ſaid he, of Muſic, of Statuary, of Architecture, and, in ſhort, of every Art whatever? I confeſs, ſaid I, it ſeems ſo. Suppoſe then, ſaid he, we ſhould ſay, *It was common to every Art to be a Cauſe.*----Should we err? I replied, I thought not. Let this then, ſaid he, be remembered, that *all Art is Cauſe.*

I promiſed him it ſhould.

But how then, continued he, if *all Art be Cauſe*, is it alſo true, that *all Cauſe is Art?* At this again I could not help heſitating. You have heard, ſaid he, without doubt, of that Painter famed in Story, who being to paint the Foam of a Horſe, and not ſucceeding to his Mind, threw

threw at the Picture in Reſentment a Sponge bedaubed with Colours, and produced a Foam the moſt natural imaginable. Now, what ſay you to this Fact? Shall we pronounce Art to have been the Cauſe?

By no means, ſaid I. What, ſaid he, if inſtead of *Chance*, his Hand had been guided by mere *Compulſion*, himſelf diſſenting and averſe to the Violence? Even here, replied I, nothing could have been referred to his Art. But what, continued he, if inſtead of a *caſual Throw*, or *involuntary Compulſion*, he had *willingly* and *deſignedly* directed his Pencil, and ſo produced that Foam, which Story ſays he failed in?—Would not Art *here* have been the Cauſe? I replied, in this caſe, I thought it would. It ſhould ſeem then, ſaid he, that *Art* implies not only *Cauſe*, but the additional Requiſite of *Intention*, *Reaſon*, *Volition*, and *Conſciouſneſs*; ſo that *not every Cauſe is Art*, but only *voluntary* or *intentional Cauſe*. So, ſaid I, it appears.

AND ſhall we then, added he, pronounce *every* intentional Cauſe to be Art? I ſee no reaſon, ſaid I, why not. Conſider, ſaid he; Hunger this Morning prompted you to eat. You were then the *Cauſe*, and that too the *intentional Cauſe*, of conſuming certain Food: And yet will you refer this Conſumption to Art? Did you chew by Art? Did you ſwallow by Art?

No certainly, ſaid I. So by opening your Eyes, ſaid he, you are the *intentional* Cauſe of Seeing, and by ſtretching your Hand, the *intentional* Cauſe of Feeling; and yet will you affirm, that *theſe things proceed from Art?* I ſhould be wrong, ſaid I, if I did: For what *Art* can there be *in doing, what every one is able to do by mere Will, and a ſort of uninſtructed Inſtinct?* You ſay right, replied he, and the reaſon is manifeſt: Were it otherwiſe, we ſhould make all Mankind univerſal Artiſts in every ſingle Action of their Lives. And what can be a greater Abſurdity than this? I confeſſed that the Abſurdity appeared

peared to be evident. But if nothing then, continued he, which we do by *Compulſion*, or without intending it, be *Art*; and not even what we do *intentionally*, if it proceed from mere Will and *uninſtructed* Inſtinct; what is it we have left remaining, where Art may be found converſant? Or can it indeed poſſibly be in any thing elſe, than in that which we do by *Uſe*, *Practice*, *Experience*, and the like, all which are born with no one, but are all acquired afterward by advances unperceived. I can think, ſaid I, of nothing elſe. Let therefore the Words *Habit* and *Habitual*, ſaid he, repreſent this Requiſite, and let us ſay, that *Art* is not only a *Cauſe*, but an *intentional Cauſe*; and not only an *intentional Cauſe*, but an *intentional Cauſe founded in Habit*, or, in other Words, *an habitual Cauſe*. You appear, ſaid I, to argue rightly.

BUT if Art, ſaid he, be what we have now aſſerted, ſomething *learnt and acquired*; if it be alſo a thing *intentional*

or

or *voluntary*, and not governed either by *Chance* or blind *Neceſſity*----If this, I ſay, be the Caſe, then mark the Conſequences.

And what, ſaid I, are they? The firſt, ſaid he, is, that *no Events*, in what we call *the natural World*, muſt be referred to *Art*; ſuch as Tides, Winds, Vegetation, Gravitation, Attraction, and the like. For theſe all happen by ſtated Laws; by a curious *Neceſſity*, which is not to be withſtood, and where the *nearer and immediate Cauſes appear to be wholly unconſcious*. I confeſs, ſaid I, it ſeems ſo. In the next place, continued he, we muſt exclude all thoſe admired *Works* of the *Animal World*, which, for their Beauty and Order, we *metaphorically* call *artificial*. The Spider's Web, the Bee's Comb, the Beaver's Houſe, and the Swallow's Neſt, muſt all be referred to another Source.—For who can ſay, theſe ever *learnt* to be thus ingenious? or, that they were *ignorant by Nature*, and *knowing only by Education?* None, ſurely, replied I. But we have ſtill, ſaid he, a higher Conſideration. And what, ſaid I,

is

ſs that? It is, anſwered he, this—— Not even that *Divine Power*, which gave Form to all things, *then acted* by *Art*, when it gave that Form. For how, continued he, can that Intelligence, which has *all Perfection ever in Energy*, be ſuppoſed to have any Power, *not original to its Nature?* How can it ever have any thing to *learn*, when it *knows all from the Beginning*; or, being *perfect and complete*, admit of what is *additional and ſecondary?* I ſhould think, ſaid I, it were impoſſible. If ſo, ſaid he, then Art can never be numbered among its Attributes: For *all Art* is ſomething *learnt*, ſomething *ſecondary and acquired*, and *never original* to any Being, which poſſeſſes it. So the Fact, ſaid I, has been eſtabliſhed.

IF this therefore, continued he, be true; if Art belong not either to the Divine Nature, the Brute Nature, or the Inanimate Nature,——to what Nature ſhall we ſay it does belong? I know not, ſaid I, unleſs it be to the *Human*. You are right, ſaid he;

he; for *every Nature* elſe you perceive is either *too excellent* to want it, or *too baſe* to be capable of it. Beſide, except the Human, what other Nature is there left? Or where elſe can we find any of the Arts already inſtanced, or indeed whatever others we may now fancy to enumerate? Who are Statuaries, but Men? Who Pilots, who Muſicians? This ſeems, replied I, to be the Fact.

LET us then, continued he, ſay, not only that *Art* is a *Cauſe*, but that it is *Man becoming a Cauſe*; and not only Man, but *Man intending to do what is going to be done*, and *doing it alſo by Habit*; ſo that its whole Idea, as far as we have hitherto conceived it, is——*Man becoming a Cauſe, Intentional and Habitual.* I confeſs, ſaid I, it has appeared ſo.

AND thus, ſaid he, have you had exhibited to you a Sketch of Art. You muſt remember however, it is but a Sketch: there is ſtill ſomething wanting to make it a

finiſhed Piece. I begged to know what this was. In order to that, replied he, I cannot do better, than remind you of a Paſſage in your admired *Horace*. It is concerning *Alfenus*; who (if you remember) he tells us, though his Tools were laid aſide, and his Shop ſhut up, was ſtill an Artiſt as much as ever.——

——*Alfenus vafer omni*
Abjecto inſtrumento Artis clauſâq; tabernâ,
Sutor erat——— I remember, ſaid I, the Paſſage, but to what purpoſe is it quoted? Only, replied he, to ſhew you, that I ſhould not be without Precedent, were I to affirm it not abſolutely neceſſary to the being of Art, that it ſhould be Man *actually becoming* a Cauſe; but that it was enough, if he had the *Power* or *Capacity* of ſo becoming. Why then, ſaid I, did you not ſettle it ſo at firſt? Becauſe, replied he, *Faculties, Powers, Capacities* (call them as you will) are in themſelves, abſtract from Action, but *obſcure and hidden* things. On the contrary, *Energies and Operations lie open to the Senſes*, and cannot

cannot but be obſerved, even whether we will or no. And hence therefore, when firſt we treated of Art, we choſe to treat of it, as of a thing only in Energy. Now we better comprehend it, we have ventured ſomewhat farther. Repeat then, ſaid I, if you pleaſe, the Alteration, which you have made. At firſt, anſwered he, we reaſoned upon Art, as if it was only Man *actually becoming* a Cauſe intentional and habitual. Now we ſay it is a *Power* in Man of becoming ſuch Cauſe; and that, *though he be not actually in the Exerciſe of ſuch a Power.* I told him, his Amendment appeared to be juſt.

THERE is too another Alteration, added he, which, for the ſake of Accuracy, is equally wanting; and that is with reſpect to theEpithet, *Intentional or Voluntary.* And what, ſaid I, is that? We have agreed it, replied he, to be neceſſary, that all *Art* ſhould be under the Guidance of *Intention* or *Volition*, ſo that no Man acting by *Compulſion*, or by *Chance*, ſhould be called an

an *Artiſt*. We have. Now tho' this, ſaid he, be true, yet it is not ſufficient. We muſt *limit* this Intention or Volition to a *peculiar Kind*. For were every little Fancy, which we may work up into Habit, a ſufficient Foundation to conſtitute an Art, we ſhould make Art one of the loweſt and moſt deſpicable of things. The meaneſt Trick of a common Juggler might, in ſuch caſe, entitle a Man to the Character of an Artiſt. I confeſſed, that without ſome Limitation, this might be the Conſequence. But how limit Intentions to a Kind or Species? What think you, replied he, if we were to do it, by the *Number* and *Dignity of the Precepts*, which go to the directing of our Intentions? You muſt explain, ſaid I; for your Meaning is obſcure. Are there not Precepts, replied he, in Agriculture, about Ploughing and Sowing? Are there not Precepts in Architecture, about Orders and Proportions? Are there not the ſame in Medicine, in Navigation, and the reſt? There are,

And what is your Opinion of theſe

ſeveral

ſeveral Precepts? Are they *arbitrary and capricious*; or *rational and ſteady?* Are they the *Inventions of a Day*; or *well-approved by long Experience?* I told him, I ſhould conſider them for the moſt part as rational, ſteady, and well-approved by long Experience. And what, continued he, ſhall we ſay to their *Number?* Are they few? Or are they not rather ſo *numerous*, that in every particular Art, ſcarce any comprehend them all, but the ſeveral Artiſts themſelves; and they only by length of time, with due Attendance and Application? I replied, It ſeemed ſo. Suppoſe then We were to pronounce, that *to every Art there was a Syſtem of ſuch various and well-approved Precepts:* Should we err? No certainly. And ſuppoſe we ſhould ſay, that the *Intention of every Artiſt*, in his ſeveral Art, *was directed by ſuch a Syſtem:* Would you allow this? Surely. And will not *this limiting of Intentions* to ſuch only, as are ſo directed, ſufficiently diſtinguiſh Art from any thing elſe which may reſemble it?—— In other words,

words, Is it likely, under this Diſtinction, to be confounded with other Habits of a trifling, capricious and inferior Kind?

I replied, I thought not.

LET us then ſee, ſaid he, and collect all that we have ſaid, together. We have already agreed, that the *Power of acting* after a certain manner is ſufficient to conſtitute Art, without the *actually operating* agreeably to that Power. And We have now farther held the *Intentions* of every Artiſt to be directed by a *Syſtem of various and well-approved Precepts*. Beſides all this, we ſettled it before, that *all Art was founded in Habit*; and was *peculiar to Man*; and was ſeen by becoming *the Cauſe of ſome Effect*. It ſhould ſeem then, that the whole Idea of ART was this—AN HABITUAL POWER IN MAN OF BECOMING THE CAUSE OF SOME EFFECT, ACCORDING TO A SYSTEM OF VARIOUS AND WELL-APPROVED PRECEPTS.

I replied, That his Account appeared to be probable and juſt.

§. 2. And now then, continued he, as we have gone thus far, and have ſettled between us what we believe Art to be; ſhall we go a little farther, or is your Patience at an end?

Oh! no, replied I, not if any thing be left. We have walked ſo leiſurely, that much remains of our Way; and I can think of no Method, how we may better amuſe ourſelves.

My Friend upon this proceded with ſaying, that if *Art* were a *Cauſe*, (as we had agreed it was) it muſt be the *Cauſe of ſomething*. Allow it, ſaid I. And if it be the *Cauſe of ſomething*, it muſt have *a Subject to operate on*. For every Agent has need of ſome Patient; the Smith of his Iron, the Carpenter of his Wood, the Statuary of his Marble, and the Pilot of his Ship.

I anſwered, It was true. If then, ſaid he, the Subjects of particular Arts be thus evident: What Idea ſhall we form of that *univerſal Subject, which is common to all Art?* At this Queſtion, it muſt be confeſſed, I was a little embaraſſed.

This

THIS induced him to aſk me, How many ſorts of Subjects I allowed of? Here I could not help heſitating again. There is nothing, continued he, ſo difficult in the Queſtion. You muſt needs perceive, that *all Natures* whatever can be but either *contingent* or *neceſſary*. This may be, replied I; but even yet I do not comprehend you. Not comprehend me! ſaid he; then anſwer me a Queſtion: Can you conceive any *Medium* between *Motion* and *No-Motion*, between *Change* and *No-Change?*

I replied, I could not. If not, can you conceive any thing *in the whole Order of Being*, which muſt not be either *liable* to theſe, or *not liable?* Nothing.

Call thoſe things therefore, ſaid he, which are *liable to Change and Motion, contingent Natures*; and thoſe, which are *not liable, neceſſary Natures:* And thus you have *a Diviſion, in which all things are included.* We have ſo, ſaid I.

IN which therefore, ſaid he, of *theſe Natures* ſhall we ſeek for this *common Subject* of Art? To this, I told him, I was unable to anſwer. Reflect, ſaid he, a little. We have found *Art* to be a *Cauſe*.

We have. And is it not *eſſential to every Cauſe to operate?* or can it be a Cauſe, and be the Cauſe of nothing? Impoſſible.

Wherever therefore there is *Cauſe*, there is neceſſarily implied ſome *Operation*.

There is. And can there poſſibly be *Operation*, without *Motion* and *Change?*

There cannot. But *Change* and *Motion* muſt needs be *incompatible* with what is *neceſſary* and *immutable*. They muſt. So therefore is *Cauſe*. It muſt.

And ſo therefore *Art*. It muſt.

Truth therefore, ſaid he, and Knowledge; Principles and Demonſtrations; the general and intellectual Eſſences of Things; in ſhort, *the whole immutable and neceſſary Nature is no part of it reducible to a Subject of Art*. It ſeems ſo, ſaid I.

IF therefore Art, ſaid he, have nothing to do with the *ſteady, abſtract, and neceſſary Nature*, it can have only to do with the *tranſient, the particular, and contingent one.* 'Tis true, ſaid I; for there is no other left. And ſhall we then ſay, replied he, it has to do with *all contingent* Natures exiſting in the Univerſe?

For aught, replied I, which to me appears contrary. What think you, ſaid he, of thoſe *Contingents of higher Order?* ſuch as the grand Planetary Syſtem; the Succeſſion of the Seaſons; the regular and uniform Courſe of all ſuperior Natures in the Univerſe? Has Art any Ability to intermeddle here? No certainly, ſaid I.

Theſe ſuperior Contingents then, *which move without Interruption*, are, it ſeems, above it. They are. And ſhall we ſay the ſame of *thoſe of lower ſort*; thoſe, *whoſe Courſe we ſee often interrupted*; thoſe, *which the Strength and Cunning of Man are able to influence and controul?* Give Inſtances, ſaid I, of what

you mean. I mean, ſaid he, Earth, Water, Air, Fire; Stones, Trees; Animals; Men themſelves. Are theſe Contingents within the reach of Art, or has Art *here* no Influence? I ſhould think, ſaid I, a very great one.

IF this, continued he, be true, it ſhould ſeem that the COMMON OR UNIVERSAL SUBJECT OF ART was—ALL THOSE CONTINGENT NATURES, WHICH LIE WITHIN THE REACH OF THE HUMAN POWERS TO INFLUENCE. I acknowledge, ſaid I, it appears ſo.

THUS far then, ſaid he, we have advanced with tolerable Succeſs. We have gained ſome Idea of *Art*, and ſome Idea of its *Subject*. Our Inquiry, on the whole, has informed us, that ART is——an *habitual Power in Man of becoming a certain Cauſe*——and that its SUBJECT is——*every ſuch contingent Nature, which lies within the reach of the human Powers to influence.*

§. 3.

§. 3. 'TIS true, ſaid I, this appears to have been the Reſult of our Inquiry, and a full and ample one it ſeems to have been.
A long one, replied he, if you pleaſe, but not a full and ample one. Can any thing, ſaid I, be wanting, after what you have ſaid already? Certainly, replied he, a great deal. We have talked much indeed of *Art*, conſidered as a Cauſe; and much of the *Subject*, on which it operates; but *what moves* theſe Operations *to commence*, and *where it is they end*, theſe are Topics, which we have as yet little thought of. I begged him then, that we might now conſider them.

HE was willing, he ſaid, for his part, and immediately went on by aſking, What I thought was the *Beginning of Art?* I mean, ſaid he, by *Beginning*, that *Cauſe for the ſake of which* it operates, and *which being ſuppoſed away, Men would be never moved to follow it.* To this, I told him, I was unable to anſwer. You will not

think it, ſaid he, ſo difficult, when you have a little more conſidered. Reflect with yourſelf——Was it not the *Abſence* of Health, which *excited* Men to cultivate the Art of Medicine? I replied, it was.

What then, ſaid he, if the *Human Body* had been ſo far *perfect and ſelf-ſufficient*, as never to have felt the *Viciſſitudes of Well and Ill:* Would not then this Art have been wholly unknown?

I replied, I thought it would. And what, ſaid he, if we extend this Perfection a degree farther, and ſuppoſe the Body not only thus *healthful*, but withal ſo *robuſt*, as to have felt no Uneaſineſs from *all Inclemencies of Weather:* Would not then the Arts of Building alſo and Clothing have been as uſeleſs, as that of Medicine?

I replied, It ſeemed they would. But what, ſaid he, if we bound not this Perfection of ours even here? What if we ſuppoſe, that not only Things *merely neceſſary*, but that thoſe alſo *conducive to Elegance and Enjoyment* were of courſe all implied in the Conſtitution of Human Nature;

ture; that they were all *ſteady, conſtant, and independant from without*, and as inſeparable from our Being, as Perſpiring, or Circulation: In ſuch caſe, would not the Arts of Muſic, Painting and Poetry, with every other Art paſſing under the Denomination of *Elegant*, have been as uſeleſs, as we have held thoſe others of Medicine, Clothing, and Architecture? I replied, It ſeemed they would. It was then the *Abſence* of Joys, Elegancies, and Amuſements from our *Conſtitution, as left by Nature*, which induced us to *ſeek them in theſe Arts of Elegance and Entertainment.*

It was. And what, ſaid he, are Joys, Elegancies, Amuſements, Health, Robuſtneſs, with thoſe ſeveral other *Objects of Deſire, whoſe Abſence leads to Art*, but ſo many different Names of that *complex Being called* GOOD, under its *various, and multiform, and popular Appearances?* I replied, It ſeemed ſo.

IF this then, ſaid he, be granted, it ſhould ſeem that the *Beginning* or *Prin-*

ciple of Art was the *Abſence of ſomething thought Good*; becauſe it has appeared that it is *for the ſake of ſome ſuch abſent Good that every Art operates*; and becauſe, *if we ſuppoſe no ſuch Abſence to have been, we ſhould never have known any Art.*
I confeſs, ſaid I, it ſeems ſo.

BUT how then, continued he? If it be true that *all Art* implies ſuch *Principle*, it is reciprocally true, that every ſuch *Principle* ſhould imply *Art?* I ſee no reaſon, ſaid I, why not. Conſider, ſaid he. It might be thought a Good by ſome perhaps, to be as ſtrong as thoſe Horſes, which are ploughing yonder Field; to be as tall as thoſe Elms, and of a Nature as durable.——Yet would the Abſence of Goods, *like theſe*, lead to Art? Or is it not *abſurd* to ſuppoſe, there ſhould be an Art of *Impoſſibilities?* Abſurd, ſaid I, certainly. If ſo, ſaid he, when we define the *Beginning* or *Principle* of Art, it is not enough to call it the *Abſence of ſomething thought Good*, unleſs we add, that the *Good* be

be a Good *Poſſible*; *a Thing attainable by Man*; *a Thing relative to Human Life, and conſiſtent with Human Nature:* Or does not *this* alſo appear a Requiſite? I replied, I thought it did.

BUT ſtill, continued he——Is it a ſufficient Motive to Art, that the *Good deſired* ſhould be *attainable?* In other Words, does *every Abſence of Good attainable* lead to *Art*, or is our Account ſtill *too looſe*, and in need of ſtricter Determination?

Of none, ſaid I, which appears to me.

Reflect, ſaid he; there are ſome of the *poſſible* Goods ſo *obvious* and eaſy, that *every* Man, in an ordinary *State of common natural Perfection*, is able to acquire them, *without Labour* or Application. You will hardly deny but that a fair Apple, tempting to eat, may be gathered; or a clear Spring, tempting to drink, may be drank at, by the mere Suggeſtions *of Will and uninſtructed Inſtinct.* I granted, they might.

It would be therefore impertinent, ſaid he, to ſuppoſe that Goods, *like theſe*, ſhould

ſhould lead to Art, becauſe *Art* would be *ſuperfluous*, and in no reſpect neceſſary.

Indeed, ſaid I, it ſeems ſo.

If therefore, ſaid he, neither *Impoſſibles* lead to *Art*, becauſe *of ſuch there can be no Art*; nor Things *eaſily poſſible*, becauſe *in ſuch Nature can do without Art*: what is it we have left, to which we may refer it? Or can it indeed be to any other than to that *middle Claſs of Things*, which, however poſſible, are ſtill not ſo eaſy, but to be beyond the Powers of Will, and Inſtinct uninſtructed? I replied, It ſeemed ſo.

That there are many ſuch things, ſaid he, is evident paſt doubt. For what Man would pay Artiſts ſo largely for their Arts, were he enabled by Nature to obtain whatever he deſired? Or who would ſtudy to be ſkilled in Arts, were Nature's original Powers to be of themſelves alone ſufficient?

I told him, It was not likely.

It ſhould ſeem then, ſaid he, according to this Reaſoning, that the BEGINNING, *Motive*,

tive, or *Principle* of *Art*; that *Cauſe*, which firſt moves it to *Action*, and, *for the ſake of which* its ſeveral Operations are exerted, is—THE WANT OR ABSENCE OF SOMETHING APPEARING GOOD; RELATIVE TO HUMAN LIFE, AND ATTAINABLE BY MAN, BUT SUPERIOR TO HIS NATURAL AND UNINSTRUCTED FACULTIES.

I replied, I could not deny, but that the Account appeared probable.

§. 4. LET this then, ſaid he, ſuffice, as to the *Beginning* of Art. But how ſhall we deſcribe its *End?* What is it we ſhall pronounce this? My Anſwer, I replied, muſt be the ſame as often already; which was indeed, that I could not reſolve the Queſtion. It ſhould ſeem, ſaid he, not ſo difficult, now we have diſcovered what Beginning is. For if *Beginning* and *End* are *Contraries* and oppoſed, it is but to *invert*, as it were, the Notion of Beginning, and we gain of courſe the Notion of End. I aſked him, In what manner?

Thus, ſaid he, the *Beginning* of Art has been

been held to be *ſomething, which, if ſuppoſed away, Men would be never moved to apply to Art.* By *Inverſion* therefore the *End* of Art muſt be *ſomething, which, while ſuppoſed away, Men will never ceaſe applying to Art*; becauſe, were they to ceaſe, while the End was wanting, they would ceaſe with Imperfection, and their Performance would be incomplete. To this I anſwered, That the Account, however true, was by far too general, to give me much Intelligence.

He replied, If it was, he would endeavour to be more particular. And what, continued he, ſhould we ſay, that every Art, according to its Genius, will of courſe be *accompliſhed* either in ſome *Energy*, or in ſome *Work*; that, beſides theſe two, it can be accompliſhed in nothing elſe; and conſequently that *one of theſe muſt of neceſſity be its End?* I could not here but anſwer him with a Smile, That the Matter was now much obſcurer than ever. I find then, ſaid he, it is proper we ſhould be more explicit in our Inquiries, and deduce our Reaſon-

Reaſonings from ſome clearer Point of View. I told him, It was quite neceſſary, if he intended to be intelligible.

THUS then, ſaid he. You will grant, that every *Art, being a Cauſe, muſt be productive of ſome Effect*; for inſtance, Muſic, of a Tune; Dancing, of a Dance; Architecture, of a Palace; and Sculpture, of a Statue.

'Tis allowed, ſaid I. You will grant alſo, ſaid he, that *in theſe Productions they are all accompliſhed and ended:* Or, in other words, that as Muſic produces a Tune, ſo it is ended and accompliſhed in a Tune; and as Sculpture produces a Statue, ſo is it ended and accompliſhed in a Statue.

'Tis admitted, ſaid I. Now theſe Productions, continued he, if you will examine, are not like *Units or Mathematical Points*; but, on the contrary, *all conſiſt of a certain Number of Parts*, from whoſe accurate *Order* is derived their *Beauty* and *Perfection*. For example; Notes, ranged after ſuch a manner, make a Tune in Muſic; and Limbs, ranged after ſuch a manner, make a

Statue

Statue or a Picture. I replied, They did.

If then the *Productions*, continued he, of every *Art* thus conſiſt of *certain Parts*, it will follow, that *theſe Parts* will be either *co-exiſtent*, or not; and if *not co-exiſtent*, then of courſe *ſucceſſive*. Aſſiſt me, ſaid I, by another Inſtance, for you are growing again obſcure. *Co-exiſtent*, replied he, as in a Statue, where Arms, Legs, Body, and Head *all ſubſiſt together at one individual Inſtant: Succeſſive*, as in a Tune or Dance, where there is no ſuch Co-exiſtence, but where ſome *Parts* are *ever paſſing away*, and others are *ever ſucceeding* them.

CAN any thing be ſaid to *exiſt*, ſaid I, whoſe Parts are *ever paſſing away?*
Surely, replied he, or how elſe exiſt Years and Seaſons, Months and Days, with their *common Parent*, *Time* itſelf?——Or indeed what is *Human Life*, but a *Compound of Parts thus fleeting*; a *Compound of various and multiform Actions*, which ſucceed each other in a certain Order? The Fact, ſaid I, appears ſo.

THIS

THIS then, continued he, being the caſe, and there being this Difference in Productions, call every *Production*, the *Parts of which exiſt ſucceſſively*, and *whoſe Nature hath its Being or Eſſence in a Tranſition*, call it, what it really is, a *Motion* or an ENERGY—Thus a Tune and a Dance are Energies; thus Riding and Sailing are Energies; and ſo is Elocution, and ſo is Life itſelf. On the contrary, call every *Production*, whoſe *Parts exiſt all at once*, and *whoſe Nature depends not on a Tranſition for its Eſſence*, call it a WORK, or *Thing done*, not an *Energy* or Operation.——Thus a Houſe is a Work, a Statue is a Work, and ſo is a Ship, and ſo a Picture. I ſeem, ſaid I, to comprehend you.

IF then there be no *Productions*, ſaid he, but muſt be of *Parts*, either *co-exiſtent* or *ſucceſſive*; and the *one* of theſe be, as you perceive, a *Work*, and the *other* be an *Energy*; it will follow, *there will be no Production, but will be either a Work or an*

Energy. There will not, ſaid I. But every *Art*, ſaid he, you have granted, is *accompliſhed and ended in what it produces?* I replied, I had. And there are *no Productions*, but *Works or Energies?* None.

IT will follow then, ſaid he, that EVERY ART WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDED IN A WORK OR ENERGY.

TO this I anſwered, That his Reaſoning I could not impeach; but that ſtill the Diſtinction of Work and Energy was what I did not well comprehend. There are ſeveral Circumſtances, ſaid he, which will ſerve ſufficiently to make it clear. I begged he would mention ſome.

THUS then, ſaid he——When the Production of any Art is an *Energy*, then the *Perfection of the Art can be only perceived during that Energy.* For inſtance, the Perfection of a Muſician is only known, while he continues playing. But when the Production

duction of any Art is a *Work*, then *is not the Perfection viſible during the Energy, but only after it.* Thus the Perfection of the Statuary is not ſeen during his Energies as a Statuary, but when his Energies are over; when no Stroke of the Chizzel is wanting, but the Statue is left as *the Reſult of all.*

'Tis true, ſaid I.

AGAIN, continued he,—— in conſequence of this, where the Production is an *Energy*, there *the Production is of Neceſſity co-eval with the Artiſt.* For how ſhould the Energy ſurvive the Man; the Playing remain, when the Muſician is dead? But where the Production is a *Work*, then *is there no ſuch Neceſſity.* The Work may well remain, when the Artiſt is forgotten; there being no more reaſon, that the Statue and the Artiſt ſhould be co-eval, than the Man and the rude Marble, before it received a regular Figure. You ſeem now, ſaid I, to have explained yourſelf.

IF then, ſaid he, WORK and ENERGY be made *intelligible Terms*, you cannot but perceive the Truth of what we before aſſerted——*that every Art, according to its Genius, muſt needs be accompliſhed in one of theſe; that, except in theſe two, it can be accompliſhed in nothing elſe; and conſequently that* ONE OF THESE MUST OF NECESSITY BE ITS END. I anſwered, That the Reaſoning appeared juſtly deduced. So much then, replied he, for the *Ending* or *Accompliſhment of Art*; and ſo much alſo for a long, and, I fear, an intricate Diſquiſition.

§. 5. HE had no ſooner ſaid this, than I was beginning to applaud him; eſpecially on his having treated a Subject ſo copiouſly, ſtarted, as it were, by Chance, and without any apparent Preparation. But I had not gone far, before he interrupted me, by ſaying, That as to my Praiſes they were more than he deſerved; that he could pretend to no great Merit for having been, as I called it,

it, ſo copious, when he had ſo often before thought, on what at preſent we had been talking. In ſhort, ſays he, to tell you a Secret, I have been a long time amuſing myſelf, in forming an Eſſay upon this Subject. I could not here forbear reproaching him, for having hitherto concealed his Intentions. My Reproaches produced a ſort of amicable Controverſy, which at length ended in his offering, That, to make me ſome amends, he would now recite me (if I pleaſed) a ſmall Fragment of the Piece; a Fragment, which he had happened accidentally to have about him. The Propoſal, on my part, was willingly accepted, and without farther Delay, the Papers were produced.

As to the Performance itſelf, it muſt be confeſſed, in point of Stile, it was ſomewhat high and florid, perhaps even bordering upon an Exceſs. At the time however of recital, this gave me leſs Offence, becauſe it ſeemed, as it were, to palliate the Dryneſs of what had paſſed before, and in ſome ſort

to ſupply the Place of an Epilogue to our Conference. Not however to anticipate, he began reading as follows:

" O ART! Thou *diſtinguiſhing Attribute*
" and *Honour* of *Human* Kind! who art
" not only able *to imitate Nature* in her
" Graces, but (what is more) even *to adorn*
" *her* with Graces *of thy own*. Poſſeſſed of
" Thee, the meaneſt Genius grows deſerv-
" ing, and has a juſt Demand for a Portion
" of our Eſteem. Devoid of Thee, the
" Brighteſt of our Kind lie loſt and uſeleſs,
" and are but poorly diſtinguiſhed from
" the moſt Deſpicable and Baſe. When
" we inhabited Foreſts in common with
" Brutes, nor otherwiſe known from them
" than by the Figure of our Species; *Thou*
" taughteſt us to aſſert *the Sovereignty of our*
" *Nature*, and to aſſume that Empire, for
" which Providence intended us. Thou-
" ſands of Utilities owe their Birth to Thee;
" thouſands of Elegancies, Pleaſures, and
" Joys, without which Life itſelf would be
" but an inſipid Poſſeſſion.

" WIDE

" WIDE and extenſive is the Reach
" of thy Dominion. No ELEMENT is
" there either ſo *violent* or ſo *ſubtle*, ſo *yield-*
" *ing* or ſo *ſluggiſh*, as by the Powers of its
" Nature to be ſuperior to thy Direction.
" Thou dreadeſt not the fierce Impetuoſity
" of FIRE, but compelleſt its Violence to
" be both obedient and uſeful. By it Thou
" ſofteneſt the ſtubborn Tribe of Minerals,
" ſo as to be formed and moulded into
" Shapes innumerable. Hence Weapons,
" Armour, Coin; and previous to theſe,
" and other Thy *Works* and *Energies*,
" hence all thoſe various Tools and Inſtru-
" ments, which empower Thee to proceed
" to farther Ends more excellent. Nor is
" the ſubtle AIR leſs obedient to Thy
" Power, whether Thou willeſt it to be a
" Miniſter to our Pleaſure, or Utility. At
" Thy Command it giveth Birth to Sounds,
" which charm the Soul with all the Powers
" of Harmony. Under thy Inſtruction it
" moves the Ship o'er Seas, while that
" yielding Element, where otherwiſe we

to ſupply the Place of an Epilogue to our Conference. Not however to anticipate, he began reading as follows:

" O ART! Thou *diſtinguiſhing Attribute* " and *Honour* of *Human* Kind! who art " not only able *to imitate Nature* in her " Graces, but (what is more) even *to adorn* " *her* with Graces *of thy own*. Poſſeſſed of " Thee, the meaneſt Genius grows deſerv- " ing, and has a juſt Demand for a Portion " of our Eſteem. Devoid of Thee, the " Brighteſt of our Kind lie loſt and uſeleſs, " and are but poorly diſtinguiſhed from " the moſt Deſpicable and Baſe. When " we inhabited Foreſts in common with " Brutes, nor otherwiſe known from them " than by the Figure of our Species; *Thou* " taughteſt us to aſſert *the Sovereignty of our* " *Nature*, and to aſſume that Empire, for " which Providence intended us. Thou- " ſands of Utilities owe their Birth to Thee; " thouſands of Elegancies, Pleaſures, and " Joys, without which Life itſelf would be " but an inſipid Poſſeſſion.

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"hence all thoſe various Tools and Inſtru-
"ments, which empower Thee to proceed
"to farther Ends more excellent. Nor is
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"Power, whether Thou willeſt it to be a
"Miniſter to our Pleaſure, or Utility. At
"Thy Command it giveth Birth to Sounds,
"which charm the Soul with all the Powers
"of Harmony. Under thy Inſtruction it
"moves the Ship o'er Seas, while that
"yielding Element, where otherwiſe we

" ſink, even WATER itſelf is by Thee
" taught to bear us; the vaſt Ocean to pro-
" mote that Intercourſe of Nations, which
" Ignorance would imagine it was deſtined
" to intercept. To ſay how thy Influence is
" ſeen on EARTH, would be to teach
" the meaneſt, what he knows already.
" Suffice it but to mention Fields of Arable
" and Paſture; Lawns and Groves, and
" Gardens, and Plantations; Cottages, Vil-
" lages, Caſtles, Towns; Palaces, Temples,
" and ſpacious Cities.

" NOR does thy Empire end in *Subjects*
" thus *in-animate*. Its Power alſo extends
" thro' the various Race of ANIMALS,
" who either patiently ſubmit to become
" thy Slaves, or are ſure to find Thee an ir-
" reſiſtible Foe. The faithful Dog, the
" patient Ox, the generous Horſe, and the
" mighty Elephant, are content all to re-
" ceive their Inſtructions from Thee, and
" readily to lend their natural *Inſtincts* or
" *Strength*, to perform thoſe Offices, which
" thy Occaſions call for. If there be found

" any

" any Species, which are ſerviceable when
" dead, Thou ſuggeſteſt the Means to in-
" veſtigate and take them. If any be ſo
" ſavage, as to refuſe being tamed; or of
" Natures fierce enough, to venture an At-
" tack; Thou teacheſt us to ſcorn their
" brutal Rage; to meet, repel, purſue, and
" conquer.

" AND ſuch, O ART! is thy amazing
" Influence, when Thou art employed only
" on theſe *inferior Subjects*; on Natures *In-*
" *animate*, or at beſt *Irrational*. But when-
" e'er Thou chooſeſt a *Subject more noble*,
" and ſetteſt to the cultivating of MIND
" itſelf, then 'tis Thou becomeſt truly ami-
" able and divine; the ever-flowing Source
" of thoſe ſublimer Beauties, of which *no*
" *Subject* but *Mind alone* is capable. Then
" 'tis Thou art enabled to exhibit to Man-
" kind the admired Tribe of Poets and of
" Orators; the ſacred Train of Patriots and
" of Heroes; the godlike Liſt of Philoſo-
" phers and Legiſlators; the Forms of *vir-*
" *tuous* and *equal* Polities, where *private*

" Wel-

" Welfare is made the ſame with *public*;
" where Crowds themſelves prove diſ-
" intereſted and brave, and Virtue is made
" a national and popular Characteriſtic.

" HAIL! ſacred Source of all theſe
" Wonders! *Thyſelf* inſtruct me to praiſe
" Thee worthily, thro' whom whate'er we
" do, is done with Elegance and Beauty;
" without whom, what we do, is ever grace-
" leſs and deformed.——Venerable Power!
" By what Name ſhall I addreſs Thee?
" Shall I call Thee *Ornament* of Mind;
" or art Thou more truly *Mind itſelf?*—
" 'TIS MIND THOU ART, moſt perfect
" Mind; not rude, untaught, but fair and
" poliſhed; in ſuch Thou dwelleſt, of ſuch
" Thou art the *Form*; nor is it a Thing
" more poſſible to ſeparate Thee from ſuch,
" than it would be to ſeparate Thee from
" thy own Exiſtence."——

MY good Friend was now arrived to a very exalted Pitch, and was purſuing his Panegyric with great Warmth and Fluency; when

when we entered the Suburbs, our Walk being near finiſhed. The People, as we went along, began to look at us with Surprize; which I, who was leſs engaged, having leiſure to obſerve, thought 'twas proper to admoniſh my Friend, that he ſhould give over. He immediately ceaſed reading; put his Papers up; and thank'd me for ſtopping him at ſo ſeaſonable a Time.

§. 6. WHAT remained of our Diſcourſe paſſed off with leſs Rapture, and was indeed no more, than a kind of ſhort Recapitulation.

HE obſerved to me, that our Inquiries had furniſhed out an Anſwer to four different Queſtions. For thus, ſaid he, if it be aſked us, *What Art is?* We have to Anſwer, *it is——an habitual Power in Man, of becoming the Cauſe of ſome Effect, according to a Syſtem of various and well-approved Precepts.* If it be aſked us, On what *Subject* Art operates? We can anſwer,

On

On a contingent, which is within the reach of the Human Powers to influence. If it be aſked us, *For what Reaſon, for the ſake of what,* Art operates? We may reply, *For the ſake of ſome abſent Good, relative to Human Life, and attainable by Man, but ſuperior to his natural and uninſtructed Faculties.* Laſtly, if it be aſked, *Where* 'tis the Operations of Art *end?* We may ſay, *Either in ſome Energy, or in ſome Work.*

He added, That if he were not afraid of the Imputation of Pedantry, he could be almoſt tempted to ſay, That we had been conſidering Art, with reſpect to thoſe *four Cauſes*, ſo celebrated *once* among Profeſſors in the Schools. By theſe, upon Inquiry, I found that he meant certain *Cauſes*, called the * *Efficient*, the † *Material*, the ‡ *Final*, and the ‖ *Formal.*

But

* P. 17 † P. 22. ‡ P. 28, 29.
‖ P. 34, 36.

BUT here, without farther explaining, he begged for the preſent that we might conclude, being ſufficiently, as he ſaid, fatigued with the Length of what had paſſed already. The Requeſt was reaſonable I could not but own, and thus ended our Converſation, and ſoon after it our Walk.

The END.

TREATISE THE SECOND:

A DISCOURSE

On MUSIC, PAINTING, and POETRY.

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A DISCOURSE

On MUSIC, PAINTING, and POETRY.

CHAP. I.

Introduction.—Design and Distribution of the Whole.—Preparation for the following Chapters.

ALL Arts have this in common, that *they respect Human Life.* Some contribute to its *Necessities*, as Medicine and Agriculture; others to its *Elegance*, as Music, Painting, and Poetry. Ch. I.

Now, with respect to these two different *Species*, the *necessary* Arts seem to have been *prior in time*; if it be probable, that

Ch. I. Men conſulted how *to live* and *to ſupport themſelves*, before they began to deliberate how *to render Life agreeable*. Nor is this indeed unconfirmed by Fact, there being no Nation known ſo barbarous and ignorant, as where the Rudiments of theſe *neceſſary* Arts are not in ſome degree cultivated. And hence poſſibly they may appear to be the *more excellent and worthy*, as having claim to a *Preference*, derived from their *Seniority*.

THE Arts however of *Elegance* cannot be ſaid to want Pretenſions, if it be true, that Nature framed us for *ſomething more than mere Exiſtence*. Nay, farther*, if *Well-being* be clearly preferable to *Mere-being*, and this without it be but a thing contemptible, they may have reaſon perhaps to aſpire even to a *Superiority*. But enough of this, to come to our Purpoſe.

§. 2.

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* Οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείςε ποιητέον,
Ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν. Plat. in Critone.

§. 2. THE Deſign of this Diſcourſe is to treat of MUSIC, PAINTING, and POETRY; to conſider in what they *agree*, and in what they *differ*; and WHICH UPON THE WHOLE, IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN THE OTHER TWO. Ch. I.

IN entering upon this Inquiry, it is firſt to be obſerved, that the MIND is made conſcious of the *natural World* and its Affections, and of other *Minds* and their Affections, by the ſeveral *Organs of the Senſes (a)*. By the *ſame Organs*, theſe Arts exhibit to the Mind *Imitations*, and imitate either Parts or Affections of this *natural*

(a) TO explain ſome future Obſervations, it will be proper here to remark, that the MIND *from theſe Materials thus brought together, and from its own Operations on them, and in conſequence of them, becomes fraught with* IDEAS——and that MANY MINDS *ſo fraught, by a ſort of* COMPACT *aſſigning to each* IDEA *ſome* SOUND *to be its* MARK *or* SYMBOL, *were the firſt* INVENTORS *and* FOUNDERS *of* LANGUAGE. See Vol. II. or *Hermes*, Lib. iii. cap. 3. 4.

Ch. I. *World*, or elſe the Paſſions, Energies, and other Affections of *Minds*. There is this Difference however between theſe *Arts* and *Nature*; that Nature paſſes to the Percipient thro' *all* the Senſes; whereas theſe Arts uſe *only two* of them, that of Seeing and that of Hearing. And hence it is that the *ſenſible Objects* or *Media*, thro' which (*b*) they imitate, can be *ſuch only*, as theſe two Senſes are framed capable of perceiving; and theſe Media are *Motion*, *Sound*, *Colour*, and *Figure*.

PAINT-

(*b*) To prevent Confuſion it muſt be obſerved, that in all theſe Arts there is a Difference between the *ſenſible Media*, *thro' which they imitate*, and the *Subjects imitated*. The ſenſible Media, thro' which they imitate, muſt be always *relative to that Senſe*, *by which the particular Art applies to the Mind*; but the Subject imitated may be *foreign to that Senſe*, *and beyond the Power of its Perception*. Painting, for inſtance, (as is ſhewn in this Chapter) has *no ſenſible Media*, thro' which it operates, except *Colour* and *Figure*: But as to *Subjects*, it may have Motions, Sounds, moral Affections and Actions; *none of which* are either *Colours* or *Figures*, but which however are *all capable of being imitated thro' them*. See Chapter the ſecond, Notes (*b*), (*c*), (*d*).

PAINTING, having the *Eye* for its *Organ*, cannot be conceived to imitate, but thro' the Media of *viſible* Objects. And farther, its Mode of imitating being always *motionleſs*, there muſt be ſubſtracted from theſe the Medium of *Motion*. It remains then, that *Colour* and *Figure* are the only Media, thro' which Painting imitates. Ch. I.

MUSIC, paſſing to the Mind thro' the *Organ* of the *Ear*, can imitate only by *Sounds and Motions*.

POETRY, having the *Ear* alſo for its *Organ*, as far as *Words* are conſidered to be no more than *mere Sounds*, can go no farther in Imitating, than may be performed by *Sound* and *Motion*. But then, as *theſe its Sounds ſtand by* * *Compact for the various Ideas, with which the Mind is fraught*, it is enabled by this means to imitate, *as far as Lan-*

* *See Note* (*a*) *Page* 55.

Ch. I. *Language can expreſs*; and that 'tis evident will, in a manner, include all things.

NOW from hence may be ſeen, how theſe ARTS *agree*, and how they *differ*.

THEY *agree*, by being *all* MIMETIC, or IMITATIVE.

THEY *differ*, as they imitate by *different Media*; PAINTING by *Figure* and *Colour*; MUSIC, by *Sound* and *Motion*; PAINTING and MUSIC, by *Media which are Natural*; POETRY, for the greateſt Part, by a *Medium, which is Artificial* (*c*).

§. 3.

(*c*) A Figure painted, or a Compoſition of Muſical Sounds have always a *natural Relation to that, of which they are intended to be the Reſemblance.* But a Deſcription in Words has rarely any ſuch *natural Relation to the ſeveral Ideas, of which thoſe Words are the Symbols. None* therefore underſtand the *Deſcription*, but *thoſe who ſpeak the Language.* On the contrary, Muſical and Picture-Imitations are *intelligible to all Men.*

WHY

§. 3. As to that ART, which upon the whole is *moſt excellent of the three*; it muſt be obſerved, that among theſe various *Media* of imitating, ſome will naturally be *more* accurate, ſome *leſs*; ſome will *beſt* imitate one Subject; ſome, another. Again, among the Number of *Subjects* there will be naturally alſo a Difference, as to *Merit* and *Demerit*. There will be ſome *ſublime*, and ſome *low*; ſome *copious*, and ſome *ſhort*; ſome *pathetic*, and others *void of Paſſion*; ſome formed to *inſtruct*, and others *not capable* of it. Ch. I.

Now, from theſe *two* Circumſtances; that is to ſay, from the *Accuracy of the Imitation*, and the *Merit of the Subject imitated*, the Queſtion concerning *which Art is moſt excellent*, muſt be tried and determined.

THIS

WHY it is ſaid that Poetry is *not univerſally*, but *only for the greater part* artificial, ſee below, Chapter the Third, where what *Natural Force* it has, is examined and eſtimated.

Ch. I. THIS however cannot be done, without a *Detail of Particulars*, that ſo there may be formed, on every part, juſt and accurate *Compariſons*.

TO begin therefore with Painting.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

On the Subjects which Painting imitates.—
On the Subjects which Muſic imitates.—
Compariſon of Muſic with Painting.

THE FITTEST SUBJECTS FOR PAINTING, are all ſuch THINGS and INCIDENTS, *as are* * *peculiarly characteriſed by* FIGURE *and* COLOUR. Ch. II.

OF this kind are the whole Maſs (*a*) of *Things inanimate and vegetable*; ſuch as Flowers, Fruits, Buildings, Landſkips—— The various Tribes of *Animal Figures*; ſuch as Birds, Beaſts, Herds, Flocks——The *Motions* and *Sounds peculiar* to each Animal Species, when accompanied with *Configurations*, which are *obvious* and *remarkable* (*b*)-- The

* P. 57.

(*a*) THE Reaſon is, that *theſe* things are almoſt *wholly* known to us by their *Colour* and *Figure*. Beſides, they are as *motionleſs*, for the moſt part, in *Nature*, as in the *Imitation*.

(*b*) INSTANCES of this kind are the Flying of Birds, the Galloping of Horſes, the Roaring of Lions, the Crowing of Cocks. And the Reaſon is, that though

Ch. II. The *Human Body* in all its *Appearances* (as Male, Female; Young, Old; Handſome, Ugly;) and in all its *Attitudes*, (as Laying, Sitting, Standing, *&c.*)—— The *Natural Sounds peculiar* to the *Human* Species, (ſuch as Crying, Laughing, Hollowing, *&c.*) *(c)*-- All *Energies*, *Paſſions*, and *Affections* of the *Soul*, being in any degree *more intenſe* or *violent*

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though to paint Motion or Sound be *impoſſible*, yet the Motions and Sounds here mentioned having an *immediate and natural Connection with a certain viſible* CONFIGURATION *of the Parts*, the Mind, from a Proſpect of this *Configuration*, *conceives inſenſibly that which is concomitant*; and hence 'tis that, by a ſort of *Fallacy*, the SOUNDS and MOTIONS *appear to be painted alſo*. On the contrary, not ſo in *ſuch* Motions, as the Swimming of many kinds of Fiſh; or in *ſuch* Sounds, as the Purring of a Cat; becauſe *here* is no ſuch *ſpecial Configuration* to be perceived.—*Homer* in his Shield deſcribing the Picture of a Bull ſeized by two Lions, ſays of the Bull— ὁ δὲ μακρὰ μεμυκὼς Ἕλκετο— *He, bellowing loudly, was drag'd along.* Where *Euſtathius*, in commenting on this Bellowing, ſays, ὡς ἐδήλου τῷ χήμαλι, *as he* (the Bull) *made manifeſt* (in the Picture) *by his Figure* or *Attitude*. Euſt. in J. Σ. p. 1224.

(*c*) THE Reaſon is of the *ſame* kind, as that given in the Note immediately preceding; and by the *ſame* Rule, the Obſervation muſt be confined to *natural Sounds only*. In *Language*, few of the Speakers know the *Configurations*, which attend it.

violent than ordinary *(d)*——All *Actions* Ch. II.
and Events, whoſe *Integrity* or *Wholeneſs* depends upon a *ſhort and ſelf-evident* Succeſſion of Incidents *(e)*——Or if the Succeſſion be extended, then *ſuch Actions* at leaſt, whoſe *Incidents are all along, during that Succeſſion, ſimilar (f)*——All *Actions*, which being qualified as *above*, open themſelves into a *large* Variety of Circumſtances, *con-*

(d) THE Reaſon is ſtill of the *ſame* kind, *viz.* from their *Viſible* Effects on the Body. They naturally produce either to the *Countenance* a particular *Redneſs* or *Paleneſs*; or a particular *Modification of its Muſcles*; or elſe to the *Limbs*, a particular *Attitude*. Now all theſe Effects are *ſolely referable* to COLOUR and FIGURE, the two grand ſenſible Media, *peculiar* to Painting. See *Raphael*'s Cartoons of St. *Paul* at *Athens*, and of his ſtriking the Sorcerer *Elymas* blind: See alſo the Crucifixion of *Polycrates*, and the Sufferings of the Conſul *Regulus*, both by *Salvator Roſa*.

(e) FOR of *neceſſity* every PICTURE is a *Punctum Temporis or* INSTANT.

(f) SUCH, for inſtance, as a Storm at Sea; whoſe *Incidents of Viſion* may be nearly all included in foaming Waves, a dark Sky, Ships out of their erect Poſture, and Men hanging upon the Ropes.——Or as a Battle; which from Beginning to End preſents nothing elſe, than Blood, Fire, Smoak, and Diſorder. Now *ſuch Events* may be well imitated

Ch. II. *concurring all in the ſame Point of Time (g)* —— *All Actions* which are *known*, and known *univerſally*, rather than Actions *newly invented* or *known but to few (h)*.

AND

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all at once; for how long ſoever they laſt, they are but *Repetitions of the ſame*. —— *Nicias*, the Painter, recommended much the ſame Subjects, *viz.* a Sea-fight or a Land-battle of Cavalry. His Reaſons too are much the ſame with thoſe mentioned in Note *(g)*. He concludes with a Maxim, (little regarded by his Succeſſors, however important,) that the Subject itſelf is as much a Part of the Painter's Art, as the Poet's Fable is a Part of Poetry. See *Demetrius* Phal. p. 53. Edit. *Ox.*

(g) FOR PAINTING is not bounded in EXTENSION, as it is in DURATION. Beſides, it ſeems true in *every Species of Compoſition*, that, as far as *Perplexity* and *Confuſion* may be avoided, and the *Wholeneſs* of the Piece may be preſerved *clear and intelligible*; the more ample the *Magnitude*, and the greater the *Variety*, the greater alſo, in proportion, the *Beauty* and *Perfection*. Noble Inſtances of this are the Pictures above-mentioned in Note *(d)*. See *Ariſtot. Poet.* cap. 7. Ὁ δὲ καθ' αὑτὴν φύσιν τῷ πράγματι ὁρῶ, ἀεὶ μὲν, &c. See alſo *Characteriſticks*, V. I. p. 143. and *Boſſu*, B. 1. cap. 16. *L'Achille d'Homére eſt ſi grand*, &c.

(h) THE Reaſon is, that a Picture being (as has been ſaid) but a *Point* or *Inſtant*, in a Story *well known* the Spectator's Memory will ſupply the *previous* and the *ſubſequent*. But this cannot be done, *where*

AND thus much as to the Subjects of Painting. Ch. II.

§. 2. IN MUSIC, THE FITTEST SUBJECTS OF IMITATION are all ſuch THINGS and

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where ſuch Knowledge is wanting. And therefore it may be juſtly queſtioned, whether the moſt celebrated Subjects, borrowed by Painting from Hiſtory, would have been any of them intelligible *thro' the Medium of Painting only*, ſuppoſing Hiſtory to have been ſilent, and to have given *no additional Information.*

IT may be here added, that *Horace*, conformably to this Reaſoning, recommends even to *Poetic* Imitation a *known* Story, before an *unknown.*

——*Tuque*
Rectius Iliacum carmen *deducis in actus*,
Quam ſi proferres ignota, indictaq; primus.
Art. Poet. v. 128.

AND indeed as *the being underſtood to others*, either Hearers or Spectators, ſeems to be a *common Requiſite* to *all Mimetic* Arts whatever; (for to thoſe, who underſtand them not, they are in fact no Mimetic Arts) it follows, that *Perſpicuity* muſt be *Eſſential* to them *all*; and that no prudent Artiſt would neglect, if it were poſſible, any juſt Advantage to obtain this End. Now there can be no Advantage greater, than the *Notoriety of the Subject imitated.*

Ch. II. and INCIDENTS, *as are moſt eminently* * *characteriſed by* MOTION *and* SOUND.

MOTION may be either *ſlow* or *ſwift*, *even* or *uneven*, *broken* or *continuous*—— SOUND may be either *ſoft* or *loud*, *high* or *low*. Wherever therefore any of theſe Species of *Motion* or *Sound* may be found in an *eminent* (not a *moderate* or *mean*) *degree*, there will be room for MUSICAL IMITATION.

THUS, in the *Natural* or *Inanimate World*, MUSIC may imitate the Glidings, Murmurings, Toſſings, Roarings, and other *Accidents of Water*, as perceived in Fountains, Cataracts, Rivers, Seas, *&c.*——The ſame of Thunder—the ſame of Winds, as well the ſtormy as the gentle.—— In the *Animal World*, it may imitate the *Voice* of ſome Animals, but *chiefly* that of ſinging Birds.——It may alſo *faintly copy* ſome of their *Motions*.—In the *Human Kind*, it can alſo

* P. 57.

alſo imitate ſome *Motions (i)* and *Sounds (k)*; and of Sounds thoſe *moſt perfectly*, which are expreſſive of *Grief* and *Anguiſh (l)*. Ch. II.

AND thus much as to the Subjects, which Muſic imitates.

§. 3. IT remains then, that we *compare theſe two* ARTS together. And here indeed, as to *Muſical Imitation in general*, it muſt be confeſſed that—as it can, from its Genius, imitate *only* Sounds and Motions—as there are not *many* Motions either in the *Animal*

(i) AS the *Walk* of the Giant *Polypheme*, in the Paſtoral of *Acis* and *Galatea*.—*See what ample Strides he takes*, &c.

(k) AS the *Shouts* of a Multitude, in the Coronation Anthem of, *God ſave the King*, &c.

(l) THE Reaſon is, that *this Species* of Muſical Imitation *moſt nearly* approaches *Nature*. For *Grief*, in moſt Animals, declares itſelf by *Sounds*, which are not unlike to *long Notes in the Chromatic Syſtem*. Of this kind is the Chorus of *Baal*'s Prieſts in the Oratorio of *Deborah*, *Doleful Tidings, how ye woúnd*, &c.

Ch. II. *Animal* or in the *Inanimate* World, which are *excluſively peculiar* even to any *Species*, and ſcarcely any to an *Individual*——as there are no *Natural* Sounds, which characteriſe at leaſt *lower than a Species* (for the *Natural* Sounds of *Individuals* are in every Species the *ſame)*——farther, as Muſic does but *imperfectly* imitate even theſe Sounds and Motions *(m)*——On the contrary, as Figures, Poſtures of Figures, and Colours characteriſe not only *every ſenſible Species*, but even *every Individual*; and for the moſt part alſo *the various* **Energies* and *Paſſions* of every Individual——and farther, as Painting is able, *with the higheſt Accuracy and Exactneſs*, to imitate all theſe Colours and Figures; and while Muſical Imita-

(m) THE Reaſon is from the *Diſſimilitude* between the Sounds and Motions of *Nature*, and thoſe of *Muſic*. *Muſical Sounds* are all produced from *Even* Vibration, moſt *Natural* from *Uneven*; *Muſical Motions* are chiefly *Definite* in their Meaſure, moſt *Natural* are *Indefinite*.

* *See Note (d) of this Chapter.*

Imitation pretends *at moſt* to no more, than the raiſing of Ideas *ſimilar*, itſelf aſpires to raiſe Ideas *the very ſame*——in a word, as Painting, in reſpect of *its Subjects*, is equal to the *nobleſt* Part of Imitation, *the imitating regular Actions conſiſting of a Whole and Parts*; and of *ſuch* Imitation, Muſic is *utterly incapable*—— FROM ALL THIS it muſt be confeſſed, that MUSICAL IMITATION IS GREATLY BELOW THAT OF PAINTING, and that *at beſt* it is but an imperfect thing. Ch. II.

As to the *Efficacy* therefore of MUSIC, it muſt be derived from *another* Source, which muſt be left for the preſent, to be conſidered of hereafter *.

THERE remains to be mentioned Imitation by Poetry.

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* Ch. VI.

CHAP. III.

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates, but imitates only thro' natural *Media, or* mere Sounds——*Compariſon of Poetry in this Capacity, firſt with Painting, then with Muſic.*

Ch. III. POETIC IMITATION *includes every thing in it, which is performed either by* PICTURE-IMITATION or MUSICAL; for its *Materials* are *Words*, and Words are * *Symbols by Compact of all Ideas.*

FARTHER as *Words*, beſide their being *Symbols* by Compact, are alſo *Sounds variouſly diſtinguiſhed* by their Aptneſs to be *rapidly* or *ſlowly* pronounced, and by the reſpective Prevalence of *Mutes*, *Liquids*, or *Vowels* in their Compoſition; it will follow that, beſide their *Compact-Relation*, they will

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* *See Note (a) Chap.* I.

will have likewiſe a *Natural Relation* to all ſuch Things, between which and themſelves there is any *Natural Reſemblance*. Thus, for inſtance, there is *Natural* Reſemblance between all ſorts of *harſh* and *grating* Sounds. There is therefore (excluſive of its Signification) a *Natural* Relation between the Sound of a vile Hautboy, and of that Verſe in * *Virgil*,

Ch. III.

Stridenti miſerum ſtipulâ diſperdere Carmen.

or of that other in † *Milton*,

Grate on their Scrannel Pipes of wretched Straw.

So alſo between the *ſmooth ſwift* Gliding of a River, and of that Verſe in ‖ *Horace*,

——at ille
Labitur, & labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

AND thus in part even *Poetic* Imitation has its Foundation in *Nature*. But then this

* Ecl. 3. ver. 27. † In his *Lycidas*.
‖ Epiſt. 2. l. 1. ẏ. 42, 43.

Ch. III. this Imitation goes not far; and taken without the *Meaning* derived to the Sounds from *Compact*, is but little intelligible, however perfect and elaborate.

§. 2. IF therefore POETRY be *compared* with PAINTING, in reſpect of this its *merely Natural and Inartificial* Reſemblance, it may be juſtly ſaid that——In as much as of *this ſort* of Reſemblance, Poetry (like Muſic) has no other Sources, than *thoſe two* of *Sound* and *Motion*—— in as much as it often wants theſe Sources *themſelves* (for Numbers of Words neither *have*, nor *can have* any Reſemblance to thoſe *Ideas*, of which they are the *Symbols*)——in as much as *Natural* Sounds and Motions, which Poetry thus imitates, are themſelves but * *looſe* and *indefinite Arcidents* of thoſe *Subjects*, to which they belong, and conſequently do but *looſely* and *indefinitely* characteriſe them——laſtly, in as much as *Poetic* Sounds and Motions do but

* P. 67, 68.

but *faintly* reſemble thoſe of *Nature*, which are *themſelves* confeſſed to be ſo *imperfect* and *vague*——FROM ALL THIS it will follow (as it has *already* followed of Muſic) that—— POETIC IMITATION FOUNDED IN MERE NATURAL RESEMBLANCE IS MUCH INFERIOR TO THAT OF PAINTING, and *at beſt* but very *imperfect*. Ch. III.

§. 3. As to the Preference, which ſuch POETIC IMITATION may claim before MUSICAL, or MUSICAL IMITATION before THAT; the Merits on each Side may appear perhaps *equal*. They both fetch their Imitations from † *Sound* and *Motion*. Now MUSIC ſeems to imitate *Nature* better as to *Motion*, and POETRY as to *Sound*. The Reaſon is, that in *Motions (a) Muſic* has

† P. 57.

(a) MUSIC has no leſs than *five different Lengths of Notes* in ordinary uſe, reckoning from the Semi-brief to the Semi-quaver; all which may be *infinitely*

Ch. III. has a *greater Variety*; and in *Sounds*, thoſe of *Poetry* approach nearer to *Nature (b)*.

IF therefore in *Sound* the *one* have the Preference, in *Motion* the *other*, and the *Merit* of Sound and Motion be ſuppoſed nearly *equal*; it will follow, that THE MERIT OF THE TWO IMITATIONS WILL BE NEARLY EQUAL ALSO.

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nitely compounded, even in any *one* Time, or Meaſure——POETRY, on the other hand, has but *two Lengths* or *Quantities*, a *long* Syllable and a *ſhort*, (which is its Half) and *all the Variety of Verſe* ariſes from ſuch Feet and Metres, as theſe *two Species* of Syllables, *by being compounded*, can be made produce.

(b) MUSICAL Sounds are produced by *even* Vibrations, which *ſcarcely any Natural* Sounds are—— on the contrary, *Words* are the Product of *uneven* Vibration, and ſo are *moſt Natural* Sounds——— Add to this, that *Words* are far more *numerous*, than *Muſical Sounds*. So that Poetry, as to Imitation by *Sound*, ſeems to exceed Muſic, not only in *nearneſs of Reſemblance*, but even in *Variety* alſo.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates, not by mere Sounds *or natural* Media, *but by* Words ſignificant; *the Subjects at the ſame time being ſuch, to which the Genius of each of the other two Arts is* moſt perfectly *adapted—Its Compariſon in theſe Subjects, firſt with Painting, then with Muſic.*

THE *Mimetic* Art of POETRY has been hitherto conſidered, as fetching its Imitation from mere *Natural* Reſemblance. In this it has been ſhewn much *inferior* to PAINTING, and nearly *equal* to MUSIC. Ch. IV.

IT remains to be conſidered, what its Merits are, when it imitates not by mere *Natural* Sound, but by Sound *ſignificant*; by Words, the *compact Symbols* of all kinds of Ideas. From hence depends its genuine Force.

Ch. IV. Force. And here, as it is able to find Sounds expreſſive of *every* Idea, ſo is there *no Subject* either of Picture-Imitation, or Muſical, to which it does not aſpire; all Things and Incidents whatever being, in a manner, to be deſcribed by Words.

WHETHER *therefore* POETRY, *in this its proper Sphere, be equal to the Imitation of the other two* ARTS, is the Queſtion at preſent, which comes in order to be diſcuſſed.

NOW as *Subjects* are *infinite*, and the other two Arts are *not equally adapted* to imitate *all*; it is propoſed, firſt to *compare* POETRY *with them in ſuch* SUBJECTS, *to which they are moſt perfectly adapted.*

§. 2. TO begin therefore with PAINTING. A SUBJECT, in which the Power of this Art may be *moſt fully* exerted, (whether it be taken from the *Inanimate*, or the *Animal*, or the *Moral* World) muſt be a SUBJECT, *which is principally and eminently characteriſed by certain Colours, Figures,*

Figures, and Poſtures of Figures——whoſe Comprehenſion depends not on a Succeſſion of Events; or at leaſt, if on a Succeſſion, on a ſhort and ſelf-evident one——which admits a large Variety of ſuch Circumſtances, as all concur in the ſame individual Point of Time, and relate all to one principal Action. Ch. IV.

As to ſuch a Subject therefore——In as much as POETRY is forced to paſs thro' the Medium of *Compact*, while PAINTING applies immediately thro' the Medium of *Nature*; the one being underſtood to all, the other to the Speakers of a certain Language * only——in as much as *Natural* Operations muſt needs be more *affecting*, than *Artificial*——in as much as Painting helps *our own rude* Ideas by *its own*, which are *conſummate* and wrought up to the Perfection of Art; while Poetry can raiſe *no other (a)* than what every Mind is furniſhed with

* *Note (c)* p. 58.

(a) WHEN we read in MILTON of EVE, that
Grace was in all her Steps, Heav'n in her Eye,
In ev'ry Geſture Dignity and Love;

we

Ch. IV. with *before*—in as much as Painting ſhews all the *minute and various concurrent Circumſtances* of the Event in the *ſame* individual Point of Time, as they appear in *Nature*; while Poetry is forced to *want* this Circumſtance of Intelligibility, by being ever obliged to enter into ſome degree of *Detail*——in as much as this Detail creates often the Dilemma of either becoming *tedious*, to be *clear*; or if *not tedious*, then *obſcure*——laſtly, in as much as all Imitations more *ſimilar*, more *immediate*,

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we have an Image *not* of that EVE, which MILTON conceived, but of *ſuch an* EVE *only*, as every one, *by his own proper Genius*, is able to repreſent, from reflecting on thoſe *Ideas*, which he has annexed to theſe ſeveral *Sounds*. The greater Part, in the mean time, have never perhaps beſtowed one accurate Thought upon what *Grace*, *Heaven*, *Love*, and *Dignity* mean; or ever enriched the Mind with Ideas of Beauty, or aſked *whence* they are to be acquired, and by what *Proportions* they are *conſtituted*. On the contrary, when we view EVE as painted by an *able Painter*, we labour under no ſuch Difficulty; becauſe we have exhibited before us the *better Conceptions of an* ARTIST, the *genuine Ideas* of perhaps a TITIAN or a RAPHAEL.

diate, and more *intelligible*, are preferable to thoſe which are *leſs* ſo; and for the Reaſons above, the Imitations of *Poetry* are leſs *ſimilar*, leſs *immediate*, and leſs *intelligible* than thoſe of *Painting*——From ALL THIS it will follow, that——IN ALL SUBJECTS, WHERE PAINTING CAN FULLY EXERT ITSELF, THE IMITATIONS OF PAINTING ARE SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF POETRY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IN ALL SUCH SUBJECTS THAT PAINTING HAS THE PREFERENCE. Ch. IV.

§. 3. AND now to compare POETRY with MUSIC, allowing to *Muſic* the ſame Advantage of a *well-adapted* Subject, which has already been allowed to *Painting* in the Compariſon juſt preceding.

WHAT ſuch a SUBJECT is, has already been * deſcribed. And as to *Preference*, it muſt

* *See Chap.* II. §. 2.

Ch. IV. muſt be confeſſed, that——In as much as MUSICAL IMITATIONS, tho' *Natural*, aſpire not to raiſe the *ſame* Ideas, but only Ideas ‖ *ſimilar* and analogous; while POETIC IMITATION, tho' *Artificial*, raiſes Ideas the very *ſame*—in as much as the *Definite* and *Certain* is ever preferable to the *Indefinite* and *Uncertain*; and that more eſpecially in *Imitations*, where the principal *(b)* Delight is *in recognizing the Thing imitated*

‖ P. 68, 69.

(b) THAT there is an eminent Delight in *this very* RECOGNITION *itſelf*, abſtract from any thing pleaſing in *the Subject recognized*, is evident from hence———that, in all the Mimetic Arts, we can be *highly charmed* with *Imitations*, at whoſe *Originals* in Nature we are *ſhocked* and *terrified*. Such, for inſtance, as Dead Bodies, Wild Beaſts, and the like.

THE Cauſe, aſſigned for this, ſeems to be of the following kind. We have a Joy, not only in the *Sanity* and *Perfection*, but alſo *in the juſt and natural Energies* of our ſeveral *Limbs* and *Faculties*. And hence, among others, the *Joy* in REASONING; as being *the Energy of that principal Faculty, our* INTELLECT *or* UNDERSTANDING. This Joy extends, not only to the Wiſe, but to the Multitude. For all Men have an *Averſion to Ignorance and Error*; and

imitated—it will follow *from hence* that—EVEN IN SUBJECTS THE BEST ADAPTED TO MUSICAL IMITATION, THE IMITATION OF POETRY WILL BE STILL MORE EXCELLENT. Ch. IV.

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and in ſome degree, however moderate, are glad to *learn* and to *inform* themſelves.

HENCE therefore the *Delight*, ariſing from theſe *Imitations*; as we are enabled, in each of them, to *exerciſe the* REASONING FACULTY; and, by *comparing* the *Copy* with the *Architype* in our Minds, to INFER that THIS is SUCH a THING; and, THAT ANOTHER; a Fact remarkable among Children, even in their firſt and earlieſt Days.

Τὸ, τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι, σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ, καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι, καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας· καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. Σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων. Ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας, χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες· οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀγριωτάτων, καὶ νεκρῶν. Αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν ἐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. Διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι, τί ἕκαστον· οἷον, ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος. Arist. Poet. c. 4.

CHAP. V.

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates by Words ſignificant, being at the ſame time Subjects not adapted *to the Genius of either of the other Arts*——*The* Nature *of thoſe Subjects*——*The* Abilities of Poetry *to imitate them*——*Compariſon of Poetry* in theſe Subjects, *firſt with Painting, then with Muſic.*

Ch. V. THE MIMETIC ART of POETRY has now been conſidered in *two* Views—Firſt, as imitating by *mere natural* Media; and in this it has been placed *on a level* with MUSIC, but *much inferior* to PAINTING——It has been ſince conſidered as imitating thro' *Sounds ſignificant by Compact*, and that in *ſuch* Subjects reſpectively, where PAINTING and MUSIC have the *fulleſt Power* to exert themſelves.

Here

Here to Painting it has been held *inferior*, but to Muſic it has been *preferred*. Ch. V.

IT remains to be conſidered——what *other Subjects* Poetry has left, to which the Genius of the other two Arts is not *ſo perfectly adapted*——How far Poetry is *able* to imitate them—— and whether from the *Perfection* of its Imitation, and the *Nature* of the Subjects themſelves, it ought to be called no more than *equal* to its Siſter Arts; or whether, on the whole, it ſhould not rather be called *ſuperior*.

§. 2. TO begin, in the firſt place, by comparing it with Painting.

THE *Subjects of Poetry*, to which the Genius of *Painting* is *not adapted*, are—— all Actions, whoſe *(a) Whole* is of ſo

(a) FOR a juſt and accurate Deſcription of *Wholeneſs* and *Unity*, ſee *Ariſt. Poet.* Ch. 7 & 8. and *Boſſu*, his beſt Interpreter, in his Treatiſe on the *Epic Poem*, B. II. ch. 9, 10, 11.

Ch. V. *lengthened* a Duration, that *no Point of Time*, in any part of that Whole, can be given *fit for Painting*; neither in its *Beginning*, which will teach what is *Subſequent*; nor in its *End*, which will teach what is *Previous*; nor in its *Middle*, which will declare both the *Previous* and the *Subſequent*.——Alſo all Subjects ſo framed, as to lay open the *internal Conſtitution of Man*, and give us an Inſight into *(b) Characters*, *Manners*, *Paſſions*, and *Sentiments*.

THE

(b) FOR a Deſcription of CHARACTER, ſee below, Note *(c)* of this Chapter.

AS for MANNERS, it may be ſaid in general, that a *certain Syſtem of them* makes a *Character*; and that as theſe Syſtems, by being *differently compounded*, make each a *different* Character, ſo is it that *one* Man *truly differs* from *another*.

PASSIONS are obvious; *Pity*, *Fear*, *Anger*, &c.

SENTIMENTS are diſcoverable in all thoſe Things, which are the *proper Buſineſs and End of* SPEECH *or* DISCOURSE. The chief Branches of this *End* are to *Aſſert* and *Prove*; to *Solve* and *Refute*; to expreſs or excite *Paſſions*; to *amplify* Incidents,

THE *Merit* of theſe Subjects is obvious. They muſt neceſſarily of all be the moſt *affecting*; the moſt *improving*; and ſuch of which the Mind has the *ſtrongeſt Comprehenſion.* Ch. V.

FOR as to the *affecting Part*——if it be true, that all *Events* more or leſs *affect* us, as the *Subjects*, which they reſpect, are more or leſs nearly *related* to us; then ſurely thoſe *Events* muſt needs be *moſt affecting*, to whoſe *Subjects* we are of all the *moſt intimately related.* Now ſuch is the Relation, which we bear to *Mankind*; and Men and Human Actions are the Subjects, here propoſed for Imitation.

cidents, and to *diminiſh* them. 'Tis in theſe things therefore, that we muſt look for *Sentiment.* See *Ariſt. Poet.* c. 19.—— ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὴν Διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τῦ λόγυ δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι. Μέρη δὲ τύτων, τό, τε ἀποδεικνῦναι, καὶ τὸ λύειν, καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν,——καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος, καὶ σμικρότητα.

Ch. V. As to *Improvement*—there can be none ſurely (to *Man* at leaſt) ſo great, as that which is derived from a juſt and decent Repreſentation of *Human Manners*, and *Sentiments*. For what can more contribute to give us that *Maſter-Knowledge (c)*, without

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(c) ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥΤΟΝ. But farther, beſides obtaining this *moral Science* from the Contemplation of Human Life; an End *common* both to Epic, Tragic, and Comic Poetry; there is a *peculiar* End to *Tragedy*, that of eradicating the Paſſions of *Pity* and *Fear*. Ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας — δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. Ariſt. Poet. c. 6. TRAGEDY *is the Imitation of an Action important and perfect, thro'* PITY *and* FEAR *working the* PURGATION OF SUCH-LIKE PASSIONS.

THERE are none, 'tis evident, ſo devoid of theſe two *Paſſions*, as thoſe *perpetually converſant*, where the *Occaſions* of them are moſt *frequent*; ſuch, for inſtance, as the *Military* Men, the Profeſſors of *Medicine*, *Chirurgery*, and the like. Their Minds, by this Intercourſe, become as it were *callous*; gaining an *Apathy* by *Experience*, which no *Theory* can ever teach them.

Now

out which, *all other* Knowledge will prove of little or no Utility? Ch. V.

Now that, which is wrought in *theſe* Men by the *real Diſaſters of Life*, may be ſuppoſed wrought in others by the *Fictions of Tragedy*; yet with this happy Circumſtance in favour of Tragedy, that, without the Diſaſters being *real*, it can obtain the *ſame* End.

It muſt however, for all this, be confeſſed, that an Effect of this kind cannot reaſonably be expected, except among Nations, like the *Athenians* of old, who lived in a perpetual Attendance upon theſe Theatrical Repreſentations. For 'tis not a *ſingle* or *occaſional* Application to theſe Paſſions, but a *conſtant* and *uninterrupted*, by which alone they may be leſſened or removed.

It would be improper to conclude this Note, without obſerving, that the Philoſopher in this place by Pity means not Philanthropy, *Natural Affection*, a *Readineſs to relieve others in their Calamities and Diſtreſs*; but, by *Pity*, he means that Senseless Effeminate Consternation, *which ſeizes weak Minds, on the ſudden Proſpect of any thing diſaſtrous*; which, in its more violent Effects, is ſeen in *Shriekings*, *Swoonings*, &c. a Paſſion, ſo far from laudable, or from operating to the Good of others, that it is certain to deprive the Party, who labours under its Influence, of all Capacity *to do the leaſt good Office*.

Ch. V. As to our *Comprehenſion*——there is nothing certainly, of which we have ſo *ſtrong* Ideas, as of that which happens in the *Moral* or *Human* World. For as to the *Internal Part*, or *Active Principle* of the *Vegetable*, we know it but *obſcurely*; becauſe there we can diſcover neither *Paſſion*, nor *Senſation*. In the *Animal* World indeed this *Principle* is more ſeen, and that from the *Paſſions* and *Senſations* which *there* declare themſelves. Yet all ſtill reſts upon the mere Evidence of *Senſe*; upon the Force only of *external* and *unaſſiſted Experience*. But in the *Moral* or *Human* World, as we have a Medium of *Knowledge* far more *accurate* than this; ſo from hence it is, that we can comprehend *accordingly*.

WITH regard therefore to the various *Events* which happen *here*, and the various *Cauſes*, by which they are produced——in other Words, of all Characters, Manners, Human Paſſions, and Sentiments; beſides the Evidence of *Senſe*, we have the *higheſt*

Evidence

Evidence additional, in having an expreſs *Conſciouſneſs* of ſomething *ſimilar within*; of ſomething *homogeneous* in the Receſſes of our own *Minds*; in that, which conſtitutes to each of us *his true and real Self.* Ch. V.

THESE therefore being the Subjects, *not adapted to the Genius of Painting*, it comes next to be conſidered, *how far Poetry can imitate them.*

AND here, that it has *Abilities* clearly *equal*, cannot be doubted; as it has *that* for the *Medium* of its Imitation, through which *Nature* declares herſelf in the *ſame* Subjects. For the *Sentiments* in *real Life* are only known by Men's * *Diſcourſe.* And the *Characters*, *Manners*, and *Paſſions* of Men being the *Prompters* to what they *ſay*; it muſt needs follow, that their *Diſcourſe* will be a *conſtant Specimen* of thoſe *Characters*, *Manners*, and *Paſſions.*

Format

* P. 84, *Note (b).*

Ch. V. * *Format enim Natura prius nos intus ad omnem*
Fortunarum habitum; juvat, aut impellit ad iram:
Poſt effert Animi Motus, INTERPRETE LINGUA.

NOT only therefore *Language* is an *adequate* Medium of Imitation, but in *Sentiments* it is the *only* Medium; and in *Manners* and *Paſſions* there is no other, which can exhibit them to us after that *clear*, *preciſe*, and *definite Way*, as they in *Nature* ſtand alotted to the various ſorts of Men, and are found to conſtitute the *ſeveral Characters* of each *(d)*.

§. 3.

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* *Hor. de Arte Poet.* ℣. 108.

(d) IT is true indeed that (beſides what is done by *Poetry*) there is ſome Idea of *Character*, which even *Painting* can communicate. Thus there is no doubt, but that ſuch a *Countenance* may be found by *Painters* for *Æneas*, as would convey upon view a *mild*,

§. 3. To *compare* therefore *Poetry*, in *theſe Subjects*, with *Painting*——In as much as no Subjects of Painting are * *wholly ſuperior* Ch. V.

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* P. 57. 58. 75, 76.

mild, *humane*, and yet a *brave* Diſpoſition. But then this Idea would be *vague* and *general*. It would be concluded, only in the groſs, that the Hero was *Good*. As to that Syſtem of Qualities *peculiar* to *Æneas* only, and which alone *properly conſtitutes his true and real Character*, this would ſtill remain a Secret, and be no way diſcoverable. For how deduce it from the mere *Lineaments* of a Countenance? Or, if it were deducible, how few Spectators would there be found ſo ſagacious? 'Tis here therefore, that Recourſe muſt be had, not to *Painting*, but to *Poetry*. So *accurate* a Conception of Character can be gathered only from a *Succeſſion of various, and yet conſiſtent Actions*; a Succeſſion, *enabling us to conjecture*, what the Perſon of the Drama will do in the *future*, from what already he has done in the *paſt*. Now to ſuch an Imitation, Poetry only is *equal*; becauſe it is not *bounded*, *like Painting*, to *ſhort*, and, as it were, *inſtant* Events, but may imitate Subjects of *any Duration whatever*. See *Ariſt. Poet.* cap. 6. Ἔστι δὲ ἦθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁποιά τις ἐστὶν, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον, εἰ προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων. See alſo the ingenious and learned *Boſſu*, Book 4. ch. 4.

Ch. V. *perior* to Poetry; while the Subjects, here deſcribed, *far exceed the Power* of Painting——in as much as they are of *all* Subjects the moſt † *affecting*, and *improving*, and ſuch of which we have the *ſtrongeſt Comprehenſion*——further, in as much as Poetry can *moſt* ‡ *accurately* imitate them—in as much as, beſides all Imitation, there is a *Charm* in Poetry, ariſing from its very *Numbers (e)*; whereas Painting has Pretence

† P. 85, *&c.*

‡ P. 89, *&c.*

(e) THAT there is a *Charm* in *Poetry*, ariſing from its *Numbers* only, may be made evident from the five or ſix firſt Lines of the *Paradiſe Loſt*; where, without any Pomp of Phraſe, Sublimity of Sentiment, or the *leaſt Degree of Imitation*, every Reader muſt find himſelf to be ſenſibly delighted; and that, only from the graceful and ſimple *Cadence* of the *Numbers*, and that artful *Variation* of the *Cæſura* or *Pauſe*, ſo eſſential to the Harmony of every good Poem.

AN *Engliſh Heroic* Verſe conſiſts of ten *Semipeds*, or Half-feet. Now in the Lines above-mentioned the

tence to no Charm, except that of Imitation only——laſtly, (which will ſoon be *ſhewn) in as much as Poetry is able to *aſſociate Muſic*, as a moſt powerful Ally; of which Aſſiſtance, Painting is utterly incapable—— FROM ALL THIS it may be fairly concluded, that——POETRY *is not only Equal, but that it is in fact* FAR SUPERIOR TO ITS SISTER ART OF PAINTING. Ch. V.

§. 4. BUT if it exceed *Painting* in *Subjects*, to which Painting is *not adapted*; no doubt *will it exceed* MUSIC in *Subjects* to Muſic

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* *Chap.* VI.

the *Pauſes* are varied upon *different* Semipeds in the Order, which follows; as may be ſeen by any, who will be at the Pains to examine

PARADISE LOST, B. I.

Verſe 1	has its Pauſe fall upon	Semiped 7
—— 2		—— 6
—— 3		—— 6
—— 4		—— 5
—— 5		—— 3
—— 6		—— 4

Ch. V. Muſic *not adapted.* For *here* it has been **preferred*, even in thoſe Subjects, which have been held *adapted the beſt of all.*

§. 5. POETRY IS THEREFORE, ON THE WHOLE MUCH SUPERIOR TO EITHER OF THE OTHER MIMETIC ARTS; *it having been ſhewn to be equally excellent,* IN THE † ACCURACY OF ITS IMITATION; *and to imitate* SUBJECTS, WHICH FAR SURPASS, AS WELL IN ‡ UTILITY, AS IN ‖ DIGNITY.

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* Ch. IV. §. 3. † P. 89. ‡ P. 86.

‖ *See* p. 83, 84. *and* p. 64, *Note (g).* *See alſo* P. 59.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

On Muſic conſidered not as an Imitation, *but as deriving its Efficacy from* another *Source.——On its joint Operation, by this means, with Poetry.——An Objection to Muſic ſolved.—The Advantage ariſing to it, as well as to Poetry, from their being united.——Concluſion.*

IN the above Diſcourſe, MUSIC has been mentioned as an * *Ally* to Poetry. It has alſo been ſaid to derive its † *Efficacy* from *another Source*, than *Imitation*. It remains therefore, that theſe things be explained. Ch. VI.

NOW, in order to this, it is firſt to be obſerved, that there are various *Affections*, which may be raiſed by the Power of *Muſic*.

* P. 93. † P. 69.

Ch. VI. *Muſic.* There are Sounds to make us *chearful*, or *ſad*; *martial*, or *tender*; and ſo of almoſt every other Affection, which we feel.

IT is alſo further obſervable, that there is a *reciprocal Operation* between our *Affections*, and our *Ideas*; ſo that, by a ſort of *natural Sympathy*, certain *Ideas* neceſſarily tend to raiſe in us certain *Affections*; and thoſe *Affections*, by a ſort of Counter-Operation, to raiſe the *ſame Ideas*. Thus *Ideas* derived from Funerals, Tortures, Murders, and the like, naturally generate the Affection of *Melancholy*. And when, by any *Phyſical Cauſes*, that *Affection* happens to prevail, it as naturally generates the ſame *doleful Ideas*.

AND hence it is, that *Ideas*, derived from *external* Cauſes, have at *different* times, upon the *ſame* Perſon, ſo *different* an Effect. If they happen to ſuit the Affections, which *prevail within*, then is their Impreſſion *moſt ſenſible*, and their Effect

moſt

moſt laſting. If the contrary be true, then is the Effect contrary. Thus, for inſtance, a Funeral will much more affect the ſame Man, if he ſee it when melancholy, than if he ſee it when chearful. Ch. VI.

Now this being premiſed, it will follow, that whatever happens to be the *Affection* or *Diſpoſition* of Mind, which ought naturally to reſult from the Genius of any *Poem*, the *ſame* probably it will be in the Power of ſome Species of *Muſic* to excite. But whenever the *proper Affection* prevails, it has been allowed that then *all kindred Ideas*, derived from external Cauſes, make the *moſt ſenſible Impreſſion*. The Ideas therefore of Poetry muſt needs make the moſt ſenſible Impreſſion, when the *(a)* Affections, peculiar to them, are already

(a) QUINTILIAN elegantly, and exactly appoſite to this Reaſoning, ſays of *Muſic*——— *Namque & voce & modulatione grandia elatè, jucunda dulciter, moderata*

Ch. VI. ready excited by the Muſic. For here a *double Force is made co-operate to one End.* A Poet, *thus aſſiſted*, finds not an Audience in a Temper, averſe to the Genius of his Poem, or perhaps at beſt under a cool *Indifference*; but by the Preludes, the Symphonies, and *concurrent Operation* of the Muſic in all its Parts, rouzed into *thoſe very Affections*, which he would moſt deſire.

AN Audience, ſo diſpoſed, not only embrace with Pleaſure the Ideas of the Poet, when exhibited; but, in a manner, even *anticipate* them in their ſeveral Imaginations. The Superſtitious have not a more previous Tendency to be frightned at the ſight of Spectres, or a Lover to fall into Raptures at the ſight of his Miſtreſs; than a Mind, thus tempered by the Power of Muſic,

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moderata leniter canit, totâq; arte conſentit cum eorum, quæ dicuntur, AFFECTIBUS. *Inſt. Orator.* l. 1. cap. 10.

Muſic, to enjoy all Ideas, which are ſuitable to that Temper. Ch. VI.

AND hence the *genuine* Charm of Muſic, and the *Wonders* which it works, thro' its great Profeſſors *(b)*. A Power, which conſiſts not in Imitations, and the raiſing *Ideas*; but in the raiſing *Affections*, to which Ideas may correſpond. There are few to be found ſo inſenſible, I may even ſay ſo inhumane, as when GOOD POETRY IS JUSTLY SET TO MUSIC, not in ſome degree to feel the Force of ſo *amiable an Union*. But to the Muſes Friends it is a Force *irreſiſtible*, and pene-

 trates

(b) SUCH, above all, is *George Frederick Handel*; whoſe Genius, having been cultivated by continued Exerciſe, and being itſelf far the ſublimeſt and moſt univerſal now known, has juſtly placed him without an Equal, or a Second. This tranſient Teſtimony could not be denied ſo excellent an Artiſt, from whom this Treatiſe has borrowed ſuch eminent Examples, to juſtify its Aſſertions in what it has offer'd concerning Muſic.

Ch. VI. trates into the deepeſt Receſſes of the Soul.

——— * *Pectus inaniter angit,*
Irritat, mulcet, falſis terroribus implet.

§. 2. Now this is *that Source*, from whence Muſic was † ſaid formerly *to derive its greateſt Efficacy*. And here indeed, not in *(c)* Imitation, ought it to be chiefly cultivated. On this account alſo it has been called a ‡ *powerful Ally* to Poetry. And farther, 'tis by the help of this Reaſoning, that the *Objection* is ſolved, which is raiſed againſt the *Singing of Poetry* (as in Opera's, Oratorio's, *&c.*) from the want of

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* *Horat. Epiſt.* 1. l. 2. ℣. 211.
† P. 69. ‡ P. 93.

(c) FOR the *narrow* Extent and *little* Efficacy of MUSIC, conſidered as a MIMETIC or IMITATIVE ART, ſee Ch. II. §. 3.

of *Probability* and *Reſemblance to Nature*. Ch. VI.

To one indeed, who has no muſical Ear, this Objection may have Weight. It may even perplex a Lover of Muſic, if it happen to ſurprize him in his Hours of *Indifference*. But when he is feeling the Charm of Poetry *ſo accompanied*, let him be angry (if he can) with that, which ſerves only to intereſt him *more feelingly* in the Subject, and ſupport him in a *ſtronger* and *more earneſt* Attention; which enforces, by its Aid, the ſeveral Ideas of the Poem, and gives them to his Imagination with unuſual Strength and Grandeur. He cannot ſurely but confeſs, that he is a *Gainer in the Exchange*, when he *barters* the want of a ſingle Probability, that of *Pronunciation* (a thing merely arbitrary and every where different) for a *noble Heightening of Affections* which are ſuitable to the Occaſion, and enable him to enter into the Subject with double *Energy* and *Enjoyment*.

Ch. VI. §. 3. FROM what has been ſaid it is evident, that theſe two Arts can never be ſo powerful *ſingly*, as when they are *properly united*. For *Poetry*, when alone, muſt be neceſſarily forced to *waſte* many of its richeſt *Ideas*, in the mere raiſing of Affections, when, to have been properly reliſhed, it ſhould have *found* thoſe Affections in their higheſt Energy. And *Muſic*, when alone, can only raiſe *Affections*, which ſoon *languiſh* and *decay*, if not maintained and fed by the nutritive Images of Poetry. Yet muſt it be remembered, in this Union, that *Poetry* ever have the *Precedence*; its * *Utility*, as well as *Dignity*, being by far the more conſiderable.

§. 4. AND thus much, for the preſent, as to † MUSIC, PAINTING, and POETRY; the

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* Ch. V. §. 2. p. 83.

† P. 55.

the Circumſtances, in which they *agree*, and in which they *differ*; and the PREFERENCE, DUE TO ONE OF THEM ABOVE THE OTHER TWO. Ch. VI.

The END.

TREATISE THE THIRD:

CONCERNING HAPPINESS,

A DIALOGUE.

Finiſhed *Dec.* 15, *A. D.* 1741.

CONCERNING HAPPINESS,

A DIALOGUE.

PART THE FIRST.

J. H. to *F. S.*

NATURE ſeems to treat Man, as a Painter would his Diſciple, to whom he commits the Out-Lines of a Figure lightly ſketched, which the Scholar for himſelf is to colour and complete. Thus from Nature we derive Senſes, and Paſſions, and an Intellect, which each of us *for himſelf* has to model into a Character. And hence (the reverſe Part I.

Part I. of every Species beſide) Human Characters alone are infinitely various; as various indeed, as there are Individuals to form them. Hence too, the great Diverſity of Syſtems, and of Doctrines, reſpecting the Laws and Rules, and Conduct of Human Life.

'Tis in the Hiſtory of theſe, my Friend, you have ſo ſucceſsfully employed yourſelf. You have been ſtudious to know, not ſo much what *Greeks*, *Romans*, or *Barbarians* have *done*; as what they have *reaſoned*, and what they have *taught*. Not an Epicure has more Joy in the Memory of a delicious Banquet, than I feel in recollecting, what we have diſcourſed on theſe Subjects.

And here you cannot forget (for we were both unanimous) the Contempt, in which we held thoſe ſuperficial Cenſurers, who profeſs to refute, what they want even Capacities to comprehend. Upon the Faith of their own Boaſting (could that be credited)

credited) Sentiments are expoſed, Opinions demoliſhed, and the whole Wiſdom of Antiquity lies vanquiſhed at their Feet. Like Opera Heroes, upon their own Stage, they can with eaſe diſpatch a Lion, or diſcomfit a whole Legion. But alas! were they to encounter, not the Shadow, but the Subſtance, what think you would be the Event then?—Little better, I fear, than was the Fortune of poor *Priam*, when the feeble Old Man durſt attack the Youthful *Pyrrhus*. Part I.

——* *Telum imbelle ſine ictu*
Conjecit: rauco quod protenus ære repulſum,
Et ſummo Clypei nequicquam umbone pependit.

AMONG the many long exploded and obſolete Syſtems, there was one, you may remember, for which I profeſſed a great Eſteem. Not in the leaſt degree convinced by all I had heard againſt it, I durſt

* *Æneid.* l. 2. ℣. 544.

Part I. durſt venture to affirm, that no Syſtem was more *plauſible*; that grant but its *Principles*, and the *reſt followed of courſe*; that none approached nearer to the *Perfection of our own* RELIGION, as I could prove, were there occaſion, by *Authority not to be controverted*. As you, I knew, were the Favourer of an Hypotheſis ſomewhat † *different*; ſo I attempted to ſupport my own, by reciting you a certain Dialogue. Not ſucceeding however ſo happily in the Recollection, as I could wiſh, I have ſince endeavoured to tranſcribe, what at that time I would have rehearſed. The Reſult of my Labour is the following Narrative, which I commit with Confidence to your Friendſhip and Candour.

§. 2. 'TWAS at a time, when a certain Friend, whom I highly value, was my Gueſt. We had been ſitting together, enter-

† *Viz.* the PLATONIC.

entertaining ourſelves with *Shakeſpear*. Among many of his Characters, we had looked into that of *Woolſey*. How ſoon, ſays my Friend, does the Cardinal in Diſgrace abjure that Happineſs, which he was lately ſo fond of? Scarcely out of Office, but he begins to exclaim Part I.

**Vain Pomp and Glory of the World! I hate ye.*

So true is it, that our Sentiments ever vary with the Seaſon; and that in Adverſity we are of one Mind, in Proſperity, of another.

As for his mean Opinion, ſaid I, of Human Happineſs, 'tis a Truth, which ſmall Reflection might have taught him long before. There ſeems little need of Diſtreſs to inform us of this. I rather commend the ſeeming Wiſdom of that † Eaſtern Monarch, who in the Affluence of Proſperity, when he was proving every Pleaſure, was yet ſo ſenſible of their Emptineſs, their Inſufficiency to make him happy, that he pro-

* SHAKESPEAR's *Henry the Eighth.*

† *Tuſc.* Diſp. v. 7.

Part I. proclaimed a Reward to the Man, who ſhould invent a new Delight. The Reward indeed was proclaimed, but the Delight was not to be found. If by Delight, ſaid he, you mean ſome *Good*; *ſomething conducive to real Happineſs*; it might have been found perhaps, and yet not hit the Monarch's Fancy.

Is that, ſaid I, poſſible? 'Tis poſſible, replied he, tho' it had been *the Sovereign Good itſelf*——And indeed what wonder? Is it probable that ſuch a Mortal, as an Eaſtern Monarch; ſuch a pamper'd, flatter'd, idle Mortal; ſhould have Attention, or Capacity to a Subject ſo delicate? A Subject, enough to exerciſe the Subtleſt and moſt Acute?

WHAT then is it you eſteem, ſaid I, the *Sovereign Good* to be? It ſhould ſeem, by your Repreſentation, to be ſomething very uncommon. Aſk me not the Queſtion, ſaid he, you know not where 'twill carry us. Its *general Idea* indeed is eaſy and plain; but the *Detail of Particulars* is

perplex'd and long——Paſſions, and Opi- Part I.
nions for ever thwart us——a Paradox appears in almoſt every Advance. Beſides, did our Inquiries ſucceed ever ſo happily, the *very Subject itſelf* is always enough to give me Pain. That, replied I, ſeems a Paradox indeed. 'Tis not, ſaid he, from any Prejudice, which I have conceived againſt it; for to Man I eſteem it the nobleſt in the World. Nor is it for being a Subject, to which my Genius does not lead me; for no Subject at all times has more employ'd my Attention. But the Truth is, I can ſcarce ever think on it, but an unlucky Story ſtill occurs to my Mind. "A certain Star-gazer, with his "Teleſcope was once viewing the Moon; "and deſcribing her Seas, her Mountains, "and her Territories. Says a Clown to "his Companion, *Let him ſpy what he* "*pleaſes*; *we are as near to the Moon, as* "*he and all his Brethren.*" So fares it alas! with theſe, our *moral* Speculations. Practice too often *creeps*, where Theory can *ſoar*. The *Philoſopher* proves as *weak*,

Part I. as thoſe, *whom he moſt contemns.* A mortifying Thought to ſuch as well attend it.

Too mortifying, replied I, to be long dwelt on. Give us rather your *general* Idea of the *Sovereign Good.* This is eaſy from your own Account, however intricate the Detail.

THUS then, ſaid he, ſince you are ſo urgent, 'tis thus that I conceive it. THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IS THAT, THE POSSESSION OF WHICH RENDERS US HAPPY.

And how, ſaid I, do we poſſeſs it? Is it *Senſual,* or *Intellectual?* There you are entering, ſaid he, upon the *Detail.* This is beyond your Queſtion. Not a ſmall Advance, ſaid I, to indulge poor Curioſity? Will you raiſe me a Thirſt, and be ſo cruel not to allay it? 'Tis not, replied he, of my raiſing, but your own. Beſides I am not certain, ſhould I attempt to proceed, whether you will admit ſuch *Authorities,* as 'tis poſſible I may vouch.

That, ſaid I, muſt be determined by their Weight, and Character. Suppoſe,

poſe, ſaid he, it ſhould be MANKIND; Part I.
the *whole Human Race.* Would you not think it ſomething ſtrange, to ſeek of *thoſe* concerning GOOD, who purſue it a *thouſand Ways*, and many of them *contradictory?* I confeſs, ſaid I, it ſeems ſo.

And yet, continued he, were there a Point, in which ſuch *Diſſentients* ever *agreed*, this *Agreement* would be no mean *Argument* in favour of its *Truth* and *Juſtneſs.* But where, replied I, is this Agreement to be found?

HE anſwered me by aſking, What if it ſhould appear, that there were certain ORIGINAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PRECONCEPTIONS OF GOOD, *which were* NATURAL, UNIFORM AND COMMON TO ALL MEN; *which all recognized in their various Purſuits; and that the Difference lay only* IN THE APPLYING THEM TO PARTICULARS? This requires, ſaid I, to be illuſtrated. As if, continued he, a Company of Travellers, in ſome wide Foreſt, were all intending for one City,

Part I. but each by a Rout peculiar to himſelf. The Roads indeed would be *various*, and many perhaps *falſe*; but all who travelled, would have *one End in view*. 'Tis evident, ſaid I, they would. So fares it then, added he, with Mankind in purſuit of *Good*. The Ways indeed are *Many*, but what they ſeek is ONE.

FOR inſtance: Did you ever hear of any, who in purſuit of their *Good*, were for living the Life of a Bird, an Inſect, or a Fiſh? None. And why not?

It would be inconſiſtent, anſwered I, with their Nature. You ſee then, ſaid he, they *all agree* in this——that what they purſue, ought to be *conſiſtent, and agreeable to their proper Nature*. So ought it, ſaid I, undoubtedly. If ſo, continued he, one *Pre-conception* is diſcovered, which is *common to Good in general*——It is, that *all Good is ſuppoſed ſomething agreeable to Nature*. This indeed, replied I, ſeems to be agreed on all hands.

BUT

BUT again, ſaid he,——Is there a Man ſcarcely to be found of a Temper ſo truly mortified, as to acquieſce in the *loweſt*, and *ſhorteſt Neceſſaries of Life?* Who aims not, if he be able, at ſomething *farther*, ſomething *better?* I replied, Scarcely one. Part I.

Do not Multitudes purſue, ſaid he, *infinite* Objects of Deſire, acknowledged, every one of them, to be in no reſpect *Neceſſaries?*———Exquiſite Viands, delicious Wines, ſplendid Apparel, curious Gardens; magnificent Apartments adorned with Pictures and Sculpture; Muſic and Poetry, and the whole Tribe of *Elegant* Arts?

'Tis evident, ſaid I. If it be, continued he, it ſhould ſeem that they *all* conſidered the *Chief* or *Sovereign Good*, not to be that, *which conduces to bare Exiſtence or mere Being*; for to this the *Neceſſaries alone are adequate.* I replied they were.

But if not this, it muſt be ſomewhat *conducive to that, which is ſuperior to mere Being.* It muſt. And what, continued he, can this be, but *Well-Being?*

Part I. Well-Being, under the various Shapes, in which *differing* Opinions paint it? Or can you ſuggeſt any thing elſe? I replied, I could not. Mark here, then, continued he, another *Pre-conception*, in which they *all* agree——the *Sovereign Good* is ſomewhat *conducive, not to mere Being, but to Well-Being*. I replied, it had ſo appeared.

AGAIN, continued he. What Labour, what Expence, to procure thoſe Rarities, which our own poor Country is unable to afford us? How is the World ranſacked to its utmoſt Verges, and Luxury and Arts imported from every Quarter?——Nay more——How do we baffle *Nature* herſelf; invert her Order; ſeek the Vegetables of Spring in the Rigours of Winter, and Winter's Ice, during the Heats of Summer? I replied, We did. And what Diſappointment, what Remorſe, when Endeavours fail? 'Tis true. If this then be evident, ſaid he, it ſhould ſeem, that whatever we deſire as our *Chief* and

Sove-

Sovereign Good, is ſomething *which, as far as poſſible, we would accommodate to all Places and Times.* I anſwered, So it appeared. Part I.

See then, ſaid he, another of its *Characteriſtics*, another *Pre-conception.*

BUT farther ſtill——What Conteſts for *Wealth?* What Scrambling for *Property?* What Perils in the Purſuit; what Sollicitude in the Maintenance?— And why all this? To what *Purpoſe*, what *End?*——Or is not the Reaſon plain? Is it not that *Wealth* may *continually* procure us, whatever we fancy *Good*; and make that *perpetual*, which would otherwiſe be *tranſient?*

I replied, It ſeemed ſo. Is it not farther deſired, as *ſupplying us from ourſelves*; when, without it, we muſt be beholden to the Benevolence of *others*, and *depend on their Caprice* for all that we enjoy?

'Tis true, ſaid I, this ſeems a Reaſon.

AGAIN——Is not *Power* of every degree as much conteſted for, as *Wealth?* Are not Magiſtracies, Honours, Principalities, and

Part I. Empire, the Subjects of Strife, and everlaſting Contention? I replied, They were. And why, ſaid he, this? To obtain what End?——Is it not to *help* us, like Wealth, to the *Poſſeſſion of what we deſire?* Is it not farther to *aſcertain*, to *ſecure* our Enjoyments; that when *others* would deprive us, we may be *ſtrong enough to reſiſt them?* I replied, It was.

Or to invert the whole——Why are there, who ſeek Receſſes the moſt diſtant and retired? fly Courts and Power, and ſubmit to *Parcimony* and *Obſcurity?* Why all this, but from the *ſame* Intention? From an Opinion that *ſmall* Poſſeſſions, uſed moderately, are *permanent*—— that *larger* Poſſeſſions raiſe Envy, and are more frequently *invaded*——· that *the Safety of Power and Dignity is more precarious, than that of Retreat*; and that therefore they have choſen, what is *moſt eligible upon the whole?* It is not, ſaid I, improbable, that they act by ſome ſuch Motive.

Do you not ſee then, continued he, two or three more *Pre-conceptions* of the *Sovereign Good*, which are ſought for by all, as Eſſential to conſtitute it? And what, ſaid I, are theſe? That it ſhould not be *tranſient*, nor *derived from the Will of others*, nor *in their Power to take away*; but be *durable*, *ſelf-derived*, and (if I may uſe the Expreſſion) *indeprivable*. Part I.

I confeſs, ſaid I, it appears ſo. But we have already found it to be conſidered, as *ſomething agreeable to our Nature*; *conducive*, not to mere Being, but *to Well-Being*; and what we aim to have *accommodate to all Places and Times*. We have.

THERE may be *other* Characteriſtics, ſaid he, but theſe I think ſufficient. See then its Idea; behold it, as collected from the *Original*, *Natural*, and *Univerſal Pre-conceptions of all Mankind*. THE SOVEREIGN GOOD, they have taught us, ought to be ſomething——AGREEABLE TO OUR NATURE; CONDUCIVE TO WELL-BEING; ACCOM-

Part I. ACCOMMODATE TO ALL PLACES AND TIMES; DURABLE, SELF-DERIVED, AND INDEPRIVABLE. Your Account, ſaid I, appears juſt.

IT matters, continued he, little, how they *err* in the *Application*——if they covet that as *agreeable to Nature*, which is in itſelf moſt *Contrary*——if they would have that as *Durable*, which is in itſelf moſt *Tranſient*——that as *Independent*, and their own, which is moſt precarious and *Servile*. 'Tis enough for us, if we know their *Aim*——enough, if we can diſcover, what 'tis they propoſe——the *Means* and *Method* may be *abſurd*, as it happens. I anſwered, Their Aim was ſufficient to prove what he had aſſerted.

'TIS true, replied he, 'tis abundantly ſufficient. And yet perhaps, even tho' this were ever ſo certain, it would not be altogether foreign, were we to examine, how they act; how they ſucceed in applying theſe *Univerſals* to *Particular Subjects*.

jects. Should they be found *juſt* in the Application, we need look no farther—— The true *Sovereign Good* would of courſe be *Plain* and *Obvious*; and we ſhould have no more to do, than to follow the beaten Road. 'Tis granted, replied I. But what if they *err?* Time enough for that, ſaid he, when we are ſatisfied that they do. We ought firſt to inform ourſelves, whether they may not poſſibly be in the Right. I ſubmitted, and begged him to proceed his own Way. Part I.

§. 3. WILL you then, ſaid he, in this Diſquiſition into Human Conduct, allow me this——That ſuch, as is the Species of Life, which every one *chooſes*; ſuch is his *Idea* of *Happineſs*, ſuch his *Conception* of the *Sovereign Good?* I ſeem, ſaid I, to comprehend You, but ſhould be glad You would illuſtrate. His Meaning, he anſwered, was no more than this—— If a Man prefer a Life of *Induſtry*, 'tis becauſe he has an *Idea* of Happineſs in *Wealth*; if he prefers a Life of *Gaiety*, 'tis from a like

Part I. like *Idea* concerning *Pleaſure*. And the *ſame*, we ſay, holds true in every other Inſtance. I told him, It muſt certainly.

AND can you recollect, ſaid he, any Life, but what is a Life of *Buſineſs*, or of *Leiſure?* I anſwered, None. And is not the great *End* of *Buſineſs* either *Power*, or *Wealth?* It is. Muſt not every *Life* therefore of *Buſineſs* be either *Political* or *Lucrative?* It muſt.

Again — Are not *Intellect* and *Senſe*, the *Soul's leading Powers?* They are.

And in *Leiſure* are we not ever ſeeking, to *gratify one, or the other?* We are. Muſt not every *Life* therefore of *Leiſure* be either *Pleaſurable*, or *Contemplative?* If you confine Pleaſure, ſaid I, to *Senſe*, I think it neceſſarily muſt.

If it be not *ſo confined*, ſaid he, we *confound all Inquiry*. Allow it.

MARK then, ſaid he, the two grand *Genera*, the LIVES of BUSINESS and of

LEISURE———mark alſo the *ſubordinate* Part I.
Species; the POLITICAL and LUCRATIVE, the CONTEMPLATIVE and PLEASURABLE——Can you think of any other, which *theſe* will not include?

I replied, I knew of none. 'Tis poſſible indeed, ſaid he, that there may be *other* Lives framed, by the *blending* of theſe, two or more of them together. But if we ſeparate with Accuracy, we ſhall find that here they all terminate.

I replied, ſo it ſeemed probable.

IF then, continued he, we would be exact in our Inquiry, we muſt *examine theſe four Lives*, and mark their *Conſequences*. 'Tis thus only we ſhall learn, how far thoſe, who embrace them, find that *Good* and *Happineſs*, which we know *they all purſue*. I made anſwer, It ſeemed neceſſary, and I ſhould willingly attend him.

§. 4. TO begin then, ſaid he, with the POLITICAL LIFE. Let us ſee the GOOD, uſually

Part I. uſually ſought after here. To *a private Man*, it is the Favour of ſome Prince, or Commonwealth; the Honours and Emoluments derived from this Favour; the Court and Homage of Mankind; the Power of commanding others——To *a Prince*, it is the *ſame* Thing nearly, only *greater in Degree*; a larger Command; a ſtricter and more ſervile Homage; Glory, Conqueſt, and extended Empire——Am I right in my Deſcription? I replied, I thought he was. Whether then, ſaid he, *all this* deſerves the Name of *Good* or not, I do not controvert. Be it one, or the other, it affects not our Inquiry. All that I would aſk concerning it, is this—— Do you not think it a *Good* (if it really be one) *derived from Foreign and External Cauſes?* Undoubtedly, replied I. It cannot come then from *ourſelves*, or be *ſelf-derived.* It cannot. And what ſhall we ſay as to its *Duration* and *Stability?* Is it ſo *firm* and *laſting*, that we cannot be *deprived* of it? I ſhould imagine, ſaid I, quite otherwiſe. You inſiſt not then,

then, ſaid he, on my appealing to *Hiſtory*. You acknowledge the Fate of Favourites, of Empires, and their owners. I replied, I did. Part I.

IF ſo, ſaid he, it ſhould ſeem that this *Political Good*, which they ſeek, correſponds not to the *Pre-conceptions* of being *Durable*, and *Indeprivable*. Far from it. But it appeared juſt before, not to be *ſelf-derived*. It did. You ſee then, ſaid he that *in three of our Pre-conceptions it intirely fails*. So indeed, ſaid I, it appears.

BUT farther, ſaid he——We are told of this *Good*, that in the *Poſſeſſion* it is attended with *Anxiety*; and that when *loſt*, it is uſually *loſt* with *Ignominy* and *Diſgrace*; nay, often with Proſecutions and the bittereſt Reſentments; with Mulcts, with Exile, and Death itſelf. 'Tis frequently, ſaid I, the Caſe. How then, ſaid he, can it anſwer that other *Pre-conception, of contributing to our Well-Being?* Can that

Part I. contribute to *Well-Being*, whoſe *Conſequences* lead to *Calamity*, and whoſe *Preſence* implies *Anxiety?* This, it muſt be confeſſed, ſaid I, appears not probable.

BUT once more, ſaid he———There are certain *Habits* or *Diſpoſitions of Mind*, called Sincerity, Generoſity, Candour, Plain-dealing, Juſtice, Honour, Honeſty, and the like. There are. And it has been generally believed, that theſe are *agreeable to Nature.* Aſſuredly. But it has been as generally believed, that the *Political Good*, we ſpeak of, is often not to be acquired but by *Habits*, *contrary to theſe*; and which, if *theſe* are *Natural*, muſt of neceſſity be *unnatural.* What Habits, ſaid I, do you mean? Flattery, anſwered he, Diſſimulation, Intrigue: upon occaſion, perhaps Iniquity, Falſhood, and Fraud. 'Tis poſſible indeed, ſaid I, that theſe may *ſometimes* be thought neceſſary. How then, ſaid he, can that *Good* be *agreeable to Nature*, which cannot be *acquired*, but by *Habits contrary to Nature?*

Nature? Your Argument, ſaid I, ſeems juſt. Part I.

IF then, ſaid he, we have reaſoned rightly, and our Concluſions may be depended on; it ſhould ſeem that the SUPPOSED GOOD, *which the* POLITICAL LIFE *purſues, correſponds not, in any Inſtance, to our Pre-conceptions of the* SOVEREIGN GOOD.

I anſwered, So it appeared.

§. 5. LET us quit then, ſaid he, the *Political Life*, and paſs to the LUCRATIVE. The Object of this is WEALTH. Admit it.

And is it not too often, ſaid he, the Caſe, that *to acquire this*, we are tempted to employ ſome of *thoſe Habits*, which we have juſt condemned as *Unnatural?* Such, I mean, as Fraud, Falſhood, Injuſtice, and the like? It muſt be owned, ſaid I, too often.

BESIDES, continued he——What ſhall we ſay to the *Eſteem*, the *Friendſhip*, and *Love* of *Mankind?* Are they worth having?

Part I. Is it *agreeable*, think you, *to Nature*, to endeavour to *deſerve* them? Agreeable, ſaid I, to Nature, beyond diſpute. If ſo, then to merit *Hatred* and *Contempt*, ſaid he, muſt needs be *contrary to Nature*.

Undoubtedly. And is there any thing which ſo certainly merits *Hatred* and *Contempt*, as a mere *Lucrative Life*, ſpent in the uniform Purſuit of *Wealth?*

I replied, I believed there was nothing.

If ſo, ſaid he, then as to *correſponding with our Pre-conceptions*, the *Lucrative Good*, in this reſpect, fares no better than the *Political*. It appears not.

And what ſhall we ſay as to *Anxiety?* Is not both the *Poſſeſſion* and *Purſuit* of Wealth, to thoſe who really love it, ever *anxious?* It ſeems ſo. And why *anxious*, but from a Certainty of its *Inſtability*; from an Experience, how obnoxious it is to every croſs Event; how eaſy to be loſt and transfer'd to others, by the ſame Fraud and Rapine, which acquired it to ourſelves?——This is indeed the triteſt of all

all Topics. The Poets and Orators have long ago exhauſted it. 'Tis true, ſaid I, they have. May we not venture then, ſaid he, upon the whole, to paſs the *ſame* Sentence on the LUCRATIVE LIFE, as we have already on the *Political*——*that it propoſes not* A GOOD, *correſpondent to thoſe Pre-conceptions, by which we would all be governed in* THE GOOD, *which we are all ſeeking?* I anſwered, We might juſtly. Part I.

§. 6. IF then neither the *Lucrative Life*, nor the *Political*, ſaid he, procure that *Good* which we deſire: ſhall we ſeek it from the PLEASURABLE? Shall we make PLEASURE our *Goddeſs?*

——*Pleaſure,*
Whom Love attends, and ſoft Deſire, and Words
Alluring, apt the ſteadieſt Heart to bend.

So ſays the Poet, and plauſible his Doctrine. Plauſible, ſaid I, indeed.

Part I. LET it then, continued he, be a *pleaſurable World*; a Race of *harmleſs, loving Animals*; an *Elyſian Temperature* of Sunſhine and Shade. Let the *Earth, in every Quarter*, reſemble our own dear Country; where never was a Froſt, never a Fog, never a Day, but was delicious and ſerene.

I was a little embarraſſed at this unexpected Flight, 'till recollecting myſelf, I told him, (but ſtill with ſome Surprize) that, in no degree to diſparage either my Country or my Countrymen, I had never found Either ſo exquiſite, as he now ſuppoſed them. There are then, it ſeems, ſaid he, in the *Natural World*, and even in our own beloved Country, ſuch things as *Storms* and *Tempeſts*; as pinching *Colds*, and ſcorching *Heats*.

I replied, There were. And *conſequent to theſe, Diſeaſe*, and *Famine*, and infinite *Calamities*. There are.

And in the *Civil or Human World*, we have *Diſcord* and *Contention*; or (as the Poet

Poet better * deſcribes it) Part I.

Cruel Revenge, and rancorous Deſpite,
Diſloyal Treaſon, and heart-burning Hate.

We have. Alas! then, poor *Pleaſure!* Where is that GOOD, *accommodate to every Time; ſuited to every Place; ſelf-derived, not dependent on Foreign External Cauſes?* Can it be PLEASURE, on ſuch a *changeable*, ſuch a *turbulent Spot, as this?* I replied, I thought not.

AND what indeed, were the *World*, ſaid he, modelled to a *Temperature the moſt exact?* Were the Rigours of the Seaſons never more to be known; nor Wars, Devaſtations, Famines, or Diſeaſes? Admitting all this, (which we know to be *impoſſible)* can we find ſtill in *Pleaſure* that *lengthened Duration*, which we conſider as an *Eſſential*, to conſtitute the *Sovereign Good?*——Aſk the Glutton, the Drinker, the

* SPENCER's *Fairy Queen*, B. 2. Cant. 7. Stanz. 22.

Part I. the Man of Gaiety and Intrigue, whether they know any *Enjoyment*, not to be cancelled by *Satiety?* Which does not haſtily paſs away into the tedious Intervals of *Indifference?*—— Or yielding all this too, (which we know *cannot be yielded)* where are we to find our *Good*, how poſſeſs it in *Age?* In that Eve of Life, declining Age, when *the Power of Senſe, on which all depends*, like the ſetting Sun, is *gradually forſaking* us?

I SHOULD imagine, ſaid I, that *Pleaſure* was no mean Adverſary, ſince you employ, in attacking her, ſo much of your *Rhetoric*. Without heeding what I ſaid, he purſued his Subject—— Beſide, if this be our *Good*, our *Happineſs*, and our *End*; to what purpoſe *Powers*, which bear no *Relation* to it?—— Why *Memory?* Why *Reaſon? Mere Senſation* might have been as *exquiſite*, had we been *Flies* or *Earth-worms*—— Or can it be proved otherwiſe?

I replied, I could not ſay. *No Animal*, continued he, *poſſeſſes its Faculties in vain*,

vain. And ſhall Man derive no GOOD from his *beſt*, his moſt *eminent?* From That, which of all is *peculiar* to himſelf? For as to *Growth* and *Nutrition*, they are not wanting to the meaneſt *Vegetable*; and for *Senſes*, there are *Animals*, which perhaps *exceed us* in them all. Part I.

§. 7. THIS ſeems, ſaid I, no mean Argument in favour of CONTEMPLATION. The CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE gives *Reaſon* all the Scope, which it can deſire. And of all Lives, anſwered he, would it ſurely be the beſt, did we dwell, like *Milton*'s *Uriel*, in the *Sun's bright Circle*. Then might we plan indeed the moſt *Romantic Kind of Happineſs*. Stretch'd at Eaſe, without Trouble or Moleſtation, we might paſs our Days, *contemplating* the Univerſe; tracing its Beauty; loſt in Wonder; raviſhed with Ecſtacy, and I know not what——But here alas! on this *ſublunary*, this *turbulent* Spot, (as we called it not long ſince) how little is this, or any thing like it, *practicable?*——Fogs ariſe, which

Part I. dim our Proſpects—the *Cares of Life* perpetually moleſt us—Is *Contemplation ſuited to a Place, like this?* It muſt be owned, ſaid I, not extremely. How then is it the *Sovereign Good*, which ſhould be *Accommodate to every Place?* I replied, It ſeemed not probable.

But farther, ſaid he——Can we enjoy the *Sovereign Good*, and be at the ſame time *vexed, and agitated by Paſſion?* Does not this ſeem a Paradox? I anſwered, It did. Suppoſe then an *Event* were to happen—not an *Inundation*, or *Maſſacre*—but an Acquaintance only drop *a diſreſpectful Word*; a Servant chance to break a *favourite Piece of Furniture*—What would inſtruct us to endure this?—— *Contemplation*, Theory, Abſtractions? Why not, ſaid I? No, replied he with Warmth, (quoting the Poet) not

——— * *Tho' all the Stars*
Thou knew'ſt by Name; and all the Etherial
Powers. For

* *Par. Loſt*, B. 12. ℣. 576.

For does not *Experience* teach us, abundantly teach us, that our deepeſt Philoſophers, as to *Temper and Behaviour*, are as very *Children* for the moſt part, as the meaneſt and moſt illiterate? A little more Arrogance perhaps, from Preſumption of what they know, but not a grain more of *Magnanimity*, of *Candour* and *calm Indurance*. Part I.

YOU are ſomewhat too ſevere, ſaid I, in cenſuring of all. There are better and worſe among Them, as among Others.

The *Difference* is no way *proportioned*, ſaid he, to the *Quantity of their Knowledge*; ſo that whatever be its Cauſe, it can't be imputed to their *Speculations*.—— Beſides, can you really imagine, we came here only to *Think?* Is *Acting* a Circumſtance, which is *foreign to Our Character?* ——Why then ſo many *Social Affections*, which all of us feel, even in *ſpite* of ourſelves? Are we to ſuppreſs them All, as *uſeleſs* and *unnatural?* The Attempt, replied I, muſt needs be found impracticable.

Part I. cable. Were they once *ſuppreſſed*, ſaid he, the Conſequences would be ſomewhat ſtrange. We ſhould hear no more of Father, Brother, Huſband, Son, Citizen, Magiſtrate, and *Society itſelf*. And were this ever the Caſe, ill (I fear) would it fare with even *Contemplation* itſelf. It would certainly be but bad *Speculating*, among lawleſs Barbarians—— Unaſſociated Animals——where *Strength* alone of *Body* was to conſtitute *Dominion*, and the Conteſt came to be (as * *Horace* deſcribes it)

——*glandem atque cubilia propter,*
Unguibus & pugnis, dein fuſtibus——

Bad enough, replied I, of all conſcience.

IT ſhould ſeem then, ſaid he, that not even the BEST CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE, however noble its *Object*, *was* AGREEABLE TO OUR PRESENT NATURE, *or conſiſtent with*

* Sat. 3. l. 1. ℣. 99.

with our preſent Situation. I confeſs, Part I.
ſaid I, you appear to have proved ſo.
But if this be allowed true of the *Beſt*, the moſt *Excellent*; what ſhall we ſay to the Mockery of *Monkery*; the Farce of *Friars*; the ridiculous Mummery of being ſequeſtred in a *Cloyſter?* This ſurely is too low a Thing, even to merit an Examination. I have no Scruples here, ſaid I, you need not waſte your Time.

§. 8. IF that, ſaid he, be your Opinion, let us look a little backward. For our Memory's ſake it may be proper to recapitulate. I replied, 'Twould be highly acceptable. Thus then, ſaid he—— We have examined the *four grand Lives*, which we find the Generality of Men embrace; the *Lucrative*, and the *Political*; the *Pleaſurable*, and the *Contemplative*. And we have aimed at proving that—— *to ſuch a Being as* MAN, *with ſuch a Body, ſuch Affections, ſuch Senſes, and ſuch an Intellect——placed in ſuch a* WORLD, *ſubject to ſuch Incidents——not one of theſe* LIVES *is pro-*

Part I. *productive of that* GOOD, *which we find all Men to recognize thro' the ſame uniform* PRE-CONCEPTIONS; *and which thro' one or other of theſe Lives they all of them purſue.*

§. 9. YOU have juſtly, ſaid I, collected the Sum of your Inquiries. And happy, ſaid he, ſhould I think it, were they to terminate here. I aſked him, Why? Becauſe, replied he, to inſinuate firſt, that *all Mankind* are in the wrong; and then to attempt afterwards, to ſhew *one's ſelf* only to be right; is a Degree of Arrogance, which I would not willingly be guilty of. I ventured here to ſay, That I thought he need not be ſo diffident—— that a Subject, where *one's own Intereſt* appeared concerned ſo *nearly*, would well juſtify every *Scruple*, and even the ſevereſt *Inquiry*. There, ſaid he, you ſay ſomething——there you encourage me indeed. For what;———Are we not cautioned againſt *Counterfeits*, even in Matters of meaneſt Value? If a Piece of Metal be tender'd us, which ſeems doubtful, do we

we not heſitate? Do we not try it by the *Teſt*, before we take it for *Current?*—And is not this deem'd *Prudence?* Are we not cenſured, if we act otherwiſe?—— How much more then does it behove us not to be impoſed on *here?* To be diffident and ſcrupulouſly exact, where *Impoſture*, if once admitted, may tempt us to a far worſe Bargain, than ever *Glaucus* made with *Diomed?* Part I.

What Bargain, ſaid I, do you mean?

The Exchange, replied he, not of *Gold* for *Braſs*, but of *Good* for *Evil*, and of *Happineſs* for *Miſery*——But enough of this, ſince you have encouraged me to proceed—We are ſeeking that *Good*, which we think *others* have not found. Permit me thus to purſue my Subject.

§. 10. EVERY Being on this our *Terreſtrial Dwelling*, exiſts *encompaſſed with infinite Objects*; exiſts among Animals *tame*, and Animals *wild*; among Plants and Vegetables of a thouſand *different* Qualities, among Heats and Colds, Tempeſts and Calms, the Friendſhips and Diſcords of *hetero-*

Part I. *heterogeneous Elements*——What ſay you? Are all theſe Things exactly the *ſame* to it; or do they *differ*, think you in their *Effects* and *Conſequences?* They differ, ſaid I, widely. Some perhaps then, ſaid he, are *Apt*, *Congruous*, and *Agreeable to its Natural State*. I replied, They were. Others are *In-apt*, *Incongruous*, and *Diſagreeable*. They are. And others again are *Indifferent*. They are.

It ſhould ſeem then, ſaid he, if this be allowed, that *to every individual Being, without the leaſt Exception, the whole Maſs of Things External, from the greateſt to the meaneſt, ſtood in the Relations of either Agreeable, Diſagreeable, or Indifferent*. I replied, So it appeared.

But tho' this, continued he, be true *in the general*, 'tis yet as certain when we deſcend to Particulars, that what is *Agreeable* to *one Species* is *Diſagreeable* to *another*; and not only ſo, but perhaps *Indifferent* to

a *third.* Inſtances of this kind, he ſaid, were too obvious to be mentioned. Part I.

I REPLIED, 'Twas evident. Whence then, ſaid he, this *Diverſity?*——It cannot ariſe from the *Externals*——for Water is *equally Water*, whether to a *Man*, or to a *Fiſh*; whether, operating on the one, it *ſuffocate*, or on the other, it *give Life and Vigour.* I replied, It was. So is Fire, ſaid he, the *ſame Fire*, however *various* in its Conſequences; whether it *harden* or *ſoften*, give *Pleaſure* or *Pain.* I replied, It was. But if this *Diverſity*, continued he, be not derived from the *Externals*, whence can it be elſe?—— Or can it poſſibly be derived otherwiſe than from the *peculiar Conſtitution*, from the *Natural State* of every Species itſelf? I replied, It appeared probable.

THUS then, ſaid he, is it that *Every particular Species is, itſelf to itſelf, the Meaſure of all Things in the Univerſe—that as Things vary in their Relations to it, they vary*

Part I. *vary too in their Value——and that if their Value be ever doubtful, it can no way be adjuſted, but by recurring with Accuracy to the Natural State of the Species, and to thoſe ſeveral Relations, which ſuch a State of courſe creates.* I anſwered, He argued juſtly.

§. 11. To proceed then, ſaid he—Tho' it be true, that every Species has *a Natural State*, as we have aſſerted; it is not true, that every Species has *a Senſe* or *Feeling* of it. This Feeling or Senſe is a *Natural Eminence* or *Prerogative*, denied the *Vegetable* and *Inanimate*, and imparted only to the *Animal*. I anſwered, It was.

And think you, continued he, that as many as have this *Senſe* or *Feeling* of a Natural State, are *alienated* from it, or *indifferent* to it? Or is it not more probable, that they are *well-affected* to it?
Experience, ſaid I, teaches us, how well they are all affected. You are right, replied he. For what would be more abſurd,

abſurd, than to be *indifferent* to their own *Welfare*; or to be *alienated* from it, as tho' 'twas *Foreign* and *Unnatural?* I replied, Nothing could be more. But, continued he, if they are *well-affected* to this their proper *Natural State*, it ſhould ſeem too they muſt be *well-affected* to all thoſe *Externals*, which appear *apt*, *congruous*, and *agreeable* to it. I anſwered, They muſt. And if ſo, then *ill-affected* or *averſe* to ſuch, as appear the *contrary*. They muſt. And to ſuch as appear *indifferent*, *indifferent*. They muſt. Part I.

But if this, ſaid he, be allowed, it will follow, that in conſequence of theſe *Appearances*, they will think ſome *Externals* worthy of *Purſuit*; ſome worthy of *Avoidance*; and ſome worthy of *neither*.

'Twas probable, ſaid I, they ſhould.

HENCE then, ſaid he, *another Diviſion* of Things *external*; that is, into *Purſuable*, *Avoidable*, and *Indifferent*—a Diviſion only belonging to Beings *Senſitive* and *Animate*, becauſe all, *below theſe*, can neither *avoid*

Part I. nor *purſue*. I replied, They could not.

IF, then, ſaid he, *Man* be allowed in the Number of theſe *Senſitive* Beings, this Diviſion will affect MAN——or to explain more fully, *the whole Maſs of Things external will*, according to this Diviſion, *exiſt to the Human Species in the Relations of Purſuable, Avoidable, and Indifferent.* I replied, They would.

SHOULD we therefere deſire, ſaid he, to know what theſe things truly are, we muſt firſt be informed, what is MAN's truly NATURAL CONSTITUTION. For thus, you may remember, 'twas ſettled not long ſince—that *every Species was its own Standard*, and *that when the Value of Things was doubtful, the Species was to be ſtudied; the Relations to be deduced, which were conſequent to it*; and *in this manner the Value of Things to be adjuſted and aſcertained.* I replied, We had ſo agreed it. I fear then, ſaid he, we are engaged

gaged in a more arduous Undertaking, a Part I.
Taſk of more Difficulty, than we were at firſt aware of—But *Fortuna Fortes*----we muſt endeavour to acquit ourſelves as well as we are able.

§. 12. THAT MAN therefore has a *Body*, of a *Figure* and *internal Structure* peculiar to itſelf; capable of certain Degrees of Strength, Agility, Beauty, and the like; this I believe is evident, and hardly wants a Proof. I anſwered, I was willing to own it. That he is capable too of *Pleaſure* and *Pain*; is poſſeſs'd of *Senſes*, *Affections*, *Appetites*, and *Averſions*; this alſo ſeems evident, and can ſcarcely be denied. I replied, 'Twas admitted.

We may venture then to range HIM in the *Tribe of* ANIMAL BEINGS.
I replied, We might.

AND think you, ſaid he, without *Society*, you or any Man could have been *born?*

Moſt certainly not. Without *Society*, when born, could you have been

Part I. *brought to Maturity?* Moſt certainly not. Had your Parents then had no *Social Affections* towards you in that *perilous* State, that *tedious* Infancy, (ſo much longer than the *longeſt* of *other* Animals) you muſt have inevitably periſhed thro' Want and Inability. I muſt. You perceive then that to *Society* you, and every Man are indebted, not only for the *Beginning* of *Being*, but for the *Continuance*. We are.

Vid. Jambl. Protrept. 56.

SUPPOSE then we paſs from this *Birth* and *Infancy* of Man, to his *Maturity* and *Perfection*——Is there *any Age*, think you, ſo *ſelf-ſufficient*, as that in it he feels no *Wants?* What Wants, anſwered I, do you mean? In the firſt and principal place, ſaid he, that of *Food*; then perhaps that of *Raiment*; and after this, a *Dwelling*, or Defence againſt the Weather. Theſe Wants, replied I, are ſurely Natural at all Ages. And is it not *agreeable to Nature*, ſaid he, that they ſhould at *all Ages* be *ſupplied?* Aſſuredly.

ſuredly. And is it not *more* agreeable to have them *well* ſupplied, than *ill?* Part I.

It is. And *moſt* agreeable, to have them *beſt* ſupplied? Certainly.

If there be then any *one* State, *better than all others*, for the ſupplying theſe *Wants*; *this State, of all others, muſt needs be moſt Natural.* It muſt.

AND what *Supply*, ſaid he, of theſe Wants, ſhall we eſteem the *meaneſt*, which we can conceive?— Would it not be ſomething like this? Had we nothing beyond Acorns for *Food*; beyond a rude Skin, for *Raiment*; or beyond a Cavern, or hollow Tree, to provide us with a *Dwelling?*

Indeed, ſaid I, this would be bad enough.

And do you not imagine, *as far as this*, we might *each* ſupply *ourſelves*, tho' we lived in Woods, mere ſolitary Savages?

I replied, I thought we might.

SUPPOSE then, continued he, that our *Supplies* were to be *mended*—for inſtance, that we were to exchange Acorns for

Part I. Bread—Would our *Savage* Character be ſufficient *here?* Muſt we not be a little better diſciplined? Would not ſome Art be requiſite?—The *Baker's*, for example.

It would. And *previouſly* to the Baker's, that of the *Miller?* It would. And *previouſly* to the Miller's, that of the *Huſbandman?* It would.

Three Arts then appear *neceſſary*, even upon the *loweſt* Eſtimation. 'Tis admitted.

But a Queſtion farther, ſaid he—Can the Huſbandman work, think you, without his *Tools?* Muſt he not have his Plough, his Harrow, his Reap-hook, and the like? He muſt. And muſt not thoſe other Artiſts too be furniſhed in the ſame manner? They muſt. And whence muſt they be furniſhed? From *their own* Arts?—Or are not the *making* Tools, and the *uſing* them, two different Occupations? I believe, ſaid I, they are. You may be convinced, continued he, by ſmall Recollection. Does *Agricul-*

ture

ture make *its own* Plough, *its own* Harrow? Or does it not apply to *other Arts*, for all Neceſſaries of this kind? It does. Again——Does the Baker build *his own* Oven; or the Miller frame *his own* Mill? It appears, ſaid I, no part of their Buſineſs. Part I.

WHAT a *Tribe* of Mechanics then, ſaid he, are advancing upon us?—Smiths, Carpenters, Maſons, Mill-wrights——and all theſe to provide the *ſingle Neceſſary of Bread.* Not leſs than *ſeven* or *eight* Arts, we find, are wanting at the *feweſt.* It appears ſo. And what if to the providing a *comfortable Cottage*, and *Raiment ſuitable to an induſtrious Hind*, we allow a *dozen* Arts more? It would be eaſy, by the ſame Reaſoning, to prove the Number double. I admit the Number, ſaid I, mentioned.

IF ſo, continued he, it ſhould ſeem, that *towards a tolerable Supply of the three Primary and Common Neceſſaries, Food, Raiment,*

Part I. *and a Dwelling, not leſs than twenty Arts were, on the loweſt Account, requiſite.*

It appears ſo.

AND is *one Man* equal, think you, to the *Exerciſe of theſe twenty Arts?* If he had even *Genius*, which we can ſcarce imagine, is it poſſible he ſhould find *Leiſure?*

I replied, I thought not. If ſo, then a *ſolitary, unſocial State can never ſupply tolerably the common Neceſſaries of Life.*

It cannot.

BUT what if we paſs from the *Neceſſaries* of Life, to the *Elegancies?* To Muſic, Sculpture, Painting and Poetry?——What if we paſs from all *Arts* whether *Neceſſary* or *Elegant*, to the large and various Tribe of *Sciences?* To Logic, Mathematics, Aſtronomy, Phyſics?— Can one Man, imagine you, maſter all this? Abſurd, ſaid I, impoſſible. And yet *in this Cycle of Sciences and Arts*, ſeem included all the *Comforts*, as well as *Ornaments* of Life; included all conducive, either to *Being*, or to *Well-Being*.

It

It muſt be confeſſed, ſaid I, it has the Appearance. Part I.

WHAT then, ſaid he, muſt be done? In what manner muſt we be ſupplied?

I anſwered, I knew not, unleſs we made a *Diſtribution*— Let one exerciſe *one* Art? and another a *different*—— Let this Man ſtudy *ſuch* a Science; and that Man, *another*——Thus the whole *Cycle* (as you call it) may be carried eaſily into Perfection. 'Tis true, ſaid he, it may; and every Individual, *as far as his own Art or Science*, might be ſupplied *completely*, and as well as he could wiſh. But what avails a Supply in a *ſingle* Inſtance? What in this caſe are to become of all his *numerous other Wants?* You conceive, replied I, what I would have ſaid, but partially. My Meaning was, that *Artiſt trade with Artiſt*; each ſupply where he is *deficient*, by exchanging where he *abounds*; ſo that a *Portion of every thing may be diſperſed throughout all.* You intend then a *State*, ſaid

Part I. ſaid he, of *Commutation* and *Traffic*.
I replied, I did.

If ſo, continued he, I ſee a new Face of things. The Savages, with their Skins and their Caverns, diſappear. In their place I behold a fair *Community* riſing. No longer Woods, no longer Solitude, but all is *Social*, *Civil*, and *Cultivated*— And can we doubt any farther, whether *Society* be *Natural*? Is not this evidently the *State*, *which can beſt ſupply the Primary Wants?* It has appeared ſo. And did we not agree ſome time ſince, that this *State*, whatever we found it, *would be certainly of all others the moſt agreeable to our Nature?* We did. And have we not added, ſince this, to the Weight of our Argument, by paſſing from the *Neceſſary* Arts to the *Elegant*; from the *Elegant* to the *Sciences*?

We have. The more, ſaid he, we conſider, the more ſhall we be convinced, that *All theſe*, the nobleſt Honours and Ornaments of the Human Mind, without that *Leiſure*, that *Experience*, that *Emulation*,

lation, that *Reward*, which the *Social State* Part I.
alone we know is able to provide them, could never have found *Exiſtence*, or been in the leaſt recognized. Indeed, ſaid I, I believe not.

LET it not be forgot then, ſaid he, in favour of *Society*, that to it we owe, not only the *Beginning* and *Continuation*, but the *Well-Being*, and (if I may uſe the Expreſſion) the very *Elegance* and *Rationality of our Exiſtence*. I anſwered, It appeared evident.

AND what then, continued he?——If *Society* be thus *agreeable to our Nature*, is there nothing, think you, *within* us, to *excite* and *lead* us to it? No *Impulſe*, no *Preparation of Faculties*? It would be ſtrange, anſwered I, if there ſhould not.

'Twould be a ſingular *Exception*, ſaid he, with reſpect to all other *herding* Species—Let us however examine—Pity, Benevolence, Friendſhip, Love; the general Diſlike of Solitude, and Deſire of Company;

Part I. pany; are they *Natural Affections, which come of themſelves*; or are they *taught us by Art*, like Muſic and Arithmetic?

I ſhould think, replied I, they were *Natural*, becauſe in *every* Degree of Men ſome Traces of them may be diſcovered.

And are not the Powers and Capacities of *Speech*, ſaid he, the ſame? Are not all Men *naturally* formed, *to expreſs their Sentiments by ſome kind of Language?* I replied, They were.

If then, ſaid he, theſe ſeveral *Powers*, and *Diſpoſitions* are *Natural*, ſo ſhould ſeem too their *Exerciſe*. Admit it. And if their *Exerciſe*, then ſo too that *State, where alone they can be exerciſed*. Admit it. And what is this *State*, but the *Social?* Or where elſe is it poſſible to *converſe*, or uſe our *Speech*; to exhibit Actions of Pity, Benevolence, Friendſhip or Love; to relieve our *Averſion to Solitude*, or gratify our *Deſire of being with others?* I replied, It could be no where elſe.

You

YOU ſee then, continued he, a *Prepa-* Part I.
ration of Faculties is not wanting. We are fitted with Powers and Diſpoſitions, which have only Relation to *Society*; and which, out of Society, *can no where elſe be exerciſed.*

I replied, It was evident. You have ſeen too the *ſuperior* Advantages of the *Social State*, above *all others*. I have.

LET this then be remember'd, ſaid he, throughout all our future Reaſonings, remember'd as a firſt Principle in our *Ideas* of *Humanity*, that MAN *by Nature is truly a* SOCIAL ANIMAL. I promiſed it ſhould.

§. 13. LET us now, ſaid he, examine what farther we can learn concerning Him. As *Social* indeed, He is diſtinguiſhed from the *Solitary* and *Savage Species*; but in no degree from the reſt, of a *milder* and *more friendly* Nature. 'Tis true, replied I, He is not. Does He then differ no more from

Part I. theſe ſeveral *Social* Species, than they, each of them, differ *from one another?* Muſt we range them *all*, and *Man among the reſt*, under the ſame *common* and *general Genus?*

I ſee no Foundation, ſaid I, for making a Diſtinction.

PERHAPS, ſaid he, there may be none; and 'tis poſſible too there may. Conſider a little—Do you not obſerve in all *other* Species, *a Similarity among Individuals?* a ſurprizing *Likeneſs, which runs thro' each Particular?* In one Species they are all *Bold*; in another, all *Timorous*; in one all *Ravenous*; in another, all *Gentle*. In the Bird-kind only, what a *Uniformity of Voice*, in each Species, as to their Notes; of *Architecture*, as to building their Neſts; of *Food*, both for themſelves, and for ſupporting their Young? 'Tis true, ſaid I.

And do you obſerve, continued he, the *ſame Similarity among Men?* Are theſe all as *Uniform*, as to their *Sentiments* and *Actions?* I replied, By no means.

ONE

ONE Queſtion more, ſaid he, as to the Character of Brutes, if I may be allowed the Expreſſion—Are *theſe*, think you, *what we behold them*, by *Nature* or *otherwiſe*? Part I.

Explain, ſaid I, your Queſtion, for I do not well conceive you. I mean, replied he, is it by *Nature* that the Swallow builds her Neſt, and performs all the Offices of her Kind: Or is ſhe taught by *Art*, by *Diſcipline*, or *Cuſtom*? She acts, replied I, by *pure Nature* undoubtedly. And is not the *ſame* true, ſaid he, of *every other* Bird and Beaſt in the Univerſe? It is. No wonder then, continued he, as they have ſo *wiſe* a Governeſs, that a *uniform Rule of Action* is provided for each Species. For what can be more worthy the Wiſdom of *Nature*, than *ever to the ſame Subſtances to give the ſame Law*? It appears, ſaid I, reaſonable.

BUT what, continued he, ſhall we ſay as to *Man*? Is He too actuated by *Nature purely*? I anſwered, Why not?

Part I. If He be, replied he, 'tis ſtrange in *Nature*, that with reſpect to *Man alone*, ſhe ſhould follow ſo *different* a Conduct. The Particulars in other Species, we agree, ſhe renders *Uniform*; but in *Our's*, every *Particular* ſeems a ſort of *Model by himſelf*. If Nature ſaid I, do not actuate us, what can we ſuppoſe elſe? Are *Local Cuſtoms*, ſaid he, *Nature?* Are the *Polities* and *Religions* of particular Nations, *Nature?* Are the *Examples*, which are ſet before us; the *Preceptors* who inſtruct us; the *Company and Friends*, with whom we converſe, all *Nature?* No ſurely, ſaid I. And yet, ſaid he, 'tis evident that by theſe, and a thouſand *incidental* Circumſtances, equally *foreign* to Nature, our Actions, and Manners, and Characters are adjuſted. Who then can imagine, we are actuated by *Nature only?*

I confeſs, ſaid I, it appears contrary.

You ſee then, ſaid he, one remarkable *Diſtinction* between *Man* and *Brutes* in general—In the *Brute*, *Nature* does *all*; in *Man*,

Man, but *Part only*. 'Tis evident, Part I.
ſaid I.

BUT farther, continued he——Let us conſider the *Powers* or *Faculties*, poſſeſſed by each—Suppoſe I was willing to give a *Brute* the *ſame Inſtruction*, which we give a *Man*. A Parrot perhaps, or Ape, might arrive to ſome ſmall Degree of *Mimicry*; but do you think, upon the whole, they would be much *profited* or *altered*?
I replied, I thought not. And do you perceive the *ſame*, ſaid he, with reſpect to *Man*? Or does not Experience ſhew us the very reverſe? Is not *Education* capable of moulding us into any thing——of making us greatly *Good*, or greatly *Bad*; greatly *Wiſe*, or greatly *Abſurd*? The Fact, ſaid I, is indiſputable.

MARK then, ſaid he, the Difference between *Human* Powers and *Brutal*—The Leading Principle of BRUTES appears to tend in each Species to *one ſingle* Purpoſe—to this, in general, it *uniformly arrives*; and here,

Part I. in general, it as *uniformly ſtops*—it needs no *Precepts* or *Diſcipline* to inſtruct it; nor will it eaſily be *changed*, or *admit a different Direction*. On the contrary, the Leading Principle of MAN is capable of *infinite Directions*——is convertible to *all ſorts of Purpoſes*—equal to *all ſorts of Subjects*—neglected, remains ignorant, and void of every Perfection—— cultivated, becomes adorned with *Sciences* and *Arts*—can raiſe us to excel, not only *Brutes*, but *our own Kind*—with reſpect to our *other* Powers and Faculties, can inſtruct us how to *uſe* them, as well as *thoſe* of the *various Natures*, which we ſee exiſting around us. In a word, to oppoſe the two Principles to each other—The Leading Principle of *Man*, is *Multiform*, *Originally Uninſtructed*, *Pliant* and *Docil*—the Leading Principle of *Brutes* is *Uniform*, *Originally Inſtructed*; but, in moſt Inſtances afterward, *Inflexible* and *Indocil*——Or does not Experience plainly ſhew, and confirm the Truth of what we aſſert? I made anſwer, It did.

You

YOU allow then, ſaid he, the *Human* Part I.
Principle, and the *Brutal*, to be things of different Idea. Undoubtedly. Do they not each then deſerve a different Appellation? I ſhould think ſo. Suppoſe therefore we call the *Human Principle* REASON; and the *Brutal*, INSTINCT: would you object to the Terms? I replied, I ſhould not. If not, continued he, then *Reaſon being peculiar to Man*, of all the Animals inhabiting this Earth, may we not affirm of Him, by way of Diſtinction, that He is a *Rational Animal?*
I replied, We might juſtly.

LET this too then be remember'd, ſaid he, in the Courſe of our Inquiry, that MAN *is by Nature a* RATIONAL ANIMAL.
I promiſed it ſhould.

§. 14. IN conſequence of this, ſaid he, as often as there is Occaſion, I ſhall appeal as well to *Reaſon*, as to *Nature*, for a Standard.
What, ſaid I, do you mean by *Nature?*

Part I. Its Meanings, replied he, are many and various. As it ſtands at preſent oppoſed, it may be enough perhaps to ſay, that *Nature* is *that, which is the Cauſe of every thing, except thoſe Things alone, which are the immediate Effects of Reaſon.* In other words, whatever is not *Reaſon*, or the *Effect* of Reaſon, we would conſider as *Nature*, or the *Effect* of Nature. I anſwered, as he ſo diſtinguiſhed them, I thought he might juſtly appeal to either.

And yet, continued he, there is a remarkable *Difference* between the Standard of *Reaſon*, and that of *Nature*; a Difference, which at no time we ought to forget. What Difference, ſaid I, do you mean? 'Tis this, anſwered he——In *Nature*, the Standard is ſought from among the *Many*; in *Reaſon*, the Standard is ſought from among the *Few*. You muſt explain, ſaid I, your Meaning, for I muſt confeſs you ſeem obſcure.

Thus

THUS then, ſaid he——Suppoſe, as an Anatomiſt, you were ſeeking the Structure of ſome internal Part——To diſcover this, would you not inſpect a *Number* of Individuals? I ſhould. And would you not inform yourſelf, what had been diſcovered by others? I ſhould. And ſuppoſe, after all, you ſhould find a *Multitude* of Inſtances for *one* Structure, and a *few ſingular* for a *different*: By which would you be governed? By the Multitude, ſaid I, undoubtedly. Thus then continued he, *in Nature the Standard*, you ſee, *exiſts among the Many*. I replied, It had ſo appeared. Part I.

AND what, ſaid he, were we to ſeek the Perfection of Sculpture, or of Painting?—Where ſhould we inquire then?—Among the *numerous* common Artiſts, or among the *few* and celebrated? Among the Few, ſaid I. What if we were to ſeek the Perfection of Poetry, or Oratory—Where then? Among the Few ſtill.

Part I. What if we were to ſeek the Perfection of true Argument, or a ſound Logic——Where then? Still among the Few. And is not true Argument, or a ſound Logic, one of *Reaſon*'s greateſt *Perfections?* It is. You ſee then, continued he, whence the Standard of *Reaſon* is to be ſought——'Tis from among the *Few*, as we ſaid before, in contradiſtinction to the Standard of Nature.

I confeſs, ſaid I, it appears ſo.

And happy, ſaid he, for us, that Providence has ſo ordered it—happy for us, that what is *Rational*, depends not on the *Multitude*; or is to be tried by ſo pitiful a Teſt, as the bare counting of Noſes. 'Tis happy, ſaid I, indeed——But whence pray the Difference? Why are the *Many* to determine in *Nature*, and the *Few* only, in *Reaſon?*

To diſcuſs this at large, ſaid he, would require ſome time. It might inſenſibly perhaps draw us from our preſent Inquiry. I will endeavour to give you the Reaſon, in as few words as poſſible; which ſhould they chance to be obſcure, be not

too

too ſolicitous for an Explanation. Part I.
I begged him to proceed his own way.

THE Caſe, ſaid he, appears to be this—In *Natural* Works and *Natural* Operations, we hold but *one Efficient Cauſe*, and that conſummately *wiſe*. This Cauſe in *every* Species recognizing *what is beſt*, and working ever *uniformly* according to this *Idea of Perfection*, the *Productions* and *Energies*, in every Species where it acts, are for the moſt part *ſimilar* and exactly *correſpondent*. If an *Exception* ever happen, it is from ſome *hidden higher Motive*, which tranſcends our Comprehenſion, and which is ſeen *ſo rarely*, as not to injure the *general Rule*, or render it doubtful and precarious. On the contrary, in the Productions and Energies of *Reaſon*, there is not *one* Cauſe but *infinite*——as many indeed, as there are *Agents* of the Human Kind. Hence *Truth* being but *one*, and *Error* being *infinite*, and Agents infinite alſo: what wonder they ſhould oftener miſs, than hit the Mark?—that *Multitudes* ſhould fail, where *one* alone

Part I. ſucceeds, and Truth be only the Poſſeſſion of the *choſen, fortunate Few?* You ſeem to have explained the Difficulty, ſaid I, with ſufficient Perſpicuity.

LET us then go back, ſaid he, and recollect ourſelves; that we may not forget, what 'tis we are ſeeking. I replied, Moſt willingly. We have been ſeeking, continued he, the *Sovereign Good.* In conſequence of this Inquiry, we have diſcovered—that *all Things whatever exiſt to the Human Species in the Relations of either Purſuable, Avoidable, or Indifferent.* To determine theſe Relations with Accuracy, we have been ſcrutinizing the Human Nature; and that, upon this known Maxim, that *every Species was its own proper Standard; and that where the Value of Things was dubious, there the Species was to be ſtudied, and the Relations to be deduced, which naturally flow from it.* The Reſult of this Scrutiny has been——that we have firſt agreed Man to be a *Social* Animal; and ſince, to be a *Rational.* So that if we can

can be content with a deſcriptive, conciſe Sketch of *Human Nature*, it will amount to this—that MAN IS A SOCIAL RATIONAL ANIMAL. I anſwered, It had appeared ſo. Part I.

§. 15. IF then, ſaid he, we purſue our Diſquiſitions, agreeably to this Idea of Human Nature, it will follow that all Things will be *Purſuable*, *Avoidable*, *and Indifferent to Man*, as they reſpect the Being and Welfare of ſuch a *Social, Rational Animal.* I replied, They muſt.

NOTHING therefore in the firſt place, ſaid he, can be Purſuable, which is *deſtructive of Society.* It cannot.
Acts therefore of Fraud and Rapine, and all acquired by them, whether Wealth, Power, Pleaſure, or any thing, are evidently from their very Character not fit to be purſued. They are not.
But it is impoſſible not to purſue many ſuch things, unleſs we are furniſhed with ſome *Habit or Diſpoſition* of Mind, by which

Part I. which we are induced *to render to all Men their own*, and to regard the Welfare, and Intereſt of Society. It is impoſſible.

But the *Habit or Diſpoſition of rendering to all their own*, and of regarding the Welfare and Intereſt of Society, is JUSTICE. It is. We may therefore fairly conclude, that *Nothing is naturally Purſuable, but what is either correſpondent to Juſtice, or at leaſt not contrary.*

I confeſs, ſaid I, ſo it appears.

BUT farther, ſaid he—'Tis poſſible we may have the beſt Diſpoſition to Society; the moſt upright Intentions; and yet thro' *Want of Ability to diſcern*, and know the Nature of Particulars, we may purſue many things inconſiſtent. as well with our Private Intereſt, as the Public. We may even purſue what is *Right*, and yet purſue it in ſuch a manner, as to find our Endeavours *fruitleſs*, and our Purpoſes to fail.

I anſwered, 'Twas poſſible.

But this would ill befit the Character of a *Rational Animal.* It would. It is neceſ-

neceſſary therefore, we ſhould be furniſhed with ſome *Habit or Faculty*, inſtructing us how to diſcern the *real Difference of all Particulars*, and ſuggeſting the proper Means, by which we may either *avoid* or *obtain* them. It is. And what is this, think you, but PRUDENCE?

Part I.

I believe, ſaid I, it can be no other.

If it be, ſaid he, then 'tis evident from this Reaſoning, that *Nothing is purſuable, which is not correſpondent to Prudence.*

I replied, He had ſhewn it could not.

BUT farther ſtill, ſaid he—'Tis poſſible we may neither want *Prudence*, nor *Juſtice* to direct us; and yet the *Impulſes of Appetite*, the *Impetuoſities of Reſentment*, the *Charms* and *Allurements* of a thouſand flattering Objects, may tempt us, in ſpite of ourſelves, to purſue what is both *Imprudent*, and *Unjuſt*. They may. But if ſo, 'tis neceſſary, would we purſue as *becomes our Character*, that we ſhould be furniſhed with ſome *Habit*, which may *moderate our Exceſſes*; which may temper

Part I. our Actions to the Standard of a *Social State*, and to the Intereſt and Welfare, not of a *Part*, but of the *Whole* Man.

Nothing, ſaid I, more neceſſary. And what, ſaid he, can we call this *Habit*, but the Habit of TEMPERANCE? You name it, ſaid I, rightly. If you think ſo, replied he, then *Nothing can be Purſuable, which is not either correſpondent to Temperance, or at leaſt not contrary.*

I replied, So it ſeemed.

ONCE more, continued he, and we have done—'Tis poſſible that not only *Reſentment* and *Appetite*, not only the *Charms and Allurements* of external Objects, but the *Terrors* too, and *Dread* of them may *marr the Rectitude of our Purpoſes.* 'Tis poſſible.

Tyranny and Superſtition may aſſail us on one hand; the Apprehenſions of Ridicule, and a *Falſe Shame* on the other—'Tis expedient, to withſtand theſe, we ſhould be armed with ſome *Habit*, or our wiſeſt beſt Purſuits may elſe at all times be defeated. They may. And what is that

that generous, manlike and noble *Habit*, which ſets us at all times above *Fear* and *Danger*; what is it but FORTITUDE? Part I.

I replied, It was no other. If ſo then, continued he, beſides our former Concluſions, *Nothing farther can be Purſuable*, as our Inquiries now have ſhewn us, *which is not either correſpondent to Fortitude, or at leaſt not contrary.* I admit, ſaid I, it is not.

OBSERVE then, ſaid he, the Sum, the Amount of our whole Reaſoning——*Nothing is truly Purſuable to ſuch an Animal as Man, except what is correſpondent, or at leaſt not contrary, to* JUSTICE, PRUDENCE, TEMPERANCE and FORTITUDE. I allow, ſaid I, it appears ſo. But if nothing *Purſuable*, then nothing *Avoidable* or *Indifferent*, but what is tried and eſtimated after the *ſame* manner. For *Contraries are ever recognized thro' the ſame Habit*, one with another. The ſame Logic judges of Truth and Falſhood; the ſame Muſical Art, of Concord and Diſcord. So the ſame

Mental

Part I. *Mental Habitudes*, of Things *Avoidable* and *Purſuable*. I replied, It appeared probable.

To how unexpected a Concluſion then, ſaid he, have our Inquiries inſenſibly led us?——In tracing the Source of Human Action, we have eſtabliſhed it to be thoſe FOUR GRAND VIRTUES, which are eſteemed, for their Importance, the very HINGES OF ALL MORALITY. We have.

BUT if ſo, it ſhould follow, that a *Life*, whoſe *Purſuings* and *Avoidings* are governed by theſe *Virtues*, is that *True and Rational Life*, which we have ſo long been ſeeking; that *Life*, where the *Value of all things is juſtly meaſured by thoſe Relations, which they bear to the Natural Frame and real Conſtitution of Mankind*—in fewer Words, A LIFE OF VIRTUE appears to be THE LIFE ACCORDING TO NATURE. It appears ſo.

BUT

BUT in *ſuch* a Life every *Purſuit*, every *Avoiding*, (to include all) every *Action* will of courſe admit of being *rationally juſtified*. Part I.

It will. But *That, which being Done, admits of a Rational Juſtification*, is the Eſſence or genuine Character of an *Office*, or MORAL DUTY. For thus long ago it has been defined by the beſt *Authorities. Admit it. If ſo, then A LIFE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE, is A LIFE ACCORDING TO MORAL OFFICES OR DUTIES. It appears ſo. But we have already agreed it, to be a *Life according to Nature*. We have. Obſerve then: A LIFE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE, ACCORDING TO MORAL OFFICES, and ACCORDING TO NATURE, mean all the THE SAME THING, tho' *varied* in the Expreſſion. Your Remark, ſaid I, ſeems juſt.

§. 16. WE need never therefore, replied he, be at a loſs how to chuſe, tho' the

* BY *Tully* in his Offices, and by other Authors of Antiquity.

Part I. the Objects of Choice be ever ſo infinite and diverſified. *As far as nothing is inconſiſtent with ſuch a Life and ſuch a Character*, we may juſtly ſet Exiſtence before Death; prefer Health to Sickneſs; Integrity of the Limbs, to being maimed and debilitated; Pleaſure to Pain; Wealth to Poverty; Fame to Diſhonour; Free Government to Slavery; Power and Magiſtracy, to Subjection and a private State—Univerſally, whatever tends either to *Being*, or to *Well-Being*, we may be juſtified, when we *prefer* to whatever appears the *contrary*. And when our ſeveral Energies, exerted according to the Virtues juſt mentioned, have put us in Poſſeſſion of all that we require: when we enjoy, *ſubjoined to a right and honeſt Mind, both Health of Body, and Competence of Externals:* what can there be wanting to *complete our Happineſs*; to render our State *perfectly conſonant to Nature*; or to give us a more *Sovereign Good*, than that which we *now* enjoy?

Nothing, replied I, that I can at preſent think of.

THERE

THERE would be nothing indeed, said he, *were our Energies never to fail*; were *all* our Endeavours to be ever crowned with due *Succeſs*. But ſuppoſe the contrary—— Suppoſe the *worſt Succeſs* to the *moſt upright Conduct*; to the wiſeſt Rectitude of Energies and Actions. 'Tis poſſible, nay Experience teaches us 'tis too often fact, that not only the Purſuers of what is *contrary to Nature*, but that thoſe who purſue nothing but what is *ſtrictly congruous to it*, may *miſs of their Aims*, and be *fruſtrated in their Endeavours*. Inquiſitors and Monks may deteſt them for their Virtue, and purſue them with all the Engines of Malice and Inhumanity. Without theſe, Peſts may afflict their Bodies; Inundations o'erwhelm their Property; or what is worſe than Inundations, either Tyrants, Pirates, Heroes, or Banditti. They may ſee their Country fall, and with it their braveſt Countrymen; themſelves pillaged, and reduced to Extremities, or Part I.

Part I. periſhing with the reſt in the general Maſſacre.

——* *cadit & Ripheus, juſtiſſimus unus*
Qui fuit in Teucris, & ſervantiſſimus æqui.

It muſt be owned, ſaid I, this has too often been the Caſe.

OR grant, continued he, that theſe *greater* Events never happen——that the Part allotted us, be not in the *Tragedy* of Life, but in the *Comedy*. Even the *Comic Diſtreſſes* are abundantly irkſome——Domeſtic Jars, the ill Offices of Neighbours——Suſpicions, Jealouſies, Schemes defeated——The Folly of Fools; the Knavery of Knaves; from which, as Members of Society, 'tis impoſſible to detach ourſelves.

WHERE

* ÆNEID. l. 2. v. 426.

WHERE then ſhall we turn, or what have we to imagine? We have at length placed HAPPINESS, after much Inquiry, in ATTAINING *the primary and juſt Requiſites of our Nature, by a Conduct ſuitable to Virtue and Moral Office.* But as to *correſponding with our Pre-conceptions* (which we have made the Teſt) does this Syſtem correſpond better, than thoſe *others*, which we have rejected? Has it not appeared from various Facts, too obvious to be diſputed, that in many *Times* and *Places* it may be abſolutely *unattainable?* That in many, where it exiſts, it may *in a moment be cancelled*, and put irretrievably *out of our Power*, by Events *not to be reſiſted?* If this be certain, and I fear it cannot be queſtioned, our ſpecious long Inquiry, however accurate we may believe it, has not been able to ſhew us a *Good*, of that Character which we require; a GOOD *Durable, Indeprivable, and Accommodate to every Circumſtance*——Far from it——Our Speculations Part I.

Part I. (I think) rather lead us to that *low Opinion* of Happineſs, which you may remember you * expreſſed, when we firſt began the Subject. They rather help to prove to us, that inſtead of a *Sovereign Good*, 'tis the more probable Sentiment, *there is no ſuch Good at all.* I ſhould indeed, ſaid I, fear ſo. For where, continued he, lies the Difference, whether we purſue what is *congruous* to Nature, or not *congruous*; if the *Acquiſition* of *one* be as *difficult*, as of the *other*, and the *Poſſeſſion* of *both* equally *doubtful and precarious?* If *Cæſar* fall, in attempting his Country's Ruin; and *Brutus* fare no better, who only fought in its Defence? It muſt be owned, ſaid I, theſe are melancholy Truths, and the Inſtances, which you alledge, too well confirm them.

We were in the midſt of theſe ſerious Thoughts, deſcanting upon the Hardſhips and

* *See* p. 111.

and Miſeries of Life, when by an Inci- Part I.
dent, not worth relating, our Speculations were interrupted. Nothing at the time, I thought, could have happened more unluckily——our Queſtion perplexed——its Iſſue uncertain——and myſelf impatient to know the Event. Neceſſity however was not to be reſiſted, and thus for the preſent our Inquiries were poſtponed.

CONCERNING HAPPINESS,

A DIALOGUE.

PART the SECOND.

BRUTUS *periſhed untimely, and* Cæſar *did no more*—Theſe Words I was repeating the next Day to myſelf, when my Friend appeared, and chearfully bade me Good-Morrow. I could not return his Compliment with an equal Gaiety, being intent, ſomewhat more than uſual, on what had paſſed the day before. Seeing this, he propoſed a Walk into the Fields. The Face of Nature, ſaid he, will perhaps diſpel theſe Glooms. No Aſſiſtance, on my part, ſhall be wanting,

Part II.

Part II. you may be assured. I accepted his Proposal; the Walk began; and our former Conversation insensibly renewed.

BRUTUS, said he, *perished untimely, and* Cæsar *did no more.*——'Twas thus, as I remember, not long since you were expressing yourself. And yet suppose their Fortunes to have been exactly *parallel*—— Which would you have preferred? Would you have been *Cæsar* or *Brutus?*

Brutus, replied I, beyond all Controversy, He asked me, Why? Where was the Difference, when their Fortunes, as we now supposed them, were considered as the *same?*

There seems, said I, abstract from their *Fortunes*, something, I know not what, *intrinsically preferable* in the Life and Character of *Brutus*. If that, said he, be true, then must we derive it, not from the *Success* of his Endeavours, but from their *Truth* and *Rectitude*. He had the Comfort to be conscious, that his Cause was a just one. 'Twas impossible the other should have

have any ſuch Feeling. I believe, ſaid I, you have explained it. Part II.

SUPPOSE then, continued he, ('tis but merely an Hypotheſis) ſuppoſe, I ſay, we were to place the SOVEREIGN GOOD *in ſuch a Rectitude of Conduct*—*in the* CONDUCT *merely, and not in the* EVENT. Suppoſe we were to fix our HAPPINESS, *not in the actual Attainment* of that Health, that Perfection of a Social State, that fortunate Concurrence of Externals, which is congruous to our Nature, and which we have a Right all to purſue; but ſolely fix it *in the mere* DOING *whatever is correſpondent to ſuch an End*, even tho' we *never* attain, or are *near* attaining it. In fewer words—What if we make our Natural State *the Standard only to determine our Conduct*; and place our Happineſs in *the Rectitude of this Conduct alone?*—On ſuch an Hypotheſis (and we conſider it as nothing farther) we ſhould not want a *Good* perhaps, *to correſpond to our Pre-conceptions*; for this, 'tis evident, would be correſpondent to them

all.

Part II. *all.* Your Doctrine, replied I, is ſo new and ſtrange, that tho' you have been copious in explaining, I can hardly yet comprehend you.

It amounts all, ſaid he, but to this—— Place your *Happineſs*, where your *Praiſe* is. I aſked, Where he ſuppoſed that? Not, replied he, in the Pleaſures which you feel, more than your Diſgrace lies in the Pain——not in the caſual Proſperity of Fortune, more than your Diſgrace in the caſual Adverſity—— but in *juſt complete Action throughout every Part of Life, what ever be the Face of Things, whether favourable or the contrary.*

But why then, ſaid I, ſuch *Accuracy* about *Externals?* So much Pains to be informed, what are *Purſuable*, what *Avoidable?* It behoves the Pilot, replied he, to know the Seas and the Winds; the Nature of Tempeſts, Calms and Tides. They are the *Subjects*, about which his Art

is converſant. Without a juſt Experience of them, he can never *prove* himſelf an *Artiſt*. Yet we look not for his *Reputation* either in *fair* Gales, or in *adverſe*; but in the *Skilfulneſs of his Conduct*, be theſe Events as they happen. In like manner fares it with this the *Moral* Artiſt. He, for a *Subject*, has *the Whole of Human Life*—— Health and Sickneſs; Pleaſure and Pain; with every other poſſible Incident, which can befal him during his Exiſtence. If his *Knowledge* of all theſe be accurate and exact, ſo too muſt his *Conduct*, in which we place his *Happineſs*. But if this *Knowledge* be defective, muſt not his *Conduct* be defective alſo? I replied, So it ſhould ſeem. And if his Conduct, then his *Happineſs*? 'Tis true. Part II.

You ſee then, continued he, even tho' *Externals were as nothing*; tho' 'twas true, in their own Nature, they were neither *Good* nor *Evil*; yet an *accurate Knowledge of them* is, from our Hypotheſis, abſolutely *neceſſary*.

Part II. *neceſſary.* Indeed, ſaid I, you have proved it.

He continued——Inferior Artiſts may be at a ſtand, becauſe they *want* Materials. From their *Stubborneſs* and *Intractability*, they may often be diſappointed. But as long as *Life* is paſſing, and *Nature* continues to operate, the *Moral Artiſt of Life* has at all times, all he deſires. He can never want a *Subject* fit to exerciſe him in his proper Calling; and that, with this happy Motive to the Conſtancy of his Endeavours, that, the croſſer, the harſher, the more untoward the *Events*, the greater his *Praiſe*, the more illuſtrious his *Reputation*.

All this, ſaid I, is true, and cannot be denied. But one Circumſtance there appears, where your Similes ſeem to fail. The *Praiſe* indeed of the Pilot we allow to be in his *Conduct*; but 'tis in the *Succeſs* of that Conduct, where we look for his *Happineſs*. If a Storm ariſe, and the Ship

be loſt, we call him not *happy*, how well ſoever he may have conducted. 'Tis then only we congratulate him, when he has reached the deſired Haven. Your Diſtinction, ſaid he, is juſt. And 'tis here lies the *noble Prerogative of Moral Artiſts*, above all others——But yet I know not how to explain myſelf, I fear my Doctrine will appear ſo ſtrange. You may proceed, ſaid I ſafely, ſince you advance it but as an *Hypotheſis*. Part II.

THUS then, continued he——The *End* in other Arts is ever *diſtant* and *removed*. It conſiſts not in the *mere Conduct*, much leſs in a *ſingle Energy*; but is *the juſt Reſult of many Energies*, each of which are eſſential to it. Hence, by Obſtacles unavoidable, it may often be *retarded*: Nay more, may be ſo embaraſſed, as *never poſſibly to be attained*. But in the *Moral Art* of Life, the very CONDUCT is the END; the very *Conduct*, I ſay, itſelf, throughout every its *minuteſt* Energy; becauſe *each* of theſe, however *minute*, partake as truly of *Rectitude*,

Part II. *Rectitude*, as the *largeſt Combination of them*, when conſidered collectively. Hence of all Arts is this the only one *perpetually complete in every Inſtant*, becauſe it needs not, like other Arts, *Time* to arrive at that Perfection, at which in *every Inſtant* 'tis arrived already. Hence by *Duration* it is not rendered either *more* or *leſs* perfect; *Completion*, like Truth, admitting of no Degrees, and being in no ſenſe capable of either *Intenſion* or *Remiſſion*. And hence too by neceſſary Connection (which is a greater Paradox than all) even that *Happineſs* or *Sovereign Good*, the End of this Moral Art, is itſelf too, *in every Inſtant, Conſummate and Complete*; is neither *heightened* or *diminiſhed* by the Quantity of its *Duration*, but is the ſame to its Enjoyers, for a *Moment* or a *Gentury*.

UPON this I ſmiled. He aſked me the Reaſon. 'Tis only to obſerve, ſaid I, the Courſe of our Inquiries----A new Hypotheſis has been advanced———Appearing ſomewhat ſtrange, it is deſired to be explained—

plained-----You comply with the Requeſt, and in purſuit of the Explanation, make it ten times more *obſcure* and *unintelligible*, than before. 'Tis but too often the Fate, ſaid he, of us Commentators. But you know in ſuch caſes what is uſually done. When the Comment will not explain the Text, we try whether the Text will not explain itſelf. This Method, 'tis poſſible, may aſſiſt us here. The Hypotheſis, which we would have illuſtrated, was no more than this-----That the *Sovereign Good lay in Rectitude of Conduct*; and that *this Good correſponded to all our Pre-conceptions*. Let us examine then, whether, upon trial, this Correſpondence will appear to hold; and, for all that we have advanced ſince, ſuffer it to paſs, and not perplex us. Part II.

Agreed, ſaid I, willingly, for now I hope to comprehend you.

§. 2. RECOLLECT then, ſaid he. Do you not remember that *one Pre-conception* of the *Sovereign Good* was, to be *accommodate to all Times and Places?* I remember it.

And

Part II. And is there any *Time*, or any *Place*, whence *Rectitude of Conduct* may be *excluded?* Is there not a right Action in Proſperity, a right Action in Adverſity?—May there not be a decent, generous, and laudable *Behaviour*, not only in Peace, in Power, and in Health; but in War, in Oppreſſion, in Sickneſs and in Death?

There may.

And what ſhall we ſay to thoſe *other Pre-conceptions*——to being *Durable, Self-derived,* and *Indeprivable?* Can there be any *Good* ſo *Durable*, as the Power of always doing right? Is there any *Good* conceivable, ſo intirely *beyond the Power of others?* Or, if you heſitate, and are doubtful, I would willingly be informed, into what Circumſtances may Fortune throw a brave and honeſt Man, where it ſhall not be in his Power to *act bravely and honeſtly?* If there are no ſuch, then *Rectitude of Conduct*, if a *Good*, is *a Good Indeprivable.*

I confeſs, ſaid I, it appears ſo.

But

BUT farther, said he——Another *Pre-conception* of the *Sovereign Good* was, to be *Agreeable to Nature.* It was. And can any thing be more agreeable to *a Rational and Social Animal*, than *Rational and Social Conduct?* Nothing. But *Rectitude of Conduct* is with us *Rational and Social Conduct.* It is. Part II.

ONCE more, continued he——Another *Pre-conception* of this *Good* was, to be *Conducive*, not to Mere-being, but *to Well-being.* Admit it. And can any thing, believe you, conduce so probably to the *Well-being* of a Rational Social Animal, as the right *Exercise* of that *Reason*, and of those *Social Affections?* Nothing. And what is this same *Exercise*, but the *highest Rectitude of Conduct?* Certainly.

§. 3. YOU see then, said he, how well our Hypothesis, being once admitted, tallies with our *Original Pre-conceptions* of the *Sovereign Good.* I replied, it in-

Part II. deed appeared ſo, and could not be denied. But who, think you, ever dreamt of a Happineſs like this? A Happineſs dependent, not on the *Succeſs*, but on the *Aim*?

Even common and ordinary Life, replied he, can furniſh us with Examples. Aſk of the Sportſman where lies his Enjoyment? Aſk whether it be in the *Poſſeſſion* of a ſlaughter'd Hare, or Fox? He would reject, with Contempt, the very Suppoſition----He would tell you, as well as he was able, that the Joy was in the *Purſuit*----in the Difficulties which are obviated; in the Faults, which are retrieved; in the *Conduct* and Direction of the Chace thro' all its Parts----that the *Completion* of their Endeavours was ſo far from giving them Joy, that inſtantly at that Period all their Joy was at an End. For Sportſmen, replied I, this may be no bad Reaſoning. It is not the Sentiment, ſaid he, of Sportſmen alone. The Man of Gallantry not unoften has been found to think after the ſame manner.

—*Meu*

—* *Meus eſt amor huic ſimilis; nam* Part II.
Tranſvolvat in medio poſita, & fugientia captat.

To theſe we may add the Tribe of Builders and Projectors. Or has not your own Experience informed you of Numbers, who, in the *Building* and *Laying-out*, have expreſſed the higheſt *Delight*; but ſhewn the utmoſt Indifference to the *Reſult* of their Labours, to the Manſion or Gardens, when once finiſhed and complete?

THE Truth, ſaid I, of theſe Examples is not to be diſputed. But I could wiſh your Hypotheſis had better than theſe to ſupport it. In the *ſerious View of Happineſs*, do you ever imagine there were any, who could fix it (as we ſaid before) not on the *Succeſs*, but on the *Aim?*

More, even in this light, ſaid he, than perhaps at firſt you may imagine. There are Inſtances innumerable of Men, *bad* as well as *good*, who having fixed, as their *Aim*, a *certain Conduct* of their own, have

* HOR. Sat. II. L. 1. v. 107.

Part II. ſo far attached their Welfare and *Happineſs* to it, as to deem *all Events* in its Proſecution, whether fortunate or unfortunate, to be mean, contemptible, and *not worthy their Regard.* I called on him for Examples.

WHAT think you, ſaid he, of the Aſſaſſin, who ſlew the firſt *Prince* of *Orange*; and who, tho' brought by his Conduct to the moſt exquiſite Tortures, yet *conſcious of what he had done*, could bear them all unmoved? Or (if you will have a better Man) what think you of that ſturdy *Roman*, who would have diſpatched *Porſenna*; and who, full of his Deſign, and ſuperior to all Events, could thruſt a Hand into the Flames with the ſteadieſt Intrepidity?
I replied, That theſe indeed were very uncommon Inſtances.

ATTEND too, continued he, to *Epicurus* dying, the Founder of a Philoſophy, little favouring of *Enthuſiaſm*----- "*This I* "*write you* (ſays he, in one of his Epiſtles) "*while the laſt Day of Life is paſſing, and* "*that*

" *that a* HAPPY *One. The Pains indeed of* Part II.
" *my Body are not capable of being heigh-*
" *tened. Yet to these we oppose that Joy of*
" *the Soul, which arises from the Memory*
" *of our past Speculations.*"——Hear him, consonant to this, in another Place asserting, that *a Rational Adversity was better than an Irrational Prosperity.*

AND what think you?——Had he not placed his *Good* and *Happiness* in the supposed *Rectitude of his Opinions*, would he not have preferred *Prosperity*, at all rates, to *Adversity?* Would not the Pains, of which he died, have made his Happiness perfect Misery?——And yet, you see, he disowns any such thing. The Memory of his past Life, and of his Philosophical Inventions were, even in the Hour of Death it seems, a Counterpoise to support him.

It must be owned, said I, that you appear to reason justly.

PASS from *Epicurus*, continued he, to *Socrates*. What are the Sentiments of that

Part II. divine Man, ſpeaking of his own unjuſt Condemnation? "*O Crito*, ſays he, *if it* "*be pleaſing to the Gods this way, then be* "*it this way.*" And again----"Anytus "*and* Melitus, *I grant, can kill me*; *but* "*to hurt or injure me, is beyond their* "*Power.*" It would not have been beyond it, had he thought his Welfare dependent on any thing they could do; for they were then doing their worſt—— Whence then was it beyond them?---- Becauſe his Happineſs was derived not from *without*, but from *within*; not from the *Succeſs*, which perhaps was due to the Rectitude of his Life, but from that *Rectitude* alone, every other thing diſregarded. He had not, it ſeems, ſo far renounced his own Doctrine, as not to remember his former Words; that——"*To whom ever* "*all things, conducive to Happineſs, are de-* "*rived ſolely, or at leaſt nearly from him-* "*ſelf, and depend not on the Welfare or* "*Adverſity of others, from the Variety of* "*whoſe Condition his own muſt vary alſo:* "*He it is, who has prepared to himſelf the*

"*moſt*

" *moſt excellent of all Lives*——*He it is, who* Part II.
" *is the Temperate, the Prudent, and the*
" *Brave*----*He it is, who, when Wealth or*
" *Children either come or are taken away,*
" *will beſt obey the Wiſe Man's Precept*-----
" *For neither will he be ſeen to grieve, nor*
" *to rejoice in exceſs, from the Truſt and*
" *Confidence which he has repoſed in himſelf.*"
—You have a Sketch at leaſt of his Meaning, tho' far below his own *Attic* and truly elegant Expreſſion. I grant, ſaid I, your Example; but this and the reſt are but ſingle Inſtances. What are three or four in Number, to the whole of Human Kind?

IF you are for Numbers, replied he, what think you of the numerous Race of Patriots, in all Ages and Nations, who have joyfully met Death, rather than deſert their Country, when in danger? They muſt have thought ſurely on *another* Happineſs than *Succeſs*, when they could gladly go, where they ſaw Death often inevitable. Or what think you of the many Martyrs

Part II. for Syſtems wrong as well as right, who have dared defy the worſt, rather than ſwerve from their Belief? You have brought indeed, ſaid I, more Examples than could have been imagined.

BESIDES, continued he, what is that *Comfort of a* GOOD CONSCIENCE, celebrated to ſuch a height in the Religion which we profeſs, but the Joy ariſing from a Conſcience of right *Energies*; a Conſcience of having done nothing, but what is conſonant to our Duty? I replied, It indeed appeared ſo.

EVEN the Vulgar, continued he, recognize a *Good* of this very Character, when they ſay of an Undertaking, tho' it *ſucceed not*, that they are *contented*; that they have *done their beſt*, and can accuſe themſelves of nothing. For what is this, but placing their *Content*, their *Good*, their *Happineſs*, not in the *Succeſs* of Endeavours, but in the *Rectitude*? If it be not the Rectitude which contents them, you muſt tell

tell me what 'tis elſe. It appears, replied I, to be that alone. Part II.

I HOPE then, continued he, that tho' you accede not to this Notion of Happineſs, which I advance; you will at leaſt allow it not to be ſuch a Paradox, as at firſt you ſeemed to imagine. That indeed, replied I, cannot be denied you.

§. 4. GRANTING me this, ſaid he, you encourage me to explain myſelf----We have ſuppoſed the *Sovereign Good* to lie in *Rectitude of Conduct*. We have. And think you there can be Rectitude of Conduct, if we do not *live conſiſtently?* In what Senſe, ſaid I, would you be underſtood? *To live conſiſtently*, ſaid he, is the ſame with me, as *To live agreeably to ſome one ſingle and conſonant Scheme, or Purpoſe*. Undoubtedly, ſaid I, without this, there can be no Rectitude of Conduct. *All Rectitude* of Conduct then, you ſay, implies ſuch *Conſiſtence*. It does. And does all *Conſiſtence*, think you, imply ſuch

Part II. ſuch *Rectitude?* I aſked him, Why not? 'Tis poſſible, indeed it may, ſaid he, for aught we have diſcovered yet to the contrary. But what if it ſhould be found that there may be numberleſs Schemes, each in particular *conſiſtent with itſelf*, but yet all of them *different*, and ſome perhaps *contrary?* There may, you know, be a *conſiſtent* Life of Knavery, as well as a *conſiſtent* Life of Honeſty; there may be a *uniform* Practice of Luxury, as well as of Temperance, and Abſtemiouſneſs. Will the Conſiſtence, *common to all of theſe Lives*, render the *Conduct* in each, *right?* It appears, ſaid I, an Abſurdity, that there ſhould be the ſame Rectitude in two Contraries. If ſo, ſaid he, we muſt look for ſomething more than *mere Conſiſtence*, when we ſearch for that *Rectitude*, which we at preſent talk of. A *conſiſtent* Life indeed is requiſite, but that alone is not enough. We muſt determine its *peculiar Species*, if we would be accurate and exact. It indeed appears, ſaid I, neceſſary.

NOR is any thing, continued he, more easy to be diſcuſſed. For what can that *peculiar Conſiſtence* of Life be elſe, than a Life, whoſe ſeveral Parts are not only conſonant to *each other*, but to the *Nature* alſo of the Being, by whom that Life has been adopted? Does not this *laſt* Degree of Conſiſtence appear as requiſite as the *former?* I anſwered, It could not be otherwiſe. Part II.

YOU ſee then, ſaid he, the true Idea of right Conduct. It is not, merely *To live conſiſtently*; but 'tis *To live conſiſtently with Nature.* Allow it.

BUT what, continued he? Can we live *conſiſtently with Nature*, and be at a loſs how to behave ourſelves? We cannot.

And can we know how to behave ourſelves, if we know nothing of *what befals us*; nothing of thoſe *Things* and *Events*, which perpetually ſurround, and affect us? We cannot. You ſee then,

Part II. then, continued he, how we are again fallen inſenſibly into that Doctrine, which proves the Neceſſity of *ſcrutinizing*, and *knowing the Value of Externals.* I replied, 'Twas true. If you aſſent, ſaid he, to this, it will of courſe follow, that, *To live conſiſtently with Nature, is, To live agreeably to a juſt Experience of thoſe Things, which happen around us.* It appears ſo.

But farther ſtill, ſaid he.—Think you any one can be deemed to live agreeably to ſuch *Experience*, if he *ſelect* not, as far as poſſible, the things moſt *congruous to his Nature?* He cannot. And by the ſame Rule, as far as poſſible, muſt he not *reject* ſuch as are *contrary?* He muſt. And that not occaſionally, as Fancy happens to prompt; but *ſteadily, conſtantly*, and without Remiſſion.

I ſhould imagine ſo. You judge, ſaid he, truly. Were he to act otherwiſe in the leaſt inſtance, he would falſify his Profeſſions; he would not live according to that Experience, which we now ſuppoſe

poſe him to poſſeſs. I replied, He would not. Part II.

IT ſhould ſeem then, ſaid he, from hence, as a natural Conſequence of what we have admitted, that the *Eſſence of right Conduct* lay in SELECTION and REJECTION. So, ſaid I, it has appeared. And that ſuch *Selection* and *Rejection* ſhould be *conſonant with our proper Nature*. 'Tis true. And be *ſteady* and *perpetual*, not occaſional and interrupted. 'Tis true. But if this be the Eſſence of *Right Conduct*, then too it is the Eſſence of our *Sovereign Good*; for in ſuch Conduct we have ſuppoſed this Good to conſiſt. We have.

SEE then, ſaid he, the Reſult of our Inquiry.—The SOVEREIGN GOOD, as conſtituted by *Rectitude of Conduct*, has, on our ſtricteſt Scrutiny, appeared to be this—TO LIVE PERPETUALLY SELECTING, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS CONGRUOUS TO NATURE, AND REJECTING WHAT IS

Part II. CONTRARY, MAKING OUR END THAT SELECTING AND THAT REJECTING ONLY.

'Tis true, ſaid I, ſo it appears.

§. 5. BEFORE we haſten then farther, ſaid he, let us ſtop to recollect, and ſee whether our preſent Concluſions accord with our former.—We have now ſuppoſed the *Sovereign Good* to be *Rectitude of Conduct*, and this *Conduct* we have made conſiſt in a certain *Selecting* and *Rejecting*.

We have. And do you not imagine that the *Selecting* and *Rejecting*, which we propoſe, as they are purely governed by the Standard of *Nature*, are capable in every inſtance of being *rationally juſtified?*

I replied, I thought they were.

But if they admit a *rational Juſtification*, then are they *Moral Offices* or *Duties*; for thus * you remember yeſterday a *Moral Office* was defined. It was. But if ſo, *To live in the Practice of them*, will be

* Sup. p. 175.

be *To live in the Diſcharge of Moral Offices.* Part II.

It will. But *To live in the Diſcharge of theſe*, is the ſame as *Living according to Virtue*, and *Living according to Nature.* It is. So therefore is *Living in that Selection, and in that Rejection, which we propoſe.* It is.

WE need never therefore be at a loſs, ſaid he, for a Deſcription of the SOVEREIGN GOOD.——We may call it, RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT.——If that be too contracted, we may enlarge and ſay, 'tis—TO LIVE PERPETUALLY SELECTING AND REJECTING ACCORDING TO THE STANDARD OF OUR BEING.——If we are for ſtill different Views, we may ſay 'tis——TO LIVE IN THE DISCHARGE OF MORAL OFFICES—TO LIVE ACCORDING TO NATURE——TO LIVE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE——TO LIVE ACCORDING TO JUST EXPERIENCE OF THOSE THINGS, WHICH HAPPEN AROUND US.—— Like ſome finiſhed Statue, we may behold it every way; 'tis the ſame Object, tho'

Part II. variouſly viewed; nor is there a View, but is natural, truly graceful, and engaging.

§. 6. I CANNOT deny, ſaid I, but that as you now have explained it, your Hypotheſis ſeems far more plauſible, than when firſt it was propoſed. You will believe it, ſaid he, more ſo ſtill, by conſidering it with more Attention.——In the firſt place, tho' perhaps it eſteem nothing *really* GOOD but VIRTUE, nothing *really* EVIL, but VICE, yet it in no manner takes away the *Difference*, and *Diſtinction* of *other Things*. So far otherwiſe, it is for eſtabliſhing their Diſtinction to the greateſt Accuracy. For were this neglected, what would become of *Selection* and *Rejection*, thoſe important Energies, which are its very Soul and Eſſence? Were there no DIFFERENCE, there could be no CHOICE.

'Tis true, ſaid I, there could not.

AGAIN, ſaid he. It is no meagre, mortifying Syſtem of *Self-denial*—It ſuppreſſes

no

no Social and Natural Affections, nor takes away any Social and Natural Relations---- It preſcribes no Abſtainings, no Forbearances *out of Nature*; no gloomy, ſad, and lonely Rules of Life, *without* which 'tis evident Men may be as honeſt as *with*, and be infinitely more uſeful and worthy Members of *Society*.---It refuſes no Pleaſure, not inconſiſtent with *Temperance*---- It rejects no Gain, not inconſiſtent with *Juſtice*——Univerſally, as far as *Virtue* neither *forbids* nor *diſſuades*, it endeavours to render Life, even in the *moſt vulgar* Acceptation, as chearful, joyous, and eaſy as poſſible. Nay, could it mend the Condition of Exiſtence in any the *moſt trivial* Circumſtance, even by adding to the ampleſt Poſſeſſions the pooreſt meaneſt Utenſil, it would in no degree contemn an Addition even ſo mean. Far otherwiſe---It would conſider, that to neglect the leaſt Acquiſition, when fairly in its power, would be to fall ſhort of that *perfect* and *accurate Conduct*, which it ever has in view, and on which alone all depends. Part II.

Part II. AND yet, tho' thus exact in every the minuteſt Circumſtance, it gives us no Solicitude as to what *Rank* we maintain in Life. Whether noble or ignoble, wealthy or poor; whether merged in Buſineſs, or confined to Inactivity, it is *equally conſiſtent with every Condition*, and equally capable of adorning them all. Could it indeed chooſe its own Life, it would be always that, where moſt ſocial Affections might extenſively be exerted, and moſt done to contribute to the Welfare of Society. But if Fate order otherwiſe, and this be denied; its Intentions are the ſame, its Endeavours are not wanting; nor are the *Social, Rational Powers* forgotten, even in Times and Circumſtances, where they can leaſt become conſpicuous.

IT teaches us to conſider *Life*, as one great important *Drama*, where we have each our *Part* allotted us to act. It tells us that our *Happineſs*, as *Actors* in this *Drama*, conſiſts not in the *Length* of our Part,

Part, nor in the *State* and *Dignity*, but in the *juſt*, the *decent*, and the *natural Performance*. Part II.

IF its Aims are ſucceſsful, it is thankful to Providence. It accepts all the Joys, derived from their *Succeſs*, and feels them as fully, as thoſe who know *no other* Happineſs. The only Difference is, that having *a more excellent Good* in view, it fixes not, like the Many, its *Happineſs* on *Succeſs* alone, well knowing that in ſuch caſe, if Endeavours *fail*, there can be nothing left behind but Murmurings and Miſery. On the contrary, when this happens, 'tis then it retires into itſelf, and reflecting on what is *Fair*, what is *Laudable* and *Honeſt* (the truly *beatific Viſion*, not of *mad Enthuſiaſts*, but of the Calm, the Temperate, the Wiſe and the Good) it becomes *ſuperiour to all Events*; *it acquieſces in the Conſciouſneſs of its own Rectitude*; and, like that Manſion founded, not on the Sands, but on the Rock, it defies all the Terrors of Tempeſt and Inundation.

Part II. §. 7. HERE he pauſed, and I took the Opportunity to obſerve, how his Subject had warmed him into a degree of Rapture; how greatly it had raiſed both his Sentiments and his Stile. No wonder, ſaid he. Beauty of every kind excites our Love and Admiration; the Beauties of Art, whether *Energies* or *Works*; the Beauties of Nature, whether Animal or Inanimate. And ſhall we expect leſs from *this Supreme Beauty*; this *moral, mental,* and *original Beauty*; of which all the reſt are but as *Types* or *Copies?*——Not however by high Flights to loſe Sight of our Subject, the whole of what we have argued, may be reduced to this——

ALL MEN PURSUE GOOD, and would be *happy*, if they knew how; not happy for Minutes, and miſerable for Hours, but *happy*, if poſſible, *thro' every Part of their Exiſtence.* Either therefore *there is a* GOOD *of this ſteady durable Kind*, or *there is none.* If *none*, then *all Good* muſt be *tranſient*

tranſient and uncertain; and if ſo, an *Ob-* Part II.
ject of loweſt Value, which can little deſerve either our Attention, or Inquiry. But if there be a *better Good*, ſuch a Good as we are ſeeking; like every other thing, *it muſt be derived from ſome Cauſe*; and that Cauſe muſt be either *external*, *internal*, or *mixt*, in as much as except theſe three, there is no other poſſible. Now *a ſteady, durable Good*, cannot be derived from an *external* Cauſe, by reaſon all derived from *Externals* muſt *fluctuate*, as they *fluctuate*. By the ſame Rule, not from a *Mixture* of the *Two*; becauſe the *Part which is external* will *proportionally deſtroy its Eſſence*. What then remains but the *Cauſe internal*; the very Cauſe which we have ſuppoſed, when we place the *Sovereign Good* in *Mind*; in *Rectitude of Conduct*; in juſt *Selecting* and *Rejecting*? There ſeems indeed no other Cauſe, ſaid I, to which we can poſſibly aſſign it.

FORGIVE me then, continued he, ſhould I appear to boaſt—We have

Part II. proved, or at leaſt there is an Appearance we have proved, that *either there is no* GOOD *except this of our own; or that, if there be any other, 'tis not worthy our Regard.* It muſt be confeſſed, ſaid I, you have ſaid as much, as the Subject ſeems to admit.

§. 8. BY means then, ſaid he, of our Hypotheſis, behold one of the faireſt, and moſt amiable of Objects, behold THE TRUE AND PERFECT MAN: that Ornament of Humanity; that Godlike Being; who, *without regard either to Pleaſure or Pain, uninfluenced equally by either Proſperity or Adverſity, ſuperiour to the World and its beſt and worſt Events, can fairly reſt his All upon the Rectitude of his own Conduct; can conſtantly, and uniformly, and manfully maintain it; thinking that, and that alone, wholly ſufficient to make him happy.*

AND do you ſeriouſly believe, ſaid I, there ever was ſuch a Character? And what, replied he, if I ſhould admit, *there never*

never was, is, or will be such a Character?—Part II.
that we have been talking the whole time of a Being, not to be found;

A faultless Monster, which the World ne'er saw?

Supposing, I say, we admit this, what then?

Would not your System in such a case, said I, a little border upon the chimerical? I only ask the Question. You need not be so tender, he replied, in expressing yourself. If it be false, if it will not indure the Test, I am as ready to give it up, as I have been to defend it. He must be a poor Philosopher indeed, who, when he sees *Truth* and a *System* at variance, can ever be solicitous for the Fate of a System.

But tell me, I pray——Do you object to mine, from its *Perfection*, or from its *Imperfection?* From its being too excellent for Human Nature, and *above* it; or from its being too base, and *below* it?

It seems to require, said I, a *Perfection*, to which no *Individual* ever arrived.

That very *Transcendence*, said he, is an

Part II. Argument on its behalf. Were it of a Rank inferior, it would not be that Perfection, which we ſeek. Would you have it, ſaid I, *beyond Nature?* If you mean, replied he, *beyond any particular or individual Nature*, moſt undoubtedly I would.—As you are a Lover of Painting, you ſhall hear a Story on the Subject.

" In ancient days, while *Greece* was " flouriſhing in Liberty and Arts, a cele- " brated Painter, having drawn many ex- " cellent Pictures for a certain free State, " and been generouſly and honourably re- " warded for his Labours, at laſt made " an Offer to paint them a *Helen*, as a " Model and Exemplar of the moſt ex- " quiſite Beauty. The Propoſal was rea- " dily accepted, when the Artiſt informed " them, that in order to draw *one* Fair, " 'twas neceſſary he ſhould contemplate " *many*. He demanded therefore a Sight " of all their fineſt Women. The State, " to aſſiſt the Work, aſſented to his Re- " queſt. They were exhibited before " him;

" him; he ſelected the moſt beautiful; Part II.
" and from theſe formed his *Helen*, more
" beautiful than them all."——

YOU have heard the Fact, and what are we to infer?—Or can there be any other Inference than this—that the *Standard of Perfection, with reſpect to the Beauty of Bodies, was not* (as this Artiſt thought) *to be diſcovered in any Individual; but being diſperſed by Nature in Portions thro' the many, was from thence, and thence only, to be collected and recognized?*
It appears, ſaid I, he thought ſo. The Picture, continued he, is loſt, but we have Statues ſtill remaining. If there be Truth in the Teſtimony of the beſt and faireſt Judges, no Woman ever equalled the Delicacy of the *Medicean Venus*, nor Man the Strength and Dignity of the *Farnheſian Hercules*. 'Tis generally, ſaid I, ſo believed.

AND will you, ſaid he, from this unparalelled and tranſcendent Excellence, deny theſe

Part II. theſe Works of Art to be truly and ſtrictly *Natural?* Their Excellence, replied I, muſt be confeſſed by All; but how they can be called ſo ſtrictly *Natural*, I muſt own a little ſtartles me. That the *Limbs* and their *Proportions*, ſaid he, are ſelected from *Nature*, you will hardly I believe doubt, after the Story juſt related.

I replied, 'Twas admitted. The *Parts* therefore of theſe Works are *Natural.* They are. And may not the ſame be aſſerted, as to the *Arrangement* of theſe Parts? Muſt not *this* too be *natural*, as 'tis analogous we know to *Nature?* It muſt. If ſo, then is the *Whole*, *Natural.* So indeed, ſaid I, it ſhould ſeem. It cannot, replied he, be otherwiſe, if it be a Fact beyond diſpute, that the *Whole* is nothing more, than *the Parts under ſuch Arrangement.*

Enough, ſaid I, you have ſatisfied me.

If I have, ſaid he, it is but to *transfer* what we have aſſerted of this *ſubordinate* Beauty, to Beauty of a *higher Order*; it is

but to paſs from the *External*, to the *Moral* and *Internal*. For here we ſay, by parity of Reaſon, that no where in any *particular* Nature is the *perfect Character* to be ſeen intire. Yet one is *brave*; another is *temperate*; a third is *liberal*; and a fourth is *prudent*. So that in *the Multitude of mixed imperfect Characters*, as before in *the Multitude of imperfect Bodies*, is expreſſed *that* IDEA, *that* MORAL STANDARD OF PERFECTION, by which *all* are tried and compared to one another, and at laſt upon the whole are either juſtified or condemned——that Standard of Perfection, which cannot be but *moſt Natural*, as it is purely collected from *Individuals of Nature*, and is the Teſt of all the Merit to which they aſpire. I acknowledge, ſaid I, your Argument. Part II.

I might add, ſaid he, if there were Occaſion, other Arguments which would ſurprize you. I might inform you of the natural Pre-eminence, and high Rank of *Specific Ideas*;—that every *Individual* was but

Part II. but their *Type*, or Shadow;——that the *Mind* or *Intellect* was the *Region of Poſſibles*;——that what ever is *Poſſible*, to the *Mind* actually *Is*; nor any thing a *Non-entity*, except what implies a *Contradiction*;——that the genuine Sphere and genuine Cylinder, tho' *Forms* perhaps *too perfect, ever to exiſt conjoined to Matter*, were yet as *true and real* Beings, as the *groſſeſt Objects of Senſe*; were the *Source* of Infinite *Truths*, which *wholly* depend on them, and which, as Truths, have a Being moſt *unalterable* and *eternal*. But theſe are Reaſonings, which rather belong to *another* Philoſophy; and if you are ſatisfied without them, they are at beſt but ſuperfluous.

He waited not for my Anſwer, but proceeded as follows. 'Tis thus, ſaid he, have I endeavoured, as far as in my power, to give you an Idea of the *perfect Character:* a Character, which I am neither ſo abſurd, as to impute to myſelf; nor ſo rigorous and unfair, as to require of others. We have propoſed it only, as an Exem-

PLAR OF IMITATION, which tho' *None* we think can *equal*, yet *All* at leaſt may *follow*—an Exemplar of Imitation, which in proportion as we approach, ſo we advance proportionably in *Merit* and in *Worth*—-an Exemplar, which, were we moſt *ſelfiſh*, we ſhould be Fools to reject; if it be true, that *to be Happy*, is *the ultimate Wiſh of us all*, and that *Happineſs* and *Moral Worth* ſo reciprocally correſpond, that there can be no Degree of *the one*, without an equal Degree of *the other*. If there be Truth, ſaid I, in your Reaſonings, it cannot certainly be otherwiſe. Part II.

HE continued, by ſaying——The *Proficiency* of *Socrates*, and indeed of every honeſt Man, was ſufficient to convince us, could we be ſteadfaſt to our Purpoſe, that *ſome Progreſs at leaſt* might be made toward this *Perfection*—How far, we knew not—The Field was open—The Race was free and common to All—Nor was the Prize, as uſual, reſerved only to the Firſt; but All, who run, might depend on a Reward, having

Part II. having the Voice of Nature, would they but liſten, to aſſure them,

* *Nemo ex hoc numero mihi non donatus abibit.*

§. 9. HERE he pauſed, and left me to meditate on what he had ſpoken. For ſome time we paſſed on in mutual Silence, till obſerving me on my part little inclined to break it, What, ſaid he, engages you with an Attention ſo earneſt? I was wondering, ſaid I, whence it ſhould happen, that in a Diſcourſe of ſuch a nature, you ſhould ſay ſo little of *Religion*, of *Providence*, and *a Deity*. I have not, replied he, omitted them, becauſe not *intimately united to Morals*; but becauſe what ever we treat accurately, ſhould be treated ſeparately and apart. Multiplicity of Matter naturally tends to Confuſion. They are weak Minds indeed, which dread a rational Suſpence; and much more ſo, when in the Event, it only leads to a ſurer Knowledge,

* ÆNEID. l. v. N. 305.

ledge, and often ſtrengthens the very Sub- Part II.
ject, on which we ſuſpend. Could I however repeat you the Words of a venerable Sage, (for I can call him no other) whom once I heard differting on the Topic of Religion, and whom ſtill I hear, when ever I think on him; you might accept perhaps my *Religious* Theories as candidly, as you have my *Moral*. I preſſed him to repeat them, with which he willingly complied.

THE Speaker, ſaid he, whoſe Words I am attempting to relate, and whom for the preſent I name *Theophilus*, was of a Character truly amiable in every part. When young, he had been fortunate in a liberal Education; had been a Friend to the Muſes, and approved himſelf ſuch to the Public. As Life declined, he wiſely retired, and dedicated his Time almoſt wholly to Contemplation. Yet could he never forget the Muſes, whom once he loved. He retained in his Diſcourſe (and ſo in the Sequel you will ſoon find) a large Portion

Part II. Portion of that rapturous, anti-proſaic Stile, in which thoſe Ladies uſually chooſe to expreſs themſelves.

WE were walking, not (as now) in the chearful Face of Day, but late in the Evening, when the Sun had long been ſett. Circumſtances of Solemnity were not wanting to affect us; the Poets could not have feigned any more happy —— a running Stream, an ancient Wood, a ſtill Night, and a bright Moonſhine.—I, for my own part, induced by the Occaſion, fell inſenſibly into a Reverie about Inhabitants in the Moon. From thence I wandered to other heavenly Bodies, and talked of States there, and Empires, and I know not what.

WHO lives in the Moon, ſaid he, is perhaps more than we can well learn. 'Tis enough, if we can be ſatisfied, by the help of our beſt Faculties, that *Intelligence* is not confined to this little Earth, which we inhabit; that tho' Men were not, the World would not want Spectators, to contemplate its

its Beauty, and adore the Wiſdom of its Author. Part II.

" THIS whole UNIVERSE itſelf is but
" ONE CITY or COMMONWEALTH——
" *a Syſtem of Subſtances* variouſly *formed*,
" and variouſly *actuated* agreeably to thoſe
" *Forms*-----a Syſtem of Subſtances both
" immenſely great and ſmall, *Rational*,
" *Animal*, *Vegetable*, and *Inanimate*.

" As many Families make one Village,
" many Villages one Province, many Pro-
" vinces one Empire; ſo many Empires,
" Oceans, Waſtes and Wilds, combined,
" compoſe that Earth on which we live.
" Other Combinations make a Planet or a
" Moon; and theſe again, united, make
" one Planetary Syſtem. What higher
" Combinations ſubſiſt, we know not.
" Their Gradation and Aſcent 'tis impoſ-
" ſible we ſhould diſcover. Yet the ge-
" nerous Mind, not deterred by this Im-
" menſity, intrepidly paſſes on, thro' Re-
" gions unknown, from greater Syſtem

Part II. " to greater, till it arrive at *that greateſt*,
" where Imagination ſtops, and can ad-
" vance no farther. In this laſt, this
" mighty, this ſtupendous Idea, it beholds
" the UNIVERSE itſelf, of which every
" Thing is a Part, and with reſpect to
" which not the ſmalleſt Atom is either
" foreign or detached.

" WIDE as it's Extent, is the Wiſdom
" of its Workmanſhip, not bounded and
" narrow, like the humbler Works of Art.
" Theſe are all of Origin no higher than
" *Human*. We can readily trace them to
" their utmoſt Limit, and with accuracy
" diſcern both their Beginning and their
" End. But where the Microſcope that
" can ſhew us, from what Point Wiſdom
" begins in Nature? Where the Teleſcope
" that can deſcry, to what Infinitude it
" extends? The more diligent our Search,
" the more accurate our Scrutiny, the
" more only are we convinced, that our
" Labours can never finiſh; that Subjects
" inex-

" inexhauſtible remain behind, ſtill un- Part II.
" explored.

" HENCE the Mind truly wiſe, quit-
" ting the Study of *Particulars*, as know-
" ing their *Multitude* to be *infinite* and *in-*
" *comprehenſible*, turns its intellectual Eye
" to what is general and comprehenſive,
" and thro' *Generals* learns to ſee, and re-
" cognize what ever exiſts.

" IT perceives in this view, that every
" Subſtance, of every degree, has its *Na-*
" *ture*, its proper Make, Conſtitution or
" Form, by which it *acts*, and by which
" it *ſuffers*. It perceives it ſo to fare with
" every natural Form around us, as with
" thoſe Tools and Inſtruments by which
" *Art* worketh its Wonders. The Saw is
" deſtined to one Act; the Mallet, to an-
" other; the Wheel anſwers this Purpoſe;
" and the Lever anſwers a different. So
" *Nature* uſes the *Vegetable*, the *Brute*,
" and the *Rational*, *agreeably to the proper*
" *Form and Conſtitution of every Kind.* The

Part II. " *Vegetable* proceeds with perfect *Inſenſi-*
" *bility.* The *Brute* poſſeſſes a Senſe of
" what is pleaſurable and painful, but ſtops
" at mere *Senſation*, and is unable to go far-
" ther. The *Rational*, like the Brute, has
" all the Powers of mere *Senſation*, but en-
" joys ſuperadded a farther tranſcendent *Fa-*
" *culty*, by which it is made conſcious, not
" only *of what it feels*, but *of the Powers*
" *themſelves*, which are the Sources of
" thoſe very Feelings; a *Faculty*, which
" recognizing both *itſelf* and *all Things*
" *elſe*, becomes a *Canon*, a *Corrector*, and
" a *Standard Univerſal*.

" HENCE to the *Rational alone* is im-
" parted that MASTER-SCIENCE, of *what*
" they are, *where* they are, and *the End*
" to which they are deſtined.

" HAPPY, too happy, did they know
" their own Felicity; did they reverence
" the Dignity of their own ſuperior Cha-
" racter, and never wretchedly degrade
" themſelves into Natures to them ſubor-
" dinate.

" dinate. And yet alas! 'tis a Truth too Part II.
" certain, that as the Rational only are
" ſuſceptible of a Happineſs truly excel-
" lent, ſo theſe only merge themſelves
" into Miſeries paſt Indurance.

" ASSIST us then, THOU POWER
" DIVINE, with the Light of that REA-
" SON, by which Thou lighteneſt the
" World; by which Grace and Beauty is
" diffuſed thro' every Part, and the Wel-
" fare of the Whole is ever uniformly up-
" held; that Reaſon, of which *our own* is
" but a *Particle* or *Spark*, like ſome *Pro-*
" *methean* Fire, caught from Heaven above.
" So teach us *to know ourſelves*, that we
" may attain that Knowledge, which
" alone is worth attaining. Check our
" vain, our idle Reſearches into the Laws,
" and Natures, and Motions of other Be-
" ings, till we have learnt and can prac-
" tiſe thoſe, which peculiarly reſpect our-
" ſelves. Teach us to be fit Actors in
" that general Drama, where Thou haſt
" allotted every Being, great and ſmall, its

Part II. " proper Part, *the due Performance of which*
" *is the only End of its Exiſtence.*

" ENABLE us to curb DESIRE within
" the Bounds of what is *Natural.* Enable
" us even to *ſuſpend* it, till we can employ
" it to our Emolument. Be our *firſt*
" Work, to have eſcaped from *wrong Opi-*
" *nion*, and *bad Habit*; that the Mind,
" thus render'd ſincere and incorrupt, may
" with Safety proceed to ſeek its genuine
" Good and Happineſs.

" WHEN we are thus previouſly ex-
" erciſed, thus duly prepared, let not our
" LOVE there ſtop, where it firſt begins;
" but inſenſibly conduct it, by thy invi-
" ſible Influence, from lower Objects to
" higher, till it arrive at that *Supreme*,
" where only it can find what is adequate
" and full. Teach us to love THEE, and
" THY DIVINE ADMINISTRATION——
" to regard the Univerſe itſelf as our true
" and genuine Country, not that little ca-
" ſual Spot, where we firſt drew vital
" Air.

" Air. Teach us each to regard *Himſelf*, Part II.
" but as a PART of this great WHOLE;
" a Part which for its Welfare we are as
" patiently to reſign, as we reſign a ſingle
" Limb for the Welfare of our whole
" Body. Let our Life be a continued
" Scene of ACQUIESCENCE and of GRATI-
" TUDE; of Gratitude, for what we *enjoy*;
" of Acquieſcence, in what we *ſuffer*; as
" both can only be referable to that con-
" catenated Order of Events, which can-
" not but be *beſt*, as being by Thee ap-
" proved and choſen.

" IN as much as Futurity is hidden
" from our Sight, we can have no other
" *Rule of Choice*, by which to govern our
" Conduct, than *what ſeems conſonant to*
" *the Welfare of our own particular Na-*
" *tures*. If it appear not contrary to Duty
" and moral Office, (and how ſhould we
" judge, but from what appears?) Thou
" canſt not but forgive us, if we prefer
" Health to Sickneſs; the Safety of Life
" and Limb, to Maiming or to Death.

Part II. " But did we know that theſe Incidents,
" or any other were appointed us; were
" fated in that Order of incontroulable
" Events, by which Thou preſerveſt and
" adorneſt the Whole: it then becomes
" our Duty, to meet them with Magna-
" nimity; to co-operate with Chearfulneſs
" in what ever Thou ordaineſt; that ſo
" we may know no other Will, than thine
" alone, and that the Harmony of our
" *particular* Minds with thy *Univerſal*,
" may be ſteady and uninterrupted thro'
" the Period of our Exiſtence.

" YET, ſince to attain this Height, this
" tranſcendent Height, is but barely poſ-
" ſible, if poſſible, to the moſt perfect
" Humanity: regard what within us is
" *Congenial to Thee*; raiſe us above our-
" ſelves, and warm us into *Enthuſiaſm*.
" But let our Enthuſiaſm be ſuch, as befits
" the Citizens of Thy Polity; liberal,
" gentle, rational, and humane—not ſuch
" as to debaſe us into poor and wretched
" *Slaves*, as if Thou wert our Tyrant,
" not

" not our kind and common Father; Part. II.
" much leſs ſuch as to transform us into
" ſavage *Beaſts of Prey*, ſullen, gloomy,
" dark and fierce; prone to perſecute, to
" ravage, and deſtroy, as if the Luſt of
" Maſſacre could be grateful to thy Good-
" neſs. Permit us rather madly to avow
" Villainy in thy Defiance, than impiouſly
" to aſſert it under colour of thy Service.
" Turn our Mind's Eye from every Idea
" of this Character; from the Servile, Ab-
" ject, Horrid and Ghaſtly, to the Gene-
" rous, Lovely, Fair and Godlike.

" HERE let us dwell;——here our
" Study and Delight. So ſhall we be en-
" abled, in the ſilent Mirrour of *Contem-*
" *plation*, to behold thoſe *Forms*, which
" are hidden to Human Eyes—that ani-
" mating WISDOM, which pervades and
" rules the Whole—that LAW irreſiſtible,
" immutable, ſupreme, which leads the
" Willing, and compels the Averſe, to co-
" operate in their Station to the general
" Welfare—that MAGIC DIVINE, which

Part II. " by an Efficacy paſt Comprehenſion, can
" transform every Appearance, the moſt
" hideous, into Beauty, and exhibit *all*
" Things FAIR and GOOD to THEE,
" ESSENCE INCREATE, *who art of*
" *purer Eyes, than ever to behold Iniquity.*

" BE theſe our Morning, theſe our
" Evening Meditations—with theſe may
" our Minds be unchangeably tinged——
" that loving Thee with a Love moſt diſ-
" intereſted and ſincere; enamoured of
" thy Polity, and thy DIVINE ADMI-
" NISTRATION; welcoming every Event
" with Chearfulneſs and Magnanimity, as
" being *beſt* upon the Whole, becauſe or-
" dained of Thee; propoſing nothing of
" ourſelves, but *with a Reſerve* that Thou
" permitteſt; acquieſcing in every Obſtruc-
" tion, as ultimately referable to thy Pro-
" vidence—in a word, that working this
" Conduct, by due Exerciſe, into perfect
" *Habit*; we may never murmur, never
" repine; never miſs what we would ob-
" tain, or fall into that which we would
" avoid;

" avoid; but being happy with that tran- Part II.
" ſcendent *Happineſs*, of which no one
" can deprive us; and bleſt with that Di-
" vine *Liberty*, which no Tyrant can an-
" noy; we may dare addreſs Thee with
" pious Confidence, as the *Philoſophic Bard*
" of old,

" *Conduct me, Thou, of Beings Cauſe Divine,*
" *Where-e're I'm deſtin'd in thy great Deſign.*
" *Active I follow on: for ſhould my Will*
" *Reſiſt, I'm impious; but muſt follow ſtill.*

IN this manner did *Theophilus*, ſaid he, purſue the Subject, to which I had led him. He adorned his Sentiments with Expreſſions even more ſplendid, than I have now employed. The Speaker, the Speech, the happy Circumſtances which concurred, the Night's Beauty and Stillneſs, with the Romantic Scene where we were walking, all together gave the Whole ſuch an Energy and Solemnity, as 'tis impoſſible you ſhould feel from the Coldneſs of a bare Recital. I, continued he, for my

Part II. my own part, returned home ſenſibly touched, and retained the ſtrongeſt Feelings of what I had heard, till the following Morning. Then the Buſineſs of the Day gently obliterated all, and left me by Night as little of a Philoſopher, as I had ever been before.

§. 10. AND is it poſſible, ſaid I, ſo ſoon to have forgotten, what ſeems ſo ſtriking and ſublime, as the Subject you have been now treating? 'Tis HABIT, replied he, is all in all. 'Tis *Practice and Exerciſe, which can only make us truly any thing.* Is it not evidently ſo, in the moſt common vulgar Arts? Did mere *Theory* alone ever make the meaneſt Mechanic? And is the *Supreme Artiſt* of *Life* and *Manners* to be formed more eaſily, than ſuch a one? Happy for us, could we prove it near ſo eaſy. But believe me, my Friend, good Things are not ſo cheap. *Nothing is to be had gratis,* much leſs that which is moſt valuable.

YET

YET however for our Comfort, we have this to encourage us, that, tho' the Difficulty of *acquiring* Habits be great and painful, yet nothing ſo eaſy, ſo pleaſant, as their *Energies*, when once wrought by Exerciſe to a due Standard of Perfection. I know you have made ſome Progreſs in *Muſic*. Mark well what you can do, as a Proficient this way--You can do that, which without Habit, as much exceeds the wiſeſt Man, as to walk upon the Waves, or to aſcend a Cliff perpendicular. You can even do it with Facility; and (leſt you ſhould think I flatter) not you yourſelf alone, but a thouſand others beſide, whoſe low Rank and Genius no way raiſe them above the Multitude. If then you are ſo well aſſured of this Force of Habit in one Inſtance, judge not in other Inſtances by your own preſent Inſufficiency. Be not ſhocked at the *apparent Greatneſs* of the *perfect Moral Character*, when you compare it to the *Weakneſs* and *Imperfection* of your own. On the contrary, when theſe dark, Part II.

Part II. dark, theſe melancholy Thoughts aſſail you, immediately turn your Mind to the Conſideration of *Habit*. Remember how *eaſy* its Energies to thoſe, who *poſſeſs* it; and yet how *impracticable* to ſuch, as *poſſeſs it not*.

It muſt be owned, ſaid I, that this is a Satisfaction, and may be ſome kind of Aſſiſtance in a melancholy Hour. And yet this very Doctrine naturally leads to another Objection.—Does not *the Difficulty of attaining Habit* too well ſupport a certain Aſſertion, that, *defend Virtue as we will, 'tis but a Scheme of Self-denial?*

By *Self-denial*, ſaid he, you mean, I ſuppoſe, ſomething like what follows—— *Appetite* bids me eat; *Reaſon* bids me forbear——If I *obey* Reaſon, I *deny* Appetite; and Appetite being *a Part of myſelf*, to *deny* it, is a *Self-denial*. What is true thus in *Luxury*, is true alſo in other Subjects; is evident in Matters of Lucre, of Power, of Reſentment, or whatever elſe we purſue by

by the Dictate of any Paſſion. You appear, ſaid I, to have ſtated the Objection juſtly. Part II.

To return then to our Inſtance, ſaid he, of Luxury. *Appetite* bids me eat; *Reaſon* bids me forbear——If I *obey Reaſon*, I *deny Appetite*——and if *I obey Appetite*, do I not *deny Reaſon?* Can I *act either way, without rejecting one of them?* And is not *Reaſon a Part of myſelf*, as notoriouſly as *Appetite?*

OR to take another Example—I have a Depoſite in my Hands. *Avarice* bids me retain—*Conſcience* bids me reſtore. Is there not a *reciprocal Denial*, let me obey *which I will?* And is not *Conſcience a Part of me*, as truly as *Avarice?*

POOR SELF indeed muſt be denied, take which Party we will. But why ſhould *Virtue* be arraigned of thwarting it, more than *Vice* her contrary?—Make the moſt of the Argument, it can come but to

Part II. this——If *Self-denial* be an Objection to *Virtue*, ſo is it to *Vice*—If *Self-denial* be no Objection to *Vice*, no more can it be to *Virtue*. A wonderful and important Concluſion indeed!

He continued by ſaying, that the *Soul of Man* appeared not as a *ſingle Faculty*, but as *compounded* of many——that as theſe Faculties were not always in perfect Peace one with another, ſo there were few Actions which we could perform, where they would be *all* found to *concur*. What then are we to do? Suſpend till they agree?——That were indeed impoſſible.——Nothing therefore can remain, but to weigh well their ſeveral Pretenſions; to hear all, that each has to offer in its behalf; and finally to purſue the Dictates of the *Wiſeſt* and the *Beſt*. This done, as for the *Self-denial*, which we force upon the reſt; with regard to our own *Character*, 'tis a Matter of Honour and Praiſe——with regard to the *Faculties denied*, 'tis a Matter of as ſmall Weight, as to contemn the Noiſe and Clamours of a mad

mad and ſenſeleſs Mob, in deference to the ſober Voice of the worthier, better Citizens. And what Man could be juſtified, ſhould he reject theſe, and prefer a Rabble? Part II.

§. 10. IN this place he pauſed again, and I took occaſion to acknowledge, that my Objection appeared obviated. As the Day advanced apace, he adviſed that we might return home; and walking along leiſurely, thus reſumed to himſelf the Diſcourſe.

I DARE ſay, continued he, you have ſeen many a wiſe Head ſhake, in pronouncing that ſad Truth, *how we are governed all by* INTEREST.——And what do they think ſhould govern us elſe? Our Loſs, our Damage, our *Diſintereſt?*——Ridiculous indeed! We ſhould be Ideots in ſuch caſe, more than rational Animals. The only Queſtion is, *where Intereſt truly lies?* For if this once be well adjuſted, no Maxim can be more harmleſs.

Part II. " I find myſelf exiſting upon a little
" Spot, ſurrounded every way by an im-
" menſe unknown Expanſion.—Where
" am I? What Sort of Place do I
" inhabit? Is it exactly accommodated,
" in every Inſtance, to my Convenience?
" Is there no Exceſs of Cold, none of
" Heat, to offend me? Am I never an-
" noyed by Animals, either of my own
" kind, or a different? Is every thing
" ſubſervient to me, as tho' I had ordered
" all myſelf?—No—nothing like it—
" the fartheſt from it poſſible———The
" World appears not then originally made
" for the *private Convenience of me alone?*—
" It does not.—But is it not poſſible ſo to
" accommodate it, by my own particular
" Induſtry?——If to accommodate Man
" and Beaſt, Heaven and Earth; if this be
" beyond me, 'tis not poſſible—What
" Conſequence then follows? Or can
" there be any other than this—*if I ſee*
" *an Intereſt of my own, detached from the*
"

" *of others; I ſeek an Intereſt which is chi-* Part II.
" *merical, and can never have Exiſtence?*

" How then muſt I determine? Have
" I no Intereſt at all?—If I have not, I
" am a Fool for ſtaying here. 'Tis a
" ſmoaky Houſe, and the ſooner out of
" it, the better.—But why no Intereſt?—
" Can I be contented with none, but one
" ſeparate and detached?—Is a SOCIAL
" INTEREST joined with others ſuch an
" Abſurdity, as not to be admitted? The
" Bee, the Beaver, and the Tribes of herd-
" ing Animals, are enough to convince
" me, that the thing is, *ſomewhere at*
" *leaſt*, poſſible. How then am I aſſured,
" that 'tis not equally true of *Man?*—
" Admit it; and what follows?—If ſo,
" then HONOUR and JUSTICE are my
" INTEREST—then the WHOLE TRAIN
" OF MORAL VIRTUES are my INTE-
" REST; *without ſome Portion of which,*
" *not even Thieves can maintain Society.*

Part II.

" BUT farther ſtill—I ſtop not here—
" I purſue this *Social Intereſt*, as far as I
" can trace my ſeveral *Relations*. I paſs
" from my own Stock, my own Neigh-
" bourhood, my own Nation, to the *whole*
" *Race of Mankind*, as diſperſed through-
" out the Earth.—Am I not *related to them*
" *all*, by the mutual Aids of Commerce;
" by the general Intercourſe of Arts and
" Letters; by that *common Nature*, of
" which we all participate?—Again—
" I muſt have Food and Clothing.—
" Without a proper genial Warmth,
" I inſtantly periſh.—Am I not rela-
" ted, in this view, to the very *Earth*
" itſelf? To the diſtant *Sun*, from
" whoſe Beams I derive Vigour? To that
" ſtupendous *Courſe and Order of the infi-*
" *nite Hoſt of Heaven*, by which the Times
" and Seaſons ever uniformly paſs on?—
" Were this Order once confounded, I
" could not probably ſurvive a Moment;
" *ſo abſolutely do I depend on this common*
" *general Welfare*.

" WHAT

" WHAT then have I to do, but to Part II.
" enlarge VIRTUE into PIETY? Not
" only *Honour* and *Juſtice*, and what I
" owe to MAN, is my *Intereſt*; but *Grati-*
" *tude* alſo, *Acquieſcence*, *Reſignation*, *Ado-*
" *ration*, and all I owe to this great *Polity*,
" and its greater Governor, OUR COM-
" MON PARENT.

" BUT if all theſe MORAL and DI-
" VINE HABITS be my INTEST, I
" need not ſurely ſeek for a better. I
" have an Intereſt *compatible* with the
" Spot on which I live——I have an In-
" tereſt which may exiſt, without *altering*
" the Plan of Providence; without *mend-*
" *ing* or *marring* the general Order of
" Events.—I can bear whatever happens
" with manlike Magnanimity; can be
" contented, and fully happy in the *Good*,
" which I poſſeſs; and can paſs thro' this
" turbid, this fickle, fleeting Period, with-
" out Bewailings, or Envyings, or Mur-
" murings, or Complaints."

Part II. AND thus, my Friend, have you my Sentiments, as it were abridged; my Sentiments on that Subject, which engages every one of us. For who would be unhappy? Who would not, if he knew how, enjoy *one perpetual Felicity?* Who are there exiſting, who do not at every Inſtant ſeek it? 'Tis the Wiſh, the Employ, not of the Rational Man only, but of the Sot, the Glutton, the very loweſt of our kind. For my own Syſtem, whether a juſt one, you may now examine, if you think proper. I can only ſay on its behalf, if it happen to be erroneous, 'tis a grateful Error, which I cheriſh and am fond of. And yet if really ſuch, I ſhall never deem it ſo ſacred, as not willingly, upon Conviction, to reſign it up to Truth.

LITTLE paſs'd after this worth relating. We had not far to walk, and we fell into common Topics. Yet one Obſervation

3

vation of his I muſt not omit. 'Twas what follows.——When we are once, ſaid he, well *habituated* to this CHIEF, this MORAL SCIENCE, then LOGIC and PHYSICS become two profitable *Adjuncts*: *Logic*, to ſecure to us the Poſſeſſion of our Opinions; that, if an Adverſary attack, we may not baſely give them up: *Phyſics*, to explain the Reaſon and Oeconomy of Natural Events, that we may know ſomething of that Univerſe, where our Dwelling has been appointed us. But let me add a Saying (and may its Remembrance never eſcape you) while you find this great, this *Maſter-Science wanting*, value *Logic* but as *Sophiſtry*, *and Phyſics* but as *Raree-ſhew*; for both, aſſure yourſelf, will be found nothing better. Part II.

'TWAS ſoon after this that our Walk ended. With it ended a Converſation, which had long engaged us; and which, according to my Promiſe, I have here endeavoured to tranſcribe.

THE END.

Advertiſement to the Reader.

THE Author has choſen to ſeparate all Notes from his firſt and third Treatiſes, and thus ſubjoin them to the End, becauſe thoſe Treatiſes, being written in Dialogue, from their Nature and Genius admit not of Interruption. One of his Reaſons for adding Notes was, to give Weight to his Aſſertions from the Authority of antient Writers. But his chief and principal Reaſon was, to excite (if poſſible) the Curioſity of Readers, to examine with ſtricter Attention thoſe valuable Remains of antient Literature. Should he obtain this End, he ſhall think his Labours (ſuch as they are) abundantly rewarded.

NOTES
ON
TREATISE the Firſt;
CONCERNING
ART.

NOTE I. p. 6. ALL ART IS CAUSE.] *Artis maxime proprium, creare & gignere.* Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 22. Ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν. *All Art is employed in Production, that is, in making ſomething to be.* *Ariſtot. Ethic. Nicom.* l. 6. c. 4.

THE *active efficient Cauſes* have been ranged and enumerated after different manners. In the ſame *Ethics*, they are enumerated thus---αἴτια γὰρ δύνασθαι εἶναι φύσις, καὶ ἀνάγκη, καὶ τύχη· ἔτι δὲ νοῦς, καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. *The ſeveral Cauſes appear to be Nature, Neceſſity, and Chance; and beſides theſe, Mind or Intellect, and whatever operates by or thro' Man.* l. 3. c. 3. The Paraphraſt *Andronicus* in explaining this laſt Paſſage, Πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου, adds οἷον τέχνη, ἢ ἄλλη τις πρᾶξις, *as for inſtance, Art, or any other human Action.*

ALEX-

ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS ſpeaks of efficient Cauſes as follows: Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰ κυρίως αἴτια ποιητικὰ, φύσις τε, καὶ τεχνη, καὶ προαίρεσις. *The Cauſes, which are ſtrictly and properly efficient, are Nature, Art, and each Man's particular Choice of Action.* περὶ Ψύχης. p. 160. B. *Edit. Ald.*

IN what manner ART is diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of theſe efficient Cauſes, the ſubſequent Notes will attempt to explain.

NOTE II. p. 6. OF THAT PAINTER FAMED IN STORY, *&c.*] See *Valer. Max.* l. 8. c. 11. See alſo *Dion. Chryſoſtom. Orat.* 63. p. 590.

NOTE III.] p. 12. ART IS MAN BECOMING A CAUSE, INTENTIONAL AND HABITUAL.] *Ariſtotle*, in his *Rhetoric*, thus accurately enumerates all the poſſible manners, either direct or indirect, in which Mankind may be ſaid to *act* or *do* any thing. Πάντες δὴ πράττουσι πάντα, τὰ μὲν, δι' αὐτούς· τὰ δὲ, δι' αὐτούς· τῶν μὲν οὖν μὴ δι' αὐτοὺς, τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχην πράττουσι, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τῶν δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ μὲν βίᾳ, τὰ δὲ φύσει· ὥστε πάντα, ὅσα μὴ δι' αὐτοὺς πράττουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης· τὰ δὲ φύσει· τὰ δὲ βίᾳ. Ὅσα δὲ δι' αὐτοὺς, καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν δι' ἔθος, τὰ δὲ δι' ὄρεξιν· καὶ τὰ μὲν διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀλόγιστον. ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν βούλησις, μετὰ λόγου ὄρεξις ἀγαθοῦ—ἄλογοι δ' ὀρέξεις, ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία. ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν, ἀνάγκη πράττειν δι' αἰτίας ἕπτα· διὰ τύχην, διὰ βίαν, διὰ φύσιν,

φύσιν, δι' ἔθος, διὰ λογισμὸν, διὰ θυμὸν, δι' ἐπιθυμίαν.

All Men do all Things, either of themſelves, or not of themſelves. The Things, which they do not of themſelves, they do either by Chance, or from Neceſſity; and the Things done from Neceſſity, they do either by Compulſion, which is External Neceſſity, or by Nature, which is Internal. So that all Things whatſoever, which Men do not of themſelves, they do either by Chance, or from Compulſion, or by Nature.

Again, the Things which they do of themſelves, and of which they are themſelves properly the Cauſes, ſome they do thro' Cuſtom and acquired Habit, others thro' original and natural Deſire. Farther, the Things done thro' natural Deſire they do, either thro' ſuch Deſire aſſiſted by Reaſon, or thro' ſuch Deſire devoid of Reaſon. If it be aſſiſted by Reaſon, then it aſſumes the Denomination of Will;—on the contrary, the irrational Deſires are Anger and Appetite.

Hence it appears that all Things whatever, which Men do, they neceſſarily do thro' one of theſe ſeven Cauſes; either thro' Chance, Compulſion, Nature, Cuſtom, Will, Anger, Appetite. Ariſt. Rhet. I. 1. c. 10.

IT remains, agreeably to this Enumeration, to conſider with which of theſe *Cauſes* we ought to arrange ART.

As to CHANCE, it may be obſerved in general of all *Caſual Events*, that they always exclude *Intention* or *Deſign*: But *Intention* and *Deſign*, are from *Art*

Art inſeparable. Thus is the Difference between *Art* and *Chance* manifeſt.

AS to EXTERNAL COMPULSION, we have it thus deſcribed——Βίαιον δὲ ὃ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν. *That is an Act of Compulſion, the efficient Principle of which is from without, independent of the Doer.* *Ethic. Nic.* l. 3. c. 1. Again, in the ſame Treatiſe, l. 6. c. 4. we are told of the Works of *Art*, that they are ſuch, ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, *the efficient Principle of which is in the Doer or Agent.* Thus therefore is *Art* diſtinguiſhed from *Compulſion.*

THESE two Cauſes, *Chance* and *Compulſion*, are mentioned and conſidered in the Dialogue, *Pages* 6 and 7.

NATURE, or rather NATURAL NECESSITY, is that Cauſe, thro' which we breathe, perſpire, digeſt, circulate our Blood, *&c.* *Will*, *Anger*, and *Appetite*, are (as already obſerved) but ſo many Species of NATURAL DESIRE, conſidered either as aſſiſted by Reaſon, or elſe as devoid of it. Now tho' *Natural Deſire* and *Natural Neceſſity* differ, becauſe in the one we act *ſpontaneouſly*, in the other *not ſpontaneouſly*, yet both of them meet in the *common Genus of Natural Power.* Moreover this is true of all *Natural Power*, that the *Power* itſelf is *prior* to any *Energies* or Acts of that Power. Οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, ἢ χρησάμενοι ἔχομεν. For [to inſtance in the natural Powers of Senſation] *it was not from often ſeeing, and often hearing*,

hearing, that we acquired thoſe Senſes; but on the contrary, being firſt poſſeſſed of them, we then uſed them, not through any Uſe or Exerciſe did we come to poſſeſs them. Ariſt. Ethic. l. 2. c, 1.

NOW the contrary to this is true in the caſe of any *Powers* or *Faculties not natural*, but acquired by *Cuſtom* and *Uſage*. For here there are many *Energies* and *Acts*, which muſt neceſſarily *precede* the Exiſtence of ſuch *Power* or *Habit*, it being evident (as is ſaid in the ſame Chapter) that ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίγνονται, *from ſimilar and homogeneous Energies it is that Habits are obtained.* So again, in the ſame Place, ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν· οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκόδομοι γίνονται, καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. *The Things which we are to do by having learnt, we learn by doing. Thus by building Men become Builders, and by practiſing Muſic they become Muſicians.*

THUS therefore is ART diſtinguiſhed from ALL NATURAL POWER OF MAN, whether *Natural Neceſſity*, *Will*, *Anger*, or *Appetite*. But ART has been already diſtinguiſhed from CHANCE and COMPULSION. So that being clearly not the ſame with *ſix* of thoſe *ſeven* Cauſes, by which all Men do all Things, it muſt needs be referred to the *ſeventh*, that is, to CUSTOM or HABIT.

IT muſt be obſerved, the natural Cauſes or Powers in Man, conſidered as diſtinct from Art, are treated in the Dialogue, *Pages* 8 and 9.

AND

AND now as we have ſhewn *Art* to be *a certain Cauſe working in Man*, it remains to ſhew how it is diſtinguiſhed from *thoſe other Cauſes beſide Man*, which we ſuppoſe to operate in the Univerſe. Theſe are either ſuch *Cauſes* as are *below* him, like the *Vegetative Power*, which operates in Vegetables, the *Senſitive* in Animals; or elſe ſuch *Cauſes* as are *above* him, like GOD, and whatever is elſe of Intelligence more than human.

THE CAUSES BELOW us may be all included in the *common Genus of* NATURE; and of *Nature* we may ſay univerſally, as well of *Nature* without us as within us, that its ſeveral *Operations*, contrary to thoſe of Art, *are not in the leaſt degree derived from Cuſtom or Uſage.* Thus the Author above cited---- Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθιζεσθαι· οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος, οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ῥίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω. *None of thoſe Things, which are what they are by Nature, can be altered by being accuſtomed. Thus a Stone, which by Nature is carried downward, can never be accuſtomed to mount upward, no, not tho' any one ſhould ten thouſand times attempt it, by throwing the Stone upward. The ſame may be ſaid of accuſtoming Fire to move downward. Ethic. Nicom.* l. 2. c. 1. Again, in the *Works of Nature*, ſuch as Trees, Animals, and the like, the *efficient Principle* is *vitally united* to the *Subjects*, wherein it operates.—ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. *Ethic. Nicom.* l. 6. c. 4. But in the *Works of Art*, ſuch as Statues or Houſes, the *efficient Principle is diſunited from the Subjects*, and exiſts not in the *Things done* or *made*, but

but in the *Doer or Artiſt*—ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ. *Ethic. Nic.* l. 6. c. 4. It is indeed poſſible that, even in *Works of Art*, the *Subject* and *efficient Cauſe* may be *united*, as in the Caſe of a Phyſician becoming his own Patient, and curing himſelf. But then it muſt be remembered that this Union is κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, merely *accidental*, and no way *eſſential* to the conſtituting of Art, conſidered as Art. By this therefore is ART clearly diſtinguiſhed from NATURE, whoſe Definition informs us that it is—ἀρχὴ τίς καὶ αἰτία τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρώτως, καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. *A certain Principle or Cauſe of moving and ceaſing to move, in ſome Subject wherein ſuch Principle exiſts immediately, eſſentially, and not by way of Accident.* Ariſt. Natur. Auſc. l. 2. c. 1.

THE CAUSES, *which are of Rank* SUPERIOUR *to Man*, ſuch as the DEITY, can have nothing to do with *Art*, becauſe being (as is ſaid in the Dialogue, *p.* 11.) *perfect and complete, and knowing all from the Beginning, they can never admit of what is additional and ſecondary.* *Art* therefore can only belong to *Beings*, like Men, who being *imperfect*, know their Wants, and endeavour to remove them by Helps *ſecondary* and *ſubſequent*. It was from a like Conſideration that *Pythagoras* called himſelf a PHILOSOPHER, that is to ſay (according to his own Explication of the Name) *a Lover and Seeker of what was wiſe and good*, but not a Poſſeſſor, which he deemed a Character above him. Conſonant to this we read in *Plato*'s Banquet, θεῶν

οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ, &c. *No* GOD *philoſophizes, or deſires to become wiſe,* FOR HE IS SO ALREADY. *Nor, if there be any other Being wiſe, doth he philoſophize for the ſame Reaſon. On the other hand, neither do the Indocil philoſophize; for this is the Misfortune of Indocility, without being virtuous, good or prudent, to appear to oneſelf ſufficient in all theſe Reſpects. In general therefore, he who thinketh himſelf in no want, deſireth not that, which he thinks himſelf not to need. Who then,* ſaid *Socrates* to *Diotima,* (the Speaker of this Narration) WHO ARE THOSE WHO PHILOSOPHIZE, *if they are neither the Wiſe nor the Indocil? That* (replied ſhe) *may be now conſpicuous even to a Child.* THEY ARE THOSE OF MIDDLE RANK, BETWEEN THESE EXTREMES. *Plat.* p. 203. tom. 3. *Edit. Serrani.*

HERE we ſee (agreeably to what is ſaid in the Dialogue, *pages* 11. and 12.) that as to *acquired* or *ſecondary Habits,* ſome Beings are *too excellent for them, and others too baſe*; and that the DEITY above all is in the Number of thoſe *tranſcendent,* and is thus, as a *Cauſe,* diſtinguiſhed from ART. *Vid. Amm.* περὶ Ἑρμεν. p. 26. b. *et omnino* εἰς καλὴν. p. 127, 128.

THERE are, beſides the *Deity* and *Nature* now ſpoken of, certain other *external* Cauſes, which are mentioned in the firſt Note as diſtinct from *Art,* namely *Chance* and *Neceſſity.* But of theſe hereafter, when we conſider the *Subject* of Art.

NOT

NOTE IV. *p.* 13. FACULTIES, POWERS, *&c.* ARE OBSCURE AND HIDDEN THINGS——ENERGIES AND OPERATIONS LIE OPEN TO THE SENSES.] Εἰ δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τί ἕκαστον τούτων, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικὸν, ἢ τί τὸ αἰσθητικὸν, πρότερον ἐπισκεπτέον, τί τὸ νοεῖν, καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι· πρότεραι γὰρ καὶ σαφέστεραι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τῶν δυνάμεών εἰσι αἱ ἐνέργειαι. προευτυγχάνομεν γὰρ αὐταῖς, καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπινοοῦμεν. *If we are to explain what each of theſe things are, as for inſtance, what the intelligent Principle, what the ſenſitive, we muſt firſt inquire what it is to think, what to ſee, hear, and uſe the Senſes. For with reſpect to us Men, the* ENERGIES *are* PRIOR *and* MORE EVIDENT *than the* POWERS, *becauſe it is in the Energies we are firſt converſant, and comprehend the Powers from them.* Themiſt. in lib. 2. de Animâ, p. 76. Edit. Ald. Fol. Ariſtot. de An. II. 4.

NOTE V. p. 15. ARE THERE NOT PRECEPTS; *&c.*] Vid. Plat. in Min. tom. 2. p. 316, 17. *Edit. Serran.* et in Gorgia, tom. 1. p. 465. A. ἐγὼ δὲ τεχνὴν οὐ καλῶ, ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πράγμα.

As to thoſe *low Habits* here mention'd, from which we diſtinguiſh *Art* by the *Number* and *Dignity* of its Precepts, they fall in general under the Denomination of Μαλαιοτεχνία, of which *Quintilian* gives the following Account. Μαλαιοτεχνία *quoque eſt quædam, id eſt, ſupervacua Artis Imitatio, quæ nihil ſane nec boni nec mali habeat, ſed vanum laborem: qualis illius fuit, qui grana ciceris, ex ſpatio diſtante miſſa, in acum continuo & ſine fruſtratione inſerebat: quem, cum ſpectaſſet Alexander, donaſſe dicitur ejuſdem*

leguminis modio. Quod quidem præmium fuit illo operi digniſſimum. Inſt. Orat. l. 2. c. 20.

NOTE VI. p. 17. AN HABITUAL POWER IN MAN OF BECOMING THE CAUSE OF SOME EFFECT, ACCORDING TO A SYSTEM OF VARIOUS AND WELL-APPROVED PRECEPTS----]

THE *Peripatetic* Definition of Art is Ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικὴ---*an efficient Habit, joined with ſound and true Reaſon.* Ariſtot. Ethic. Nic. l. 6. c. 4.

THE *Stoic* Definition, as we find it in *Sext. Empir. adverſus Logicos*, p. 392. is, Σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων ἐγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τὶ τέλος εὐχρήστων τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Thus tranſlated by *Cicero* in *Diodemes de Grammat. l. 2. Ars eſt Perceptionum exercitatarum collectio, ad unum exitum vitæ utilem pertinentium.* And again by *Quintilian*, Inſt. Orat. l. 2. c. 18. *Artem conſtare ex perceptionibus conſentientibus & coexercitatis ad finem utilem vitæ.* The ſame Definition is alſo alluded to in the Academics of *Cicero*, l. 2. c. 7. where it is ſaid——*Ars vero quæ poteſt eſſe, niſi quæ non ex una, aut duabus, ſed ex multis animi perceptionibus conſtat?*

THERE is a third Definition of Art cited by *Quintilian* in the ſame place, and aſcribed by him to *Cleanthes---Ars eſt poteſtas viâ (id eſt, ordine) efficiens.* The Greek, from which this Latin Definition is taken, is fuller and more philoſophical. The Words are—Ἕξις ὁδῷ βαδίζουσα μετὰ φαντασίας—which may be rendered, *an Habit, which proceeds in a Road or Method, having a Senſe withal of what it is about.* The

laſt Character diſtinguiſhes Art from the natural Energies of all things *inſenſitive*, which, tho' they proceed *methodically*, yet *want a Senſe* of what they are doing. Vid. Niceph. Blemmid. Epit. Logic. p. 20.

Now if we compare theſe Definitions with that in the Dialogue, we ſhall find them all to correſpond. *The Habitual Power in Man of becoming the Cauſe of ſome Effect*, is the ſame as Ἕξις ποιητικὴ in the *Peripatetic* Definition. *According to a Syſtem of various and well-approved Precepts*, is the ſame as μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς. For *ſound and true Reaſon* muſt needs be the Baſis of *all ſuch Precepts.*

AGAIN, as to the ſecond Definition—The Words Σύστημα καταλήψεων [*a Syſtem of Comprehenſions*, or *of certain and evident Truths*] correſpond to the latter Part of the Definition in the Dialogue—*According to a Syſtem of various and well-approv'd Precepts.* The Word ἐγγεγυμνασμένων [that is to ſay, *worked in by Habit and Exerciſe*] correſponds to the firſt Part, that *Art* is *a Cauſe founded in Habit.* And the reſt [πρὸς τὶ τέλος, &c. that is to ſay, *a Syſtem which has reſpect to ſome uſeful and ſerviceable End or Purpoſe in Human Life*] ſhews the Syſtem here mentioned to regard *Practice* and *Action*, not *Theory* and *Speculation.* And thus does it correſpond with the Definition of the Dialogue, where it is ſaid that Art is an *Habitual Power* not of merely *contemplating* and *knowing*, but of *becoming the Cauſe of ſome Effect.* It is not indeed expreſſed in the Dialogue, that this Effect has reſpect to the *Utility of Human Life*, becauſe this *latter Circumſtance* is reſerved to the Definition of the *final Cauſe* of Art, given *page* 29.

As to the third Definition of Art, *poteſtas viâ efficiens, a Power operating methodically*, it may be obſerved, that by being called an *operating* Power, it is diſtinguiſhed from Powers *purely ſpeculative*; and as it is ſaid to *operate methodically*, or *in a Road and regular Proceſs*, it is diſtinguiſhed from *Chance* as well as blind *Neceſſity*. And thus far it correſponds with what is offered in the Dialogue. But it does not appear from this Definition, whether the Power therein mentioned be *Original* and *Natural*, or *Secondary* and *Habitual*, becauſe Powers of *either* ſort may operate methodically. And perhaps *Cleanthes* intended not to diſtinguiſh ſo far, but took *Art* in that *larger* and more general Senſe, adopted ſometimes by the *Stoics*; as when they deſcribe *Nature herſelf* to be a Πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον πρὸς γένεσιν, *an artificial Fire, proceeding methodically to Production or Creation.* For it is not to be imagined, they intended by this to inſinuate that *Nature* was a *Fire*, which had learnt by *Habit* ſo to operate. On the contrary, by *artificial* it is probable they intended no more than ſome *active efficient Principle, working with Reaſon, Order, and Method*; of which Principle they conſider'd *Fire* to be the *propereſt* vehicle, as being of all Bodies the moſt *ſubtle*, and that into which the reſt are all *ultimately* reſolvable. *Vide Diog. Laert.* l. 7. *Sect.* 156. *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* l. 2. c. 22.

NOTE VII. page 22. IT SHOULD SEEM THAT THE COMMON OR UNIVERSAL SUBJECT OF ART WAS——ALL THOSE CONTINGENT NATURES, WHICH LIE WITHIN THE REACH of HUMAN POWERS TO INFLUENCE.]

THE

THE CAUSE here treated is the MATERIAL, the Ὕλη, or Ὑποκείμενον, or τὸ ἐξ οὗ γινεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος.

OF a *Contingent* we have the following Definition——Λέγω δ' ἐνδέχεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, οὗ μὴ ὄντος ἀναιτίου, τεθέντος δ' ὑπάρχειν, εἶδεν ἔσται διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον. *I call that a* CONTINGENT, *which not being neceſſary, but being ſuppoſed to be, there will follow nothing impoſſible from ſuch Suppoſition.* Ariſt. Anal. prior. l. 1. c. 13. Diog. Laert. l. 3. §. 10.

THAT this is true in Works of *Art*, is evident. It *not neceſſary*, that a given Fragment of ſuch a Rock ſhould aſſume the Figure of *Hercules:* but there follows *nothing impoſſible*, if we ſuppoſe it ſo figured. 'Tis for this reaſon, that the *Subject* of *Art* is in the Dialogue called a *Contingent*.

BUT however, to explain the whole of what is ſaid in this Place, it is neceſſary to go backward, and deduce what we would ſay from ſome remoter Conſiderations.

THE *Peripatetics* held the *End* or Aim of their Philoſophy to be the diſcovering and knowing the ἀρχὴ, the *primary and creative Principle of all Things.* They purſued this Inquiry, when they reaſoned *analytically*, that is to ſay *upwards*, by beginning their Contemplation from thoſe things, which are *to us firſt* in the Order of our Comprehenſion, and ſo aſcending gradually to that which is *truly firſt in the real Order of Beings.* Ammon. εἰς Ε. Φων, p. 36.

THE *first* and *original Objects* of our Comprehenſion are thoſe nearer and more immediate, *viz. the Objects of Senſe*, with which we are ſurrounded on every Side. *Theſe Objects* we perceive to be *all in motion*; and the Motions are *multiform*, *various*, and often *oppoſite* to each other. The Conſequences of this we perpetually behold. By *ſuch Motions* we ſee that not only the mere *local* Site of theſe Beings is changed, but their very *Bulk*, and *Figure*, and *Qualities*; nay more than this, even *the Beings themſelves* are made to *ſeparate* and *periſh*, while *new* Beings *ariſe* from the Re-aſſemblage of the ſcattered Parts, which Parts different *Motions* can as well *bring together*, as *diſunite*. The *Beings* or *Objects* of the Character here deſcribed, *the Peripatetics* denoted under the common Appellation of the τὰ κινέμενα καὶ φθαρτὰ, *the Beings moving and corruptible.*

FROM theſe *moving and periſhable Objects*, they paſſed to thoſe *ſublimer* and *more tranſcendent* Objects of *Senſe*, which they ſaw *adorn the Heavens*. Here likewiſe they diſcovered *Motion*; but then this Motion was *uniform* and *conſtant*; *affecting not the Beings moved*, ſave in the relation of *local Site*. As therefore they beheld no *Change* in the *Form and Eſſence* of theſe Beings, they deemed them (*upon their Hypotheſis*) *incorruptible*, and out of them eſtabliſhed *another Claſs* of Beings, that is to ſay, the τὰ κινέμενα καὶ ἄφθαρτα, *the Beings moving and incorruptible.*

FROM theſe *ſublimer Objects of Senſe*, they paſſed to *Objects of pure Intellect*; to *Bodies devoid of all Motion*, and of all *Quality*, ſave that inſeparable one of

of *Figure*; ſuch Bodies for inſtance as the Cube, the Sphere, and the reſt of Bodies *mathematical*. From *mathematical* Bodies, and the *Truths reſulting from them*, they paſſed to the Contemplation of *Truth in general*; to the *Soul*, and its Powers both of *Intuition* and *Syllogization*; to *Being univerſal*, and above both *Time* and *Place*; and thus at laſt to that *ſupreme Cauſe*, the great Principle of the whole, which is ever the *ſame*, *immutaole* and *eternal*. The ſeveral *Objects* of this *intellectual Comprehenſion* they ſtiled not merely ἄφθαρτα, but ἄφθαρτα καὶ ἀκίνητα, *Beings incorruptible and immoveable*. V. inf. Note xvii.

IN this manner did the *Peripatetics* ſpeculate. And hence was it they eſtabliſhed to themſelves *three Species* of Philoſophical Employment—one about Beings *motionleſs* and *eternal*; another, about Beings *moveable* and *eternal*; and a third, about Beings *moveable* and *periſhable*. The firſt they held the proper Employment of the *Metaphyſician*; the two laſt of the *Aſtronomer* and the *Naturaliſt*.

Διὸ τρεῖς αἱ θεωρημάτειαι· ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀκινήτου· ἡ δὲ, περὶ κινουμένου μὲν, ἄφθαρτου δὲ· ἡ δὲ, περὶ τὰ φθαρτά. *Idcirco tres ſunt tractationes; una, de immobili; altera de eo, quod movetur quidem, ſed eſt interitus expers; tertia de rebus, interitui obnoxiis.* Ariſtot. Natural. Auſc. l. 2. c. 7. Διὸ καὶ τρεῖς αἱ θεωρημάτειαι· ἡ μέν, περὶ κινούμενα καὶ φθαρτά· ἡ δε περὶ κινούμενα, ἄφθαρτα δέ· ἡ δε, περὶ ακίνητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα. *Themiſtii Paraphraſis in loc.*

THIS *threefold Subject* of Philoſophic Inquiry is elegantly explained in the following Paſſage. Τί δὲ

τὸ

τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτελικῆς Φιλοσοφίας; Φαμὲν ὅτι γνῶναι τὴν πάντων ἀρχὴν, τὴν τῶν πάντων δημιουργὸν αἰτίαν, τὴν ἀεὶ καὶ ὡσάυτως ἔχουσαν· ἀποδείκνυσι γὰρ πάντων ἀρχὴν, καὶ ἀσώματον· ἐξ ἐκείνης δὲ τὰ πάντα παράγεσθαι. Τίνα δὲ τὰ ἄγοντα ἡμᾶς εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τέλος; Φαμὲν ὅτι ἡ διδασκαλία τῶν ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ μεταβολῇ ὑπαρχόντων· τοιαῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ· ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτων, διὰ μεσῶν μαθηματικῶν, ἀναγόμεν ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ ἀεὶ καὶ ὡσάυτως ἔχοντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ ἔστι τὰ οὐράνια· καὶ οὕτω, μετὰ τὰς ἀσωμάτους οὐσίας, ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάντων ἀρχήν. Πάσης γὰρ κινήσεως ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν ἔσης, ἢ κατὰ ποιὸν, ἢ κατὰ τόπον, τὰ μὲν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ κατὰ πᾶσαν κίνησιν κινοῦνται· τα δε οὐράνια κατὰ μόνην τὴν καλὰ τόπον. Διὸ χρὴ εὐτάκτως ὁδεύειν ἀπὸ τῶν πολυτρόπως κινουμένων ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ μίαν, καὶ μόνην κίνησιν κινέμενα, καὶ οὕτως ἐπὶ ΤΗΝ ΑΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΕΙ ΩΣΑΥΤΩΣ ΕΧΟΥΣΑΝ ΑΡΧΗΝ. Ἀμμονίε εἰς τὰς κατηγορίας, p. 12. *Edit. Venet.* 8vo. 1545.

THE Author of the Dialogue has had Reference to this *threefold Diviſion of Subjects*, as may be ſeen in that Part of his Dialogue, which gives occaſion to the preſent Comment. He has choſen however to ſtile the τὰ Οὐράνια, or *Heavenly Bodies*, rather *Contingents of higher Order*, than Beings *neceſſary*, as imagining the former to be their truer Character.

IT may be here added, that the *Peripatetics* confined Φύσις, or *Nature*, for the moſt part, to this Earth of our's, where they conſidered her as the *active Principle of Life* in *Plants* and *Animals*. Hence therefore they diſtinguiſhed not her *Effects* from thoſe

of

of *Art*, by their *Neceſſity* (for the *Effects* of both they treated as *contingent*) but from the Cauſe in *Natural* Subjects operating *within*, in *Artificial without*, as has been already obſervèd, *p.* 256, 257. See *Diog. Laert.* p. 459.

IT may be farther added, that they placed theſe *Effects* of *Art* and *Nature*, and indeed all other *Contingents* whatever, in a *middle* Rank between Things *Neceſſary*, and Things *Impoſſible*. The Reaſon was evident. Things *Neceſſary* could not *but* be; Things *Impoſſible* could *not* be; but *Contingents* were τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, that is, *were equally ſuſceptible both of Being and Non-being*.

BUT ſtill tho' all Contingents admitted on their Hypotheſis both of Being and Non-being, yet they ſuppoſed ſome to have a greater Tendency to Exiſtence, and others to have a leſs. The firſt Species of theſe they ſtiled τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ *the Things which happen for the moſt part*; the laſt, τὰ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, *the Things which happen leſs frequently*.

NOW as it is evident that both *Nature* and *Art oftener* obtain their *End*, than miſs it (for complete Animals are more frequently born than Monſters, and the Muſician, if an Artiſt, ſtrikes oftener the right String than the wrong) hence it was, that they ranged the *Effects* of *Nature* and *Art* among thoſe *Contingents* which were τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, *Contingents of greater Frequency*. But yet as theſe Effects were not from the Hypotheſis *neceſſary*, and *contrary* to theſe upon occaſion happened, hence it was, that whenever either *Nature* or *Art* became *Cauſes* of the τὰ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, *thoſe rarer Events*,

Events, in ſuch caſe they (Nature and Art) were conſidered by theſe Philoſophers as αἰτίαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς *Cauſes by way of Accident*, and not according to their own *Eſſence* and diſtinguiſhing *Character*. In ſuch Inſtances it was, that they aſſumed the Names of Τύχη and Αὐτόματον, FORTUNE *and* CHANCE, Τύχη having moſtly Reference to Works of *Men*, Αὐτόματον to Works of *Nature*. The Inſtances given by *Themiſtius*, in caſes of *Chance* and *Fortune*, are as follow. A Tile falls from a Houſe. The *End* of its falling is to arrive at that lower Place, whither *Nature* would carry it by the common Law of *Gravity*. In falling it ſtrikes and wounds a Paſſenger. This *laſt* Event is from *Chance*. Again, a Man digs in his Garden, to plant. In digging, he diſcovers a hidden Treaſure. This *laſt* Event is from *Fortune*. And thus, adds *Themiſtius*, ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἢ μία, ἄλλα μὲν καθ' αὐτὴν αἰτία, ἄλλα δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. *The ſame individual Action is the Cauſe of one Thing from its own peculiar Character, and of another Thing, by way of Accident.* And again, ἔστι μὲν ἃ ἢ τῶν ἔτως συμβαινόντων ἢ τὴν φύσιν ἢ τὴν προαίρεσιν αἰτίαν πῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐ καθ' αὐτήν. ἐ γὰρ τέτων χάριν ἔτε προήλθεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔτε ἡ κέραμις κατηνέχθη, ἀλλ εἰ ἄρα, κατὰ συμβεβηκός.—*Of theſe Events we may call Nature or Human Will in a manner the Cauſe, but yet not ſo from themſelves, and according to their own peculiar Eſſence; for it was not for the ſake of what happened that either the Paſſenger* WENT FORTH, *or the Tile* FELL DOWNWARD, *but if any thing it was by Accident.* Themiſt. in lib. 2. Natur. Auſcult. p. 26. *Edit. Ald.* See alſo *Ariſtot. Natur. Auſcult.* l. 2. c. 4, 5, 6. *Ammon in Prædicam.* p. 113. b. This Doctrine came originally

originally from *Plato*, whoſe *Definition* of *Fortune* was—Σύμπτωμα φύσεως ἢ προαιρέσεως, *a Symptom, or thing co-incident either with Nature or Human Will. Vid. Suidam in Voc.* Εἱμαρμένη.

IT muſt be here obſerved, that κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς [by accident] means in no Part of theſe Quotations *accidental*, as ſtanding for *caſual*; for this would be mere Tautology, as to what is here ſaid concerning *Chance*. It means rather ſomething by way of *Appendage*; ſomething *Adventitious*; in other Words, it means *Accident*, as adhering to *Subſtance*, *without which it can have no Being*, tho' ſuppoſe it *abſent* or *taken* away, the *Nature of Subſtance is no way affected*. It was in this Senſe the *Peripatetics* ſuppoſed *Chance* and *Fortune* to be *Accidents* or *Appendages* to *Nature*, and *Mind*. According therefore to them, the Suppoſition of *Chance* and *Fortune* was ſo far from *excluding Nature* and *Mind* from the Univerſe, that they demonſtrably proved their Exiſtence in it. For admitting their Account of *Chance* and *Fortune* to be juſt; if we grant the *Accidents* to exiſt, much more muſt we grant the *Subjects*, and this too with that *ſuperior Dignity* and *Priority of Exiſtence*, which is evidently due to all *Subjects* above their *Accidents*. Well therefore did the Philoſopher conclude Ὕστερον ἄρα τὸ Αὐτόματον, καὶ ἡ Τύχη τοῦ Νοῦ, καὶ τῆς Φύσεως. *Subſequent in Exiſtence, are* CHANCE *and* FORTUNE *to* MIND *and* NATURE. *Ariſtot. Natur. Auſc.* l. 2. c. 6.

FROM what has been ſaid, we ſee the Reaſon of that Enumeration of Cauſes mentioned in the Beginning of the firſt Note, where they are deſcribed to be NECESSITY, NATURE, MAN, and FORTUNE.

To

TO NECESSITY they referred all thoſe Things and Events, which they *ſuppoſed of neceſſary Exiſtence*; ſuch as the Univerſe, the Heavenly Bodies, together with their *uniformly regular* Motions.

TO NATURE, MAN, and CHANCE, they referred all *Contingents*; to *Nature*, and *Man*, *obtaining their End, all Contingents of greater Frequency*; to the ſame Cauſes, either *falleng ſhort of their End*, or *going beyond it*, and thus becoming *Chance* or *Fortune*, *thoſe oppoſite Contingents of Exiſtence leſs uſual.*

AND hence, as *Art* and *Fortune* were both converſant about the *ſame* Subjects (*viz.* ſuch Contingents as reſpected Human Life) we find the Meaning of that Verſe of *Agatho*'s, cited by *Ariſtotle*, in his *Ethics*, l. 6. c. 5.

Τέχνη τύχην ἔς-ερξε, κὴ τύχη τέχνην.

Art loveth Fortune; *Fortune loveth Art.*

THE whole Chapter indeed is well worth peruſal. But we ſhall not venture to lengthen this Note, which may be probably deemed too long already, and which can be only excuſed, as giving ſome Sample of a Philoſophy, which, from its Rarity perhaps, may poſſibly furniſh ſome Amuſement.

NOTE

NOTE VIII. p. 23. I MEAN, SAID HE, BY BEGINNING, THAT CAUSE FOR THE SAKE OF WHICH, *&c.*]

AS the CAUSE here ſpoken of, is that *Cauſe* uſually called FINAL, it may be aſked, how it comes in this Place to be conſidered as a *Beginning*. The Anſwer is, that what comes *laſt* in *Practice*, ſtands in *Theory firſt*; or in other Words, the Order of *Ideas* in the *Intellect* of the Artiſt is exactly *inverted*, with reſpect to the Order of his *Energies*.

THUS *Ammonius*—Καθόλε γὰρ τῆς μὲν θεωρίας τὸ τέλος γίγνεται ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως· ἔμπαλιν δὲ τῆς πράξεως τὸ τέλος, ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας. οἷον ὁ Οἰκοδόμος, ἐπιταξεὶς οἶκον, λέγει καθ' ἑαυτὸν, ἐπετάγην οἶκον ποιῆσαι· ὅπερ ἐστὶ σκέπασμα, κωλυτικὸν ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων· τοῦτο δὲ ἂν γένοιτο, μὴ γινομένης ὀροφῆς. Ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἄρχεται της θεωρίας. προβαίνων δὲ φησίν· Ἀλλα τοῦτο ἂν γένοιτο, μὴ γινομένων τοίχων· ἤτοι δὲ ἂν γένοιντο, μὴ ὑποβληθέντων θεμελίων· οἱ δὲ θεμελίοι ἂν βληθεῖεν, μη ὀρυχθείσης τῆς γῆς. ἐνταῦθα κατέληξεν ἡ θεωρία. Ενξεῦθεν ἤδη ἄρχεται ἡ πρᾶξις. πρότερον γὰρ ὀρύττει τὴν γῆν· ἔιθ' ὕτω βάλλει τὸν θεμέλιον· εἶτα ἐγείρει τοίχους· καὶ ὕστερον ἐπιτίθησι τὴν ὀροφὴν, ἥτις ἐστὶ τέλος τῆς πράξεως. ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, τέλος τῆς θεωρίας. Αμμ. εἰς κατηγ. p. 15. *Edit. Venet.* 8vo.

FOR *in general the End of Theory is the Beginning of Practice; and ſo reciprocally, the End of Practice, the Beginning of Theory. Thus for inſtance: An Architect,*

chitect, being ordered to build a Houſe, ſays to himſelf, I am ordered to build a Houſe; that is to ſay, a certain Defence, to protect againſt the Rains and the Heats. But this cannot be without a Roof or Covering. From this Point therefore he begins his Theory. He proceeds and ſays—But there can be no Roof, if there be no Walls; and there can be no Walls, without ſome Foundations; nor can there be laid Foundations, without opening the Earth. At this Point, the Theory is at an End. Hence therefore commences the Practice or Action. For firſt he opens the Earth; then lays the Foundation; then raiſes the Walls; and laſtly puts on the Roof, which is the End of the Action or Practice, [but Beginning of the Theory] as the Beginning of the Practice was the End of the Theory. See alſo *Ariſt. Ethic. Nicom.* l. 3. c. 3. *et de Animâ*, l. 3. c. 3.

NOTE IX. p. 24. Was it not the Abſence of Health, *&c.*] *Vide Platon. de Rep.* l. 1. tom. 2. p. 341. *Edit. Serrani.* Ὥσπερ (ἔφην ἐγὼ) εἴ με ἔροιο εἰ ἐξαρκεῖ σώματι, εἶναι σώματι, ἢ προσδεῖται τίνος· εἴποιμ' ἄν, ὅτι παντάπασι μέν γε προσδεῖται. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἰατρικὴ νῦν εὑρεμένη, ὅτι σῶμα ἐστι πονηρὸν, καὶ οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι. *Quemadmodum, inquam, ſi a me quæreres, an ſatis ſit Corpori, ut ſit Corpus, an aliâ quâpiam re indigeat: reſponderem, omninò indigere. Atque hâc quidem de Causâ medicinæ ars nunc eſt inventa, quoniam Corpus per ſe proſligatum eſt, neque ipſi ſatis eſt, ut ſit hujuſmodi.* So likewiſe the acute *Scaliger—Motionis enim Appetentia Cauſa eſt; Appetentiæ, Privatio.* De Cauſ. L. Lat. l. 15. c. 114. p. 235.

NOTE X. p. 26. OR IS IT NOT ABSURD TO SUPPOSE THERE SHOULD BE AN ART OF IMPOS-

IMPOSSIBILITIES?] What is here ſaid concerning the Difference between thoſe things for which we may poſſibly *wiſh*, and thoſe which we *actually purſue*, is expreſſed in the *Ethics* of *Ariſtotle*, l. 3. c. 2. Προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, κἂν εἴ τις φαίη ωροαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν ἠλίθιος εἶναι. βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. *There is indeed no determined Choice of Action with reſpect to Things impoſſible; and if any one ſhould ſay he had ſo determined, he would appear to be a Fool. But there may be a Willing or Longing after Things impoſſible; as for inſtance, never to die.*

NOTE XI. p. 27. THE SUGGESTIONS OF WILL, AND UNINSTRUCTED INSTINCT.] *Will*, βούλησις, or Ὄρεξις λογιστική; *uninſtructed Inſtinct*, ὄρεξις ἀλόγιστος. See before, *Note* III.

NOTE XII. p. 29. THE WANT OR ABSENCE OF SOMETHING APPEARING GOOD; RELATIVE TO HUMAN LIFE, AND ATTAINABLE BY MAN, BUT SUPERIOR TO HIS NATURAL AND UNINSTRUCTED FACULTIES.]

THE CAUSE here deſcribed is the τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, or FINAL.——*Ariſtotle* in his *Phyſics*, l. 2. c. 3. in enumerating the various Sorts of Cauſes, reckons among the reſt——τὸ δ' ὡς τὸ τέλος, καὶ τ' ἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων. τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα βέλτιστου, καὶ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων ἐθέλει εἶναι. *To theſe may be added that Cauſe, which is conſidered as the End, and Good of all the reſt. For that, for whoſe ſake all the others are*

deemed neceſſary, has juſt pretenſions to be beſt, and to be the End of them all. To this he ſubjoins, conſonant to what is ſaid in the Dialogue—διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν——*Let it make no Difference whether we call this End, real Good, or only apparent Good.* So in the Beginning of his *Ethics*—Πᾶσα τέχνη, καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δε πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ. Διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τ' ἀγαθὸν, οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται. *Every Art, and every orderly Speculation, ſo likewiſe every Action, and determined Choice of Purſuit, appear all of them to tend toward ſome Good. Well therefore have they pronounced* GOOD *to be that, toward which all things tend.* See alſo Plat. in Gorg. p. 499. E. tom. 1. *Edit. Serrani.*

IN the Definition here treated, the Words [*relative to Human Life*] expreſs that Part of the *Stoic* Definition of Art [πρὸς τὶ τέλος εὐχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.] They were omitted in the Definition, *p.* 17. as more properly belonging to the preſent Definition, which reſpects Art in its *final* Cauſe. See *page* 261.

THAT what is *perfect* and *ſelf-ſufficient* is above the *ſecondary Helps* of ART; that our own *Weakneſs* and *Inſufficiency*, and the Proſpect of procuring that *abſent* Good, by which we all hope to ſupply ourſelves, where deficient; that this is the Source not only of all *Arts*, but (joined to ſocial Affection) is the *Origin* and *Cement* of HUMAN SOCIETY; ſee (beſides the Place here treated) pages 11, 12; and of *the third Treatiſe*, p. 147 to p. 157.

Thus

Thus the Poet in *Stobæus*, p. 515.

Χρειὼ πάντ' ἐδίδαξε· τί δ' ἃ χρειὼ κεν ἀνεύροι;
Need *all things taught: What cannot Need invent?*

AGREEABLY alſo to this, *Virgil*, in his firſt *Georgic*, having told us of the various Changes to the worſe, which happened in the *natural* World immediately ſubſequent to the *Golden* Age, goes on to enumerate the ſeveral *Inventions* of Men, which were the *natural Reſult of this their newly indigent State.* He at laſt ſums up the whole by ſaying——

Tum variæ venere artes: labor omnia vicit
Improbus, & duris urgens in rebus EGESTAS.

WHERE ((according to the Doctrine in the Dialogue) WANT is made the *Beginning* or *Origin* of ARTS. The Poet even refers this *Diſpenſation*, this Introduction of *Indigence*, *Care*, and *Solicitude*, to the immediate Will of PROVIDENCE, acting for the Good of Mankind; leſt Plenty ſhould lull them into ſlothful *Lethargy*, ſo as to forget their *nobleſt* and *moſt active Faculties.*

——*Pater ipſe colendi*
Haud facilem eſſe viam voluit, primuſq; per artem
Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda,
Nec torpere gravi paſſus ſua regna veterno.

NOTE XIII. p. 32. CO-EXISTENT, REPLIED HE, AS IN A STATUE, &c. SUCCESSIVE, AS IN

A TUNE or DANCE, &c.] This Diviſion of Beings or Productions we find mentioned by *Ariſtotle* in his *Phyſics*, (l. 3. c. 8.) where explaining his Doctrine concerning *Infinite*, he ſays ——ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πολλάκις τὸ εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν, τῷ ἀεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο γίνεσθαι, ἕτω καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. *In as much as* BEING *is manifold, ſuch as is the Being of a Day or public Feſtival, (which exiſt by continually becoming ſomething farther) ſuch alſo is the Being and Nature of Infinite.* The ſame Sentiment ſoon after is more fully explained and opened. Ὥστε τὸ ἄπειρον ἐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν, ὡς τόδε τί, οἷον ἄνθρωπον, ἢ οἰκίαν· ἀλλ' ὡς ἡμέρα λέγεται, καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν ὅις τὸ εἶναι, ἐκ ὡς ἐσία τὶς γέγονεν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ. *We are not to conceive of Infinite, as of a poſitive particular Subſtance, like a Man or a Houſe; but rather as we pronounce Exiſtence of a Day or public Feſtival, which have their Eſſence, not as ſenſible, individual Subſtances, but by a continued Procedure of Being and ceaſing to be.* Vid. Scalig. de Cauſ. Ling. Lat. L. 3. C. 72. p. 124. Ariſtot. Categ. Cap. 6. Ammon. Com. εις Καλ. p. 82. b. Scal. Poetic. L. 3. C. 1. p. 82.

NOTE XIV. p. 32. WHAT IS HUMAN LIFE, BUT A COMPOUND OF PARTS THUS FLEETING, &c.] It is not inelegantly ſaid in the *Ethics* ſo often referred to——Ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστι, καὶ ἕκας῾ος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλις῾α ἀγαπᾷ· οἷον ὁ μὲν μυσικὸς, τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς, τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα· ἕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκας῾ος. LIFE *is a certain* ENERGY, *and each Man energizes about thoſe*

Subjects

Subjects, and with thoſe Faculties, for which he hath the greateſt Affection; the Muſician, with his Hearing, about Sounds harmonious; the Studious, with his Intellect, about Matters of Speculation; and in like manner each Man elſe, of the various ſorts beſide. Ethic. Nicom. l. 10. c. 4.

NOTE XV. p. 34. EVERY ART WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDED IN A WORK OR ENERGY.] The CAUSE here treated is the FORMAL, called by various Names; the εἶδος, the λόγος, the τί ἐστι, the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. Vid. Scal. de Cauſ. Ling. Lat. L. v. c. 113. p. 232. *Imperfectum autem Græci*, &c.

IN the Beginning of the above-cited *Ethics*, after the Author has told us that every *Art*, and Human *Action* tend to ſome *Good* or *End*, he adds Διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τέλων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνεργείαι· τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς, ἔργα τινά——*But there appears a Difference in Ends: For ſome are* ENERGIES; *ſome, over and above theſe Energies, are certain* WORKS. In *Quintilian's Inſtitutes* the ſame *Diſtinction*, with reſpect to the End of Arts, is mentioned, *l.* 2. *c.* 18. *Vid. Plat. in Dio. Laert. L.* 3. *C.* 84. *p.* 216. *C.* 100. *p.* 225.

BUT here perhaps it may be aſked, if all *Arts* are ended and accompliſhed in ſome *Energy* or *Work*, and this Energy or Work be almoſt univerſally that *abſent Good*, toward which they all tend, and for the ſake of which they are all exerted; (for a *Dance*, which is an Energy, and a *Houſe*, which is a Work, are certain *abſent Goods* or Pleaſures, for the ſake of which

certain Arts operate) if this be allowed, it may be aſked, whence then the Difference between the *Formal* Cauſe and the *Final*; the *Final*, as in *Note* XII. it has been already treated?

THE Anſwer to this is, that they *concur* and are the *ſame*. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστι, καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, ἓν ἐστι. *The* FORMAL *Cauſe and the* FINAL *are* ONE. *Ariſt. Nat. Auſc.* l. 2. c. 7. If they *differ*, it is (as *Joannes Grammaticus* obſerves in commenting on this Place) a *Difference* rather in the *Time* and *Manner* of our viewing them, than in their own *Eſſence* and *Nature*. It may not perhaps be improper to tranſcribe his own Words. Ταυτὸν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ εἶδος, τῇ σχέσει μόνῃ διαφέρον, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὡς γινόμενον, καὶ μήπω ὂν θεωρῆται, τέλος ἐστίν· ὅταν δὲ ὡς ἤδη γενόμενον, εἶδος. *The* END *and the* FORM *are numerically the ſame, differing (as has been ſaid) in* RELATION *only, and* TIME. *For thus the ſame Thing, while conſidered as in its Progreſs to Completion, but as not yet complete, is ſo long an* END; *when conſidered as actually complete, is no longer an End, but a* FORM. And thus is this Queſtion one way anſwered, by acknowledging that theſe two Cauſes *co-incide*, and differ not in their *Eſſence* or real Character, but rather in the *Time* and *Manner* of our contemplating them.

BUT there is another Anſwer, and that is derived rom the *twofold* Nature of *final* Cauſes. According to this Doctrine, *Arts* have not only a *nearer* and *more immediate End*, (as a Ship is the End of Shipbuilding, or Navigating the End of Pilotry) but they have a ſtill *remoter* and *higher End*, a τέλος τε-

λειώτατον,

λικώτατον, that is to ſay, MAN, *Human-kind*, or (in other Words) the *Utility* or *Elegance of Human Life.* Thus the *Stagirite.* Ἐσμὲν γάρ πως καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος· διχῶς γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. *For* WE OURSELVES *alſo are in ſome ſort* AN END; *for the final Cauſe is twofold.* Natur. Auſcult. l. 2. c. 2. If therefore we have reſpect to this ULTIMATE END, theſe two *Cauſes* will be found to *differ*, and be really diſtinct from each other.

AND thus it is that in ſome reſpects they *agree*, and in others they *differ*, according to the above Diſtinctions eſtabliſhed by this Philoſophy.

NOTE XVI. p. 38. O ART! THOU DISTINGUISHING ATTRIBUTE, *&c.*] This alludes to a capital *Diſtinction of* ART, *taken from a View of her different Ends.* ART may in ſome reſpects be ſaid TO FINISH NATURE, in others TO IMITATE HER. She *finiſhes* her, where *Nature*, having given *the Powers*, is of herſelf unable to give them *Perfection.* 'Tis thus the *Gymnaſtic Arts*, Dancing, Riding, *&c.* finiſh the *Corporeal* Powers; while the ſublimer Arts, Logic, Rhetoric, Moral Virtue, *&c.* finiſh the *Mental.* Where ſhe does not finiſh Nature, ſhe *imitates* her, as in Sculpture, Painting, Dramatic Poetry, *&c.*

ARISTOTLE expreſſes the above ſentiment, as follows. Ὅλως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ, ἃν ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. *Phyſic. L.* 2. *C.* 8.

NOTE XVII. p. 44. THE EFFICIENT, THE MATRRIAL, THE FINAL, AND THE FORMAL.] That is to ſay, τὸ κινήσαν, ἡ Ὕλη, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ Εἶδος.

THUS *Seneca* in his 65th Epiſtle. *Cauſam Ariſtoteles putat tribus modis dici. Prima, inquit, cauſa eſt ipſa Materia, ſine qua nihil poteſt effici. Secunda, Opifex. Tertia, Forma quæ unicuique operi imponitur, tanquam ſtatuæ; nam hanc Ariſtoteles Idos (εἶδος) vocat. Quarta quoque, inquit, his accedit, Propoſitum totius operis.*

QUID *ſit hoc, aperiam. Æs prima ſtatuæ cauſa eſt: nunquam enim facta eſſet, niſi fuiſſet id, ex quo ea funderetur, ducereturve. Secunda cauſa, Artifex eſt: non potuiſſet enim æs illud in habitum ſtatuæ figurari, niſi acceſſiſſent peritæ manus. Tertia cauſa eſt Forma: neque enim ſtatua iſta Doryphoros aut Diadumenos vocaretur, niſi hæc illi eſſet impreſſa facies. Quarta cauſa eſt, faciendi Propoſitum: nam niſi hoc fuiſſet, facta non eſſet. Quid eſt Propoſitum? Quod invitavit artificem, quod ille ſecutus fecit. Vel pecunia eſt hoc, ſi venditurus fabricavit; vel gloria, ſi laboravit in nomen; vel religio, ſi donum templo paravit. Ergo & hæc Cauſa eſt, propter quam fit. An non putas inter cauſas facti operis numerandum, quo remoto factum non eſſet.*——

ARISTOTLE's own Words are as follow. Ἕνα μὲν ἓν τρόπον ἄϊτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος· οἷον, ὁ χαλκὸς τῆς ἀνδριάντος, καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης, καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη. Ἄλλον δὲ,

τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη· οἷον τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἕν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς, καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. Ἔτι, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη, ἢ ἡ τῆς ἠρεμήσεως· οἷον ὁ βουλεύσας, αἴτιον· καὶ ὁ πατὴρ, τοῦ τέκνου· καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου, καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου. Ἔτι, ὡς τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια· διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ; Φαμὲν ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ, καὶ εἰπόντες οὕτως, οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἴτιον.

IN *one manner that may be called a Cauſe, out of which, exiſting as a Part of it, any thing is made or compounded. Thus is Braſs the Cauſe of a Statue, Silver of a Cup, and ſo alſo the higher Genera, in which theſe are included* [as Metal, the Genus including Braſs and Silver; Body, the Genus including Metal, *&c. &c.*] *In another Way, the Form and Exemplar of any thing is its Cauſe; that is to ſay, in other Words, the Definition, the Detail or Narrative of its Eſſence* [that which, characterizing it to be ſuch a particular thing, diſtinguiſhes it from all things elſe] *and of this Definition the ſeveral higher Genera. Thus the Cauſe of the* Diapaſon *or* Octave *is the Proportion of two to one; and more generally than that, is Number; and is moreover the ſeveral Parts, out of which this Definition is formed. Add to this Cauſe, that other, from whence the original Principle of Change, or of Ceaſing to change; as for inſtance, the Perſon who deliberates is the Cauſe of that, which reſults from ſuch Deliberation; the Father is the Cauſe of the Son; and in general, the Efficient, of the Thing effected; the Power changing, of the thing changed. Beſides theſe Cauſes,*

there

there is that alſo, which is conſidered as the End; that is to ſay, the Cauſe, for the ſake of which the thing is done. Thus the Cauſe of Exerciſing is Health. For if it be aſked, Why does he uſe Exerciſe? We ſay, To preſerve his Health; and having ſaid thus much, we think we have given the proper Cauſe. Ariſtot. Natur. Auſcult. l. 2. c. 3.

ADDITION to NOTE III.

THE *Peripatetic* Definition of *Nature*, given *p.* 257, tho' in ſome degree illuſtrated *p.* 266, yet being ſtill from its Brevity perhaps obſcure, the following Explication of it is ſubjoined.

IN the firſt place, by NATURE the *Peripatetics* meant that *Vital Principle* in Plants, Brutes, and Men, by which they are ſaid *to live*, and to be diſtinguiſhed from Things *inanimate*. *Nature* therefore being another Name for *Life* or a *vital Principle*, the *firſt Act* of this Principle, throughout all Subjects, is univerſally found to be of the following kind; namely, *to advance the Subject, which it enlivens, from a Seed or Embryo to ſomething better and more perfect.* This *Progreſſion*, as well in Plants as in Animals, is called *Growth*. And thus is it that NATURE is *a Principle of Motion.*——But then this *Progreſſion* or *Growth* is not *infinite*. When the Subject is *mature*, that is, hath obtained its *Completion* and *perfect Form*, then the *Progreſſion ceaſes*. Here therefore the Buſineſs of the *vital Principle* becomes *different*. It is from henceforward no longer employed *to acquire a Form*, but *to preſerve to its Subject a Form already acquired.* And thus is it that NATURE is a *Principle of Reſt, Stability,* or *Ceaſing*

Ceaſing to move. And ſuch indeed ſhe continues to be, maintaining, *as long as poſſible*, the *Form* committed to her Care, till *Time* and *external Cauſes* in the firſt Place impair it, and induce at length its *Diſſolution*, which is *Death*.

AND thus it has been ſhewn how NATURE may be called A PRINCIPLE BOTH OF MOTION AND CEASING TO MOVE.

AS to the reſt of the Definition, namely, that NATURE is a *Principle*, which inheres in its Subject *immediately*, *eſſentially*, and *not by way of Accident*; no more is meant by this, than that the NATURE or *Life* in every Being, which hath ſuch Principle, is *really* and *truly* A PART OF THAT BEING, and not *detached* and *ſeparate* from it, like the Pilot from the Ship, the Muſician from the Inſtrument. For to theſe *Subjects* tho' thoſe *Artiſts* are *Principles of Motion and Reſt*, yet do they in no ſenſe participate with them in *vital Sympathy* and *Union*.

END *of the* NOTES *on* TREATISE *the Firſt.*

NOTES
ON
TREATISE the Third;
CONCERNING
HAPPINESS.

NOTE I. p. 107. NATURE SEEMS TO TREAT MAN, &c.] *Ut Phidias poteſt a primo inſtituere ſignum, idque perficere; poteſt ab alio inchoatum accipere & abſolvere: huic eſt ſapientia ſimilis. Non enim ipſa genuit hominem, ſed accepit a natura inchoatum: hanc ergo intuens, debet inſtitutum illud, quaſi ſignum abſolvere.* Cic. de Fin. IV. 13. p. 304. Edit. Daviſ.

NOTE II. p. 113. PRACTICE TOO OFTEN CREEPS, &c.] See *p.* 136. and *Note* X.

NOTE III. p. 114. THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IS THAT, THE POSSESSION OF WHICH RENDERS US HAPPY.] Κλήσει γὰρ ἀγαθῶν, οἱ εὐδαίμονες, εὐδαίμονες. *By the Poſſeſſion of Things* GOOD, *are the*

the Happy made HAPPY. Platon. Conviv. p. 204. tom. 2. *Edit. Serrani. Phileb. Plat.* p. 60. B. See *Arrian Epict.* l. 3. c. 22. p. 453.

THE Reader will be pleaſed to obſerve, that, in all Quotations from the Diſſertations of *Epictetus* collected by *Arrian*, the Author refers to the late Edition in two Volumes *Quarto*, publiſhed by his learned and ingenious Friend, Mr. UPTON.

NOTE IV. p. 115. CERTAIN ORIGINAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PRE-CONCEPTIONS, *&c.*] The *Pre-conceptions* here ſpoken of, are called by the *Latins Prænotiones*, or *Anticipationes*; by the *Greeks*, προλήψεις, or Ἔννοιαι, with the occaſional Epithets of either κοιναὶ, ἔμφυλοι, or φυσικαὶ.

'TIS evident that all Men, without the leaſt Help of Art, exert a kind of *Natural Logic*; can in ſome degree *refute*, and *prove*, and *render a Reaſon.*

NOW this cannot be (as the meaneſt Proficient in Logic well knows) without *general Ideas*, and *general Propoſitions*, becauſe a Syllogiſm of *Particulars* is an Impoſſibility. There muſt be therefore ſome *natural Faculty* to provide us theſe *Generals*. This Faculty cannot be any of the *Senſes*, for they all reſpect *Particulars* only. Nor can it be the *reaſoning* or *ſyllogizing Faculty*, for this does not *form* ſuch Generals, but *uſe* them when formed. There only therefore remains the *Faculty* called Νοῦς, that is to ſay, the *Inductive* Faculty; the Faculty, which, *by Induction of ſimilar Individuals*, forms out of the *particular*

particular and the *many* what is *general* and *one*. This Species of *Apprehenſion* is evidently our *firſt* and *earlieſt* Knowledge, becauſe all Knowledge by *Reaſoning* dates its Origin from it, and becauſe, except *theſe two*, no other Knowledge is poſſible.

As therefore *every* Ear, not abſolutely depraved, is able to make ſome *general Diſtinctions* of *Sound*; and in like manner *every* Eye, with reſpect to Objects of *Viſion*; and as this general Uſe of theſe Faculties, by being diffuſed through all Individuals, may be called *common* Hearing, and *common* Viſion, as oppoſed to thoſe *more accurate Energies*, peculiar only to *Artiſts*: So fares it with reſpect to the *Intellect*. There are Truths, or Univerſals of ſo *obvious* a kind, that *every Mind*, or *Intellect*, not abſolutely depraved, without the leaſt Help of Art, can hardly fail to recognize them. The *Recognition* of theſe, or at leaſt the *Ability* to recognize them, is called Κοινὸς Νοῦς, COMMON SENSE, as being *a Senſe common to all*, except Lunatics and Ideots.

FARTHER, as this Power is called Κοινὸς Νοῦς, ſo the ſeveral *Propoſitions*, which are its proper Objects, are called προλήψεις, or *Pre-conceptions*, as being *previous* to all other Conceptions. It is eaſy to gather from what has been ſaid, that theſe προλήψεις muſt be *general*, as being formed by *Induction*; as alſo *natural*, by being *common to all Men*, and *previous* to all Inſtruction. Hence therefore their Definition. Ἔστι δ' ἡ πρόληψις, ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. "A PRE-CONCEPTION *is the natural Apprehenſion of what is general, or univerſal.*" Diog. Laert.

Laert. *l.* 7. *ſ.* 54. See alſo *Arrian. Epict.* l. 1. c. 22. l. 3. c. 6. *Cic. de Naturâ Deor.* l. 1. c. 16, 17. *Plut. de Placit. Philoſoph.* 910. c. *Ariſtot. de. Anim.* III. 11.

NOTE V. p. 115.——AND THAT THE DIFFERENCE LAY ONLY IN THE APPLYING THEM TO PARTICULARS.] This was called Ἐφαρμογὴ τῶν προλήψεων ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους ἐσίαις---τὰς φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους ἐσίαις. *Arr. Epict.* l. 1. c. 22. p. 114, 116. *Edit. Upt.* See an eminent Inſtance, illuſtrating the Truth of this Reaſoning, in the ſame Author, *l.* 4. *c.* 1. *p.* 545. Ἐννοῦμεν γὰρ, ὅτι, &c. *Boet. de Conſ.* L. 3. *Proſa.* 2. p. 106.

NOTE VI. p. 120. WHY ARE THERE, WHO SEEK RECESSES, *&c.*] *Multi autem & ſunt, & fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes, a negotiis publicis ſe removerint, ad otiumque perfugerint.——His idem propoſitum fuit, quod regibus; ut ne quâ re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur: cujus proprium eſt ſic vivere, ut velis. Quare cum hoc commune ſit potentiæ cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi, otioſis: alteri ſe adipiſci id poſſe arbitrantur, ſi opes magnas habeant; alteri ſi contenti ſint & ſuo, & parvo.* Cic. de OFFIC. l. 1. c. 20, 21.

NOTE VII. p. 121.——THE SOVEREIGN GOOD, THEY HAVE TAUGHT US, OUGHT TO BE, *&c.*] The ORIGINAL PRE-CONCEPTIONS of the SOVEREIGN GOOD here recited, may be juſtified by the following Authorities, from among many which are omitted.

AGREE-

AGREEABLE TO NATURE.——*Neque ulla alia in re, niſi in* NATURA, *quærendum eſſe illud* SUMMUM BONUM, *quo omnia referrentur.* Cic. Acad. l. 1. c. 5. p. 27. Edit. Daviſ.

CONDUCIVE TO WELL-BEING.—*Epictetus* calls that *Truth or Knowledge, which reſpects our real Happineſs* [τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας] the Truth or Knowledge, which regards not *mere Living*, but which conduces to LIVING WELL [ἐ τὴν περὶ τὲ ΖΗΝ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ΕΥ ΖΗΝ.] *Arrian. Epict.* l. 1. c. 4. p. 28. *Edit. Upt.* Αἱ κοιναὶ περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἔννοιαι--ΤΟ ΖΗΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΦΥΣΙΝ, καὶ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΝ λέγουσι· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ΤΟ ΕΥ ΖΗΝ, καὶ τὸ εὖ βιῶν, καὶ τὴν εὐζωΐαν, ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΝ φασὶν εἶναι. *Our common Pre-conceptions concerning* HAPPINESS *call it the* LIVING ACCORDING TO NATURE; *farther than this, they ſay it is Living or Exiſting well,* THE LIFE OF WELL-BEING. *Alex. Aphrod.* περὶ ψυχ. p. 157. *Edit. Ald.*

ACCOMMODATE TO ALL PLACES and TIMES---*Antoninus*, ſpeaking of that *Happineſs*, which he deemed our *Sovereign Good*, calls it ſomething which was in our Power ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΥ καὶ ΔΙΗΝΕΚΩΣ, EVERY WHERE *and* PERPETUALLY. l. 7. ſ. 54.

DURABLE--and INDEPRIVABLE.——*Niſi* STABILI & FIXO & PERMANENTE BONO, BEATUS *eſſe nemo poteſt.* Tuſc. Diſp. l. 5. c. 14. p. 372. *Edit.*

Daviſ. So immediately after, in the ſame page—*An dubium eſt, quin nihil ſit habendum in eo genere, quo vita beata completur,* ſi id poſſit amitti? *nihil enim interareſcere, nihil exſtingui,* &c. Καὶ τίς ἄυλη ἡ εὔροια, ἣν ὁ τυχὼν ἐμποδίσαι δύναται, ἃ λέγω Καίσαρ ἢ Καίσαρος φίλος, ἀλλὰ κόραξ, ἀυλητὴς, πυρετὸς, ἄλλα τρισμύρια; ἡ δ' ΕΥΡΟΙΑ ἀδὲν ἔτως ἔχει ὡς ΤΟ ΔΙΗΝΕΚΕΣ καὶ ΑΝΕΜΠΟΔΙΣΤΟΝ. *And what ſort of Happineſs is this, which any thing intervening may embarraſs; I ſay not* Cæſar, *or* Cæſar's *Friend, but a Crow, a Piper, a Fever, a thouſand things beſide?* HAPPINESS *ſurely implies nothing ſo much, as* PERPETUITY *and* BEING SUPERIOR TO HINDRANCE *or* IMPEDIMENT. *Arrian. Epict.* l. 4. c. 4. p. 585. *Edit. Upt.* See alſo *l.* 2. *c.* 11. *p.* 227.

SELF-DERIVED.---*Atque hoc dabitis, ut opinor ſi modo ſit aliquid eſſe* beatum, *id oportere* TOTUM PONI IN POTESTATE SAPIENTIS: *nam, ſi amitti vita beata poteſt, beata eſſe non poteſt.* Cic. de Fin. l. 2. c. 27. p. 163.---καὶ τοῖς μὲν καθ' ἀληθειαν κακοῖς ἵνα μὴ περιπίπτῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐπ' αὐτῷ [οἱ θεοὶ] τὸ πᾶν ἔθεντο. *That Man might not fall into real Evils, the Gods have put the whole* IN HIS OWN POWER. *M. Ant.* l. 2. ſ. 11. Τί γάρ ἐστιν, ὃ ζητεῖ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος; Εὐσταθῆναι, εὐδαιμονῆσαι, ΠΑΝΤΑ ΩΣ ΘΕΛΕΙ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ, μὴ κωλύεσθαι, μηδ' ἀναγκάζεσθαι. *For what is it, that every Man ſeeks? To be ſecurely fixed, to be happy,* TO DO ALL THINGS ACCORDING TO HIS OWN WILL, *not to be hindered, not to be compelled.* Arr. Epict. l. 4. c. 1. p. 539, 540. *Ariſtotle* joins *ſelf-derived* and *indeprivable* in his idea of

of Good. Τἀγαθὸν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μανθευόμεθα. *Eth. Nic.* l. 1. c. 5.

NOTE VIII. p. 125. THE POLITICAL AND LUCRATIVE, THE CONTEMPLATIVE AND PLEASURABLE.] This *fourfold* Diſtinction of *Lives* is mentioned in *Ariſtotle*'s *Ethics*, l. 1. c. 5.

NOTE IX. p. 131. ——PLEASURE
WHOM LOVE ATTENDS, *&c.*
alluding to *Homer*, *Iliad.* Ξ. V. 214.

NOTE X. p. 136. SUPPOSE AN EVENT WERE TO HAPPEN----NOT AN INUNDATION, *&c.*] See *Arrian. Epict.* l. 4. c. 4. which Chapter is peculiarly addreſſed to the Seekers of *Leiſure*, *Retirement*, and *Study*. Part of it has been already quoted, *p.* 290. καὶ τίς αὕτη ἡ ἔνροια, *&c.* See alſo the ſame Author, l. 4. c. 1. p. 567. Πῶς ἀκόυεις, *&c.* and of the Dialogue here commented, *p.* 113.

NOTE XI. p. 137.——IS ACTING A CIRCUMSTANCE, *&c.*] *Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturæ manca quodammodo atque inchoata ſit, ſi nulla actio rerum conſequatur. Ea autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur.* Cic. de Offic. *l.* 1. *c.* 43. The whole Chapter, as well as the Subſequent, is well worthy of Peruſal.

NOTE XII. p. 140.---IF A PIECE OF METAL BE TENDERED US, *&c.*] See *Arr. Epict.* l. 1. c. 10. p. 110. Ὁρᾶτε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶ νομίσματος, &c.

NOTE XIII. p. 144.---ARE ALIENATED FROM IT, OR ARE INDIFFERENT TO IT?] *Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, ſimul atque natum ſit*

animal (hinc enim eſt ordiendum) ipſum ſibi conciliari, & commendari ad ſe conſervandum, & ſuum ſtatum, & ad ea, quæ conſervantia ſunt ejus ſtatûs, diligenda; alienari autem ab interitu, iiſque rebus, quæ interitum videantur afferre. Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 5. p. 211. *Edit. Dav.* See alſo *l.* 5. *c.* 9. *De Offic.* l. 1. c. 4. Οἰκειούμεθα πρὸς ἀλλὰς εὐθὺς γενόμενοι. *Plut. Mor.* p. 1038. b.

NOTE XIV. p. 155. LET IT NOT BE FORGOT THEN, SAID HE, IN FAVOUR OF SOCIETY, *&c.*] The whole *Argument* to prove *Society natural to Man*, from *p.* 147 to the *page* here cited, is taken from the ſecond Book of *Plato's Republic.* See *Plat.* tom. 2. p. 369, *&c. Edit. Serrani.* See alſo the ſame argument hinted at in the *Protagoras* of *Plato*, p. 322. C. Edit. Serr. Tom. 1.

NOTE XV. p. 156.-- ARE NOT THE POWERS AND CAPACITIES OF SPEECH, *&c.*] The Argument in favour of *Society*, from our being poſſeſſed of λόγος, or *the ſpeaking Faculty*, ſeems to have been much inſiſted on by the beſt Authors of Antiquity.

Διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ Ἄνθρωπος ζῶον, πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζώου μᾶλλον, δῆλον. Οὐθὲν γὰρ, ὡς φάμεν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγου δὲ μόνον Ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων. Ἡ μὲν ἓν φωνὴ τὸ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ ἐστὶ σημεῖον· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζώοις· μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθεν, ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος, καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις. Ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τὸ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ σύμφερον, καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν· ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. Τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώ-

ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθῦ καὶ κακῦ, καὶ δικάιυ καὶ ἀδίκυ αἴσθησιν ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τύτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. *The Reaſon why* MAN *is a* SOCIAL ANIMAL, *more than any Bee, or any herding Species whatever, is evident from hence. Nature, we ſay, makes nothing in vain; and Man, of all Animals, is only poſſeſſed of* SPEECH. *Bare Sound indeed may be the Sign of what is pleaſurable or painful; and for that reaſon is it common even to other Animals alſo. For ſo far we perceive even their Nature can go, that they have a Senſe of thoſe Feelings, and ſignify them to each other. But Speech is made to indicate what is expedient, and what hurtful, and in conſequence of this, what is juſt and unjuſt. It is therefore given to Men; becauſe this, with reſpect to other Animals, is to Men alone peculiar, that of Good and Evil, Juſt and Unjuſt, they only poſſeſs a Senſe or Feeling. Now 'tis the Participation or Community of theſe, which makes and conſtitutes both a* FAMILY, *and a* POLITY. *Ariſtot. Polit.* l. 1. c. 2.

Εἰκόνες γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν πραγμάτων [τὰ νοήματα]· αἱ δὲ φωναὶ τῶν νοημάτων εἰσὶν ἐξαγγελτικαί· καὶ διὰ τῦτο δέδυνται ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, πρὸς τὸ δι' αὐτῶν σημαίνειν ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλοις τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ νοήματα---ἵνα καὶ δυνώμεθα κοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ συμπολιτεύεσθαι· κοινωνικὸν γὰρ ζῶον ὁ Ἄνθρωπος. *Ideas are Images of Things in the Soul; and Sounds are declarative of theſe Ideas. And for this reaſon were theſe* SOUNDS *imparted to us by Nature, not only that we might indicate to each other theſe Ideas, but that we might be enabled to* COMMUNICATE *and* LIVE IN ASSOCIATIONS. *For* MAN *is by Nature a* SOCIAL ANIMAL. *Ammon. in l. de Interpr. p.* 16. *b.*

THUS *Cicero*, ſpeaking of *Human Nature*---*Omitto opportunitates habilitateſque reliqui corporis, moderationem vocis,* ORATIONIS *vim, quæ conciliatrix eſt humanæ maxume ſocietatis.* De Legg. l. 1. c. 9. p. 35. *Edit. Daviſ.*

AGAIN in his *Offices*——*Sed quæ natura principia ſint communitatis & ſocietatis humanæ, repetendum altius videtur. Eſt enim primum, quod cernitur in univerſi generis humani ſocietate. Ejus enim vinculum eſt Ratio, &* ORATIO; *quæ docendo, diſcendo, communicando, diſceptando, dijudicando, conciliat inter ſe homines, conjungitque naturali quadam ſocietate.* De Offic. l. 1. c. 16.

THUS too in his Treatiſe *De Nat. Deor.*——*Jam vero domina rerum (ut vos ſoletis dicere)* ELOQUENDI VIS *quam eſt præclara, quamque divina? Quæ primum efficit ut ea, quæ ignoramus, diſcere, & ea, quæ ſcimus, alios docere poſſimus. Deinde hac cohortamur, hac perſuademus, hac conſolamur afflictos, hac deducimus perterritos a timore, hac geſtientes comprimimus, hac cupiditates iracundiaſque reſtinguimus: hæc nos* juris, legum, urbium ſocietate *devinxit: hæc a vitâ immani & ferâ ſegregavit.* De Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 59. p. 243. *Edit. Daviſ.*—See alſo *Quint. Inſt.* l. 2. c. 16. and *Alex. Aphrod.* περὶ ψυχ. p. 155. b. *Edit. Ald. Sanctii Min.* l. 1. c. 2. p. 15. *Plat. in Sophiſtâ*, p. 260. A. *Edit. Serr.*

NOTE XVI. p. 166. 'TIS FROM AMONG THE FEW, *&c.*] *In omni enim arte, vel ſtudio, vel quavis ſcientia, vel in ipſa virtute, optumum quodque rariſſimum*

mum eſt. Cic. de Fin. l. 2. c. 25. p. 158. *Edit. Dav.* Thus too *Ariſtotle* joins the rare and the excellent.—τὸ εὖ, καὶ σπάνιον, καὶ ἐπαίνετον, καὶ καλὸν. Eth. Nic. l. 2. c. 9. τὸ γὰρ σπανίον, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τίμιον. Plat. in Euthyd. p. 304. b. *Edit. Serr.*

NOTE XVII. p. 167.—WORKING EVER UNIFORMLY ACCORDING TO THIS IDEA OF PERFECTION, *&c.*]

Thus *Boethius*, addreſſing the Deity,

O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas,
Terrarum cœlique Sator, qui tempus ab ævo
Ire jubes, ſtabiliſque manens das cuncta moveri;
Quem non externæ pepulerunt fingere cauſæ
Materiæ fluitantis opus; verum INSITA SUMMI
FORMA BONI, *livore carens: Tu cuncta* SUPERNO
Ducis ab EXEMPLO, *pulchrum pulcherrimus ipſe*
Mundum mente gerens, ſimilique in imagine formans.

Conſol. Philoſ. l. 3. Metr. 9.

NOTE XVIII. p. 167.—FROM SOME HIDDEN HIGHER MOTIVE, *&c.*] Μήποτε δὲ μήδε ταῦτα [ſc. τὰ τέρατα] παρὰ φύσιν εἰσὶν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν μερικῇ φύσει ἢ φύσει, ἀλλὰ παρὰ φύσιν· τῇ δε καθόλυ, καὶ φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ μερικὴ φύσις ἑνὸς εἴδυς ςοχάζεται, καὶ μίαν ςέρησιν φέυσει. Διὰ τῦτο τῇ μὲν τῷ ἀνθρώπυ φύσει τὸ τέρας ἅτε φύσει ἐς-ὶν, ἅτε κατὰ φύσιν· τῇ δ' ὅλῃ φύσει ἐπεὶ μηδὲν τῷ παντὶ παρὰ φύσιν (ουδὲν γὰρ κακὸν ἐν τῷ παντὶ) ὐυκ ἔς-ι παρὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν. Joannes Gram. in Ariſtot. lib. 2. Natural. Auſcult. *Nibil enim fieri ſine cauſâ poteſt: nec quicquam fit,*

quod fieri non poteſt: nec, ſi id factum eſt quod potuit fieri, portentum debet videri. Cic. de Divin. l. 2. c. 28. p. 189. *Edit. Daviſ.*

NOTE XIX. p. 169. MAN IS A SOCIAL RATIONAL ANIMAL.] Ζῶον λογικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν, λογικὸν καὶ κοινωνικὸν, λογικὸν καὶ ἥμερον, theſe are Deſcriptions of *Humanity*, which we meet in every Page of *Epictetus* and *Antoninus*.

IT ſeems indeed to have been a received Opinion of old, that ſo *intimate* was the *Relation* between theſe two *Attributes*, that wherever there was *Rationality*, *Sociality* followed of courſe. Thus *Antoninus*—ἔστι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν, εὐθὺς καὶ πολιτικόν. l. 10. ſ. 2. And again, more fully—καὶ τοίνυν πᾶν τὸ τῆς νοερᾶς Φύσεως μέτοχον, πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς ὁμοίως σπεύδει, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον· ὅσῳ γάρ ἐστι κρεῖττον παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα, τοσούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ συγκιρνᾶσθαι τῷ οἰκείῳ καὶ συγκεῖσθαι ἑτοιμότερον. l. 9. ſ. 9.

IT is not perhaps foreign to the preſent Subject to obſerve, that were the *Eyes* of any two Men whatever to view the *ſame Object*, they would each, from their *different Place*, and their *different Organization*, behold it *differently*, and have a *different Image*. But were all the *Minds* in the Univerſe to recognize the *ſame Truth*, they would all recognize it as *one*, their *Recognition* would be *uniform*, and themſelves *in a manner* would be *one* alſo. The Reaſon is, *Perception by the Senſes* admits of *more* and *leſs*, better and worſe; but *Perception by the Intellect*, like *Truth*, its Object, admits of *no degrees*, and is either nothing at all, or elſe *total*, *uniform*, *complete*, and ONE. Hence

Hence therefore one Source of the *Society*, and as it were *Communion of all Minds*, conſidered as Minds, namely, the Unity of *Truth*, their common Object.

AGAIN, every juſt and perfect *Society* ſtands on the Baſis of certain *Laws*. But LAW is nothing more, than *right and perfect* REASON, ſeen in *bidding* and *forbidding*, according to the Nature and Eſſence of thoſe Beings, to which it is a Law. If therefore this UNIVERSE be *one* WHOLE, or general Society, there muſt be *ſome* COMMON, GENERAL LAW for its *Conduct* and *Welfare*; and this *Law* muſt, of conſequence, be ſome *right* and *perfect* REASON, which paſſes thro' all things, and extends to every Part. Well therefore might *Antoninus* ſay in the Beginning of this *Note*, that every thing *rational*, was of courſe *ſocial*, ſince REASON and LAW appear to be the *ſame*, and *Law* to be the *Support* and *Baſis* of all SOCIETY. Thus too *Cicero*—*ſequitur, ut eadem ſit in his* [ſc. *Diis*] *quæ humano generi* RATIO; *eadem* VERITAS *utrobique ſit*; *eademque* LEX, *quæ eſt recti præceptio, pravique depulſio.* De Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 31. p. 180. See alſo the ſame Author, *De Legg.* l. 1. c. 8, 12, 15. p. 29, 41, 51. *Edit. Daviſ. De Fin.* l. 2. c. 14. p. 123. See alſo *Diog. Laert.* l. 7. ſ. 88. *M. Anton.* l. 5. c. 16. l. 6. c. 23. *Ariſt. Polit.* as quoted in *Note* XV.

NOTE XX. p. 169. NOTHING CAN BE PURSUABLE, which is DESTRUCTIVE OF SOCIETY.] *Si enim ſic erimus affecti, ut propter ſuum quiſque emolumentum ſpoliet, aut violet alterum, diſrumpi neceſſe eſt eam, quæ maxime eſt ſecundum naturam, humani generis Societatem.* Cic. de Offic. l. 3. c. 5.

NOTE

NOTE XXI. p. 173.—FOR CONTRARIES ARE EVER RECOGNIZED THROUGH THE SAME HABIT, *&c.*] Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων, ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι. *There ſeems to be one and the ſame Error, and one and the ſame Science, with reſpect to things contrary.* Ariſt. de Anim. l. 3. c. 3. This by *Themiſtius*, in his *Paraphraſe*, is thus illuſtrated. Τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ μία ἄγνοια· ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ὠφέλιμον γινώσκων, καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὅτι βλαβερὸν συνεπίσταται· καὶ ὁ περὶ θάτερον ἐξαπατώμενος, ἐξαπατᾶται καὶ περὶ θάτερον. *Of Things contrary there is one Science, and one Ignorance. For thus he, who knows Good to be ſomething beneficial, knows Evil at the ſame time to be ſomething pernicious; and he, who is deceived with reſpect to one of theſe, is deceived alſo with reſpect to the other.* See the *Io* of *Plato*, p. 531. T. 1. *Edit. Serr.*

NOTE XXII. p. 174.—THOSE FOUR GRAND VIRTUES, *&c.*] *Stobæus* having told us, that of the *Virtues* ſome were *primary*, ſome *ſubordinate*, adds ---πρώτας δὲ τέτταρας εἶναι, Φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, δικαιοσύνην· καὶ τὴν μὲν Φρόνησιν, περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα γίνεσθαι· τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τῶ ἀνθρώπω· τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν, περὶ τὰς ὑπομονάς· τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην, περὶ τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις. *The primary Virtues are four*; PRUDENCE, TEMPERANCE, FORTITUDE, *and* JUSTICE: *Prudence is employed in moral Offices; Temperance, in Mens natural Appetites and Purſuits; Fortitude, in Endurings; and Juſtice, in Diſtributions.* Ecl. Ethic. p. 167.

THAT

THAT *the Life according to* VIRTUE, was deemed *the Life according to* NATURE, appears from what is ſaid by the ſame Author, in the Page following—Πασῶν δὲ τέτων τῶν ἀρεῖῶν τὸ τέλος εἶναι, τὸ ἀκολέθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ἑκάς-ην δὲ τέτων διὰ τῶν ἰδίων παρέχεσθαι τυγχάνοντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον. *The End of all theſe Virtues is, to live agreeably to Nature; and each of them, by thoſe Means, which are peculiar to itſelf, is found to put a Man in poſſeſſion of this End.*

SO likewiſe *Cicero*——*Etenim quod ſummum bonum a Stoicis dicitur*, convenienter naturæ vivere, *id habet hanc, ut opinor, ſententiam*, cum virtute congruere ſemper. *De Offic.* l. 3. c. 3.

NOTE XXIII. p. 174. THAT LIFE, WHERE THE VALUE OF ALL THINGS IS JUSTLY MEASURED, *&c.*] See *pages* 143, 146, 168, 203, 204.

NOTE XXIV. p. 175.---THAT, WHICH BEING DONE, ADMITS OF A RATIONAL JUSTIFICATION.] In the Original it is——ὃ πραχθὲν ἔυλογον ἴσχει ἀπολογισμόν. *Diog. Laert.* l. 7. ſ. 107. ὅπερ πραχθὲν ἔυλογον ἔχει τήν ἀπολογίαν. *Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathem.* l. 7. Thus rendered by *Cicero*---*Officium id eſſe dicunt, quod cur factum ſit, ratio probabilis reddi poſſit.* De Offic. l. 1. c. 3. The Reaſon of its *Greek* Name, καθῆκον, is given by *Simplicius.* Καθήκοντά ἐς-ι τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ ἥκοντα κὴ ἐπιβάλλοντα——*Moral Offices are thoſe things which are done agreeably*

agreeably to what is fitting, and expedient. Simplic. in Ench. c. 37.

NOTE XXV. p. 176.——AND WHEN OUR SEVERAL ENERGIES, EXERTED ACCORDING TO THE VIRTUES ABOVE, HAVE PUT US IN POSSESSION OF, *&c.*] This was the *Idea* of HAPPINESS, adopted by the *old Academy*, or *Platonics*. *Secundum naturam vivere, ſic affectum, ut optimè affici poſſit, ad naturamque accommodatiſſimè.* Cic. de Fin. l. 5. c. 9. p. 370. The *Peripatetics*, who were originally of the *ſame* School, held the ſame. Εἰ δ' ἔτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίγνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν---τὴν ἀρίστην δὲ τελειοτάτην---ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. *If this be admitted, it follows that* HUMAN GOOD *or* HAPPINESS *is, the energizing of the Soul according to the beſt and moſt conſummate Virtue, in a perfect and complete Life.* Ethic. Nic. l. 1. c. 7. A *perfect and complete Life*, they explained to be ſuch a Life as was *no way deficient either as to its Duration, its bodily Health, and its being attended with a proper Competence of external Goods, and Proſperity.* By the *beſt* and *moſt conſummate* Virtue, they not only meant that Virtue, which was in *its kind* moſt perfect, but which was the Virtue alſo of *that Part*, which is in each of us *moſt excellent.* For there are Virtues of the Body, ſuch as Strength and Agility; and there are Virtues of the Senſes, ſuch as accurate Seeing, accurate Taſting; and the ſame of every Faculty, from the loweſt to that which is ſupreme.

THE ſovereign *Good* or *Happineſs* here ſpoken of, is again repeated, in other Words, *p.* 179. where it is

is called, the ATTAINING *the primary and juſt Requiſites of our Nature, by a Conduct ſuitable to Virtue and moral Office.*

THE PRIMARY AND JUST REQUISITES here mentioned, are all Things requiſite to the Uſe and Enjoyment of our PRIMARY and NATURAL PERFECTIONS. Theſe *Primary* and *Natural Perfections* mean the NATURAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS of both our MIND and BODY. They were called by the *Latins*, *Prima Naturæ*, *Prima ſecundum Naturam*; by the *Greeks*, τὰ πρῶτα καὶὰ φύσιν, τὰ πρῶτα τῆς φύσεως. In them were included Health, Strength, Agility, Beauty, perfect Senſations, Memory, Docility, Invention, *&c.* See *Stob. Ecl. Eth.* p. 163. *Cic. de Fin.* l. 5. c. 7. p. 364. *A. Gell.* l. 12. c. 5.

A *like Sentiment of Happineſs*, to this here ſpoken of, is that mentioned by *Cicero*——*Virtute adhibitâ, frui* PRIMIS *a naturâ datis.* De Fin. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. 'Tis there called the Opinion of the *old Academics*, and *Peripatetics*. It is again repeated by the ſame Author. *Honeſte vivere, fruentem rebus iis, quas* PRIMAS *homini natura conciliet.* Acad. l. 2. c. 42. p. 240.

IT is to be obſerved that *Cicero*, ſpeaking of this Hypotheſis, ſays that it propoſed an Idea of *Happineſs, which was not properly in our own Power. Hoc non eſt poſitum in noſtrâ actione: completur enim & ex eo genere vitæ, quod virtute finitur, & ex iis rebus quæ ſecundum naturam ſunt, neque ſunt in noſtra poteſtate.* De Fin. l. 4. c. 6. p. 287.

HENCE

HENCE therefore the DEFICIENCY *of this Doctrine.* However juſtifiable, however laudable its *End*, it could not inſure a *due Succeſs to its Endeavours.* And hence too the Force of what is objected to it in the *Dialogue*, from *p.* 177, to the End of the firſt Part.

NOTE XXVI. p. 185.——TO PLACE THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IN RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT, *&c.*] As the *Conduct* here mentioned implies a Conduct under the Direction of a befitting *Rule* or *Law*, and that, as oppoſed to *wrong* Conduct, which has either no Rule at all, or at leaſt one erroneous; it may not be an improper Place to enquire, what was the antient Opinion concerning LAW UNIVERSAL, that *great* and *general Law*, which ſtood oppoſed to the *municipal Laws* of particular Cities, and Communities.

EST *quidem vera* LEX, *recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffuſa in omnes, conſtans, ſempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat—nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, aliâ poſthac; ſed & omnes gentes, & omni tempore una lex, & ſempiterna, & immortalis continebit; unuſque erit communis quaſi magiſter, & imperator omnium Deus. Ille hujus legis inventor, diſceptator, lator. Cui qui non parebit, ipſe ſe fugiet, ac naturam hominis aſpernabitur; hoc ipſo luet maximas pœnas, etiamſi cætera ſupplicia, quæ putantur effugerit.* Fragm. Cic. de Rep. l. 3.

LEX

LEX *eſt ratio ſumma, inſita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda ſunt, prohibetque contraria.* What follows is worth remarking. *Eadem ratio, cum eſt in hominis mente confirmata & confecta, lex eſt.* Cic. de Legg. l. 1. c. 6. p. 22.

AGAIN. LEX *vera---ratio eſt recta ſummi Jovis.* To which he ſubjoins, as above, *Ergo ut illa divinæ mens ſumma lex eſt; ita cum in homine eſt, perfecta eſt in mente ſapientis.* De Legg. l. 2. c. 4, 5. p. 88.

'TIS in this Senſe the *Apoſtle* tells us of the *Gentiles*, or *Mankind in general*, that they *ſhew the Work of the Law written in their Hearts, their Conſcience alſo bearing witneſs, and their Thoughts the mean while accuſing, or elſe excuſing one another.* Rom. i. 11.

AS *Cicero*, in his *Book of Laws* above cited, follows the *Stoic* Diſcipline, ſo is it agreeable to their Reaſoning, that he makes the *original natural* LAW, of which we here treat, to be the SOVEREIGN REASON OF THE DEITY *himſelf.* Thus *Chryſippus*—— *Idem* [ſcil. *Chryſippus*] *legis perpetuæ & æternæ vim, quæ quaſi dux vitæ & magiſtra officiorum ſit,* Jovem *dicit eſſe.* Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 15. p. 41.

So by the ſame Philoſophers in *Laertius*, we are ordered *to live according to Nature*, ἀδὲν ἐνεργεῖνας ὧν ἀπαγορέυειν ἔιωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινὸς, ὅσπερ ἐςὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διά πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διὶ, καθηγεμόνι τώτῳ τῆς τῶν ὅλων (for ὅλων) διοικήσεως ὄντι, *doing nothing, forbidden by the* UNIVERSAL LAW, *that*

that is to ſay, by that right Reaſon, which paſſeth *thro' all Things, and which is the* SAME *with* JOVE *himſelf, the Governor and Conductor of this univerſal Adminiſtration.* Laert. l. 7. ſ. 88. *Edit. Aldobrand.*

AGREEABLY to this Reaſoning, *Plutarch* corrects thoſe, who made Δίκη, a Goddeſs, and *the Aſſeſſor of* Jove; for, ſays he, ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ἔχει μὲν τὴν Δίκην παρεδρον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς Δίκη καὶ Θέμις ἐστὶ, καὶ νόμων ὁ πρεσβύταλος καὶ τελειόταλος, Jove *has not* Δίκη *or* RIGHT *for his Aſſeſſor, but is himſelf* RIGHT, *and* JUSTICE, *and of all* LAWS *the moſt* ANTIENT *and* PERFECT. *Moral.* p. 781. B.

THUS *Antoninus*——τέλος δὲ λογικῶν ζώων, τὸ ἕπεσθαι τῷ τῆς πόλεως καὶ πολιτείας τῆς πρεσβυτάτης λόγῳ καὶ θεσμῷ. *The End of Rational Animals is to follow the* REASON *and* SACRED LAW *of that City and moſt antient Polity,* [in which all rational Beings are included.] l. 2. ſ. 16.

THE moſt ſimple Account of this *Law,* which the *Stoics* gave, ſeems to be that recorded by *Stobæus*; according to which they called it λόγον, ὀρθὸν ὄντα, προστακτικὸν μὲν τῶν ποιητέων, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ τῶν μὴ ποιητέων, RIGHT REASON, *ordaining what is to be done, and forbidding what is not to be done.* Ecl. Ethic. 178. See alſo the Notes of *Turnebus* and *Davis* upon *Cic. de Legg.* l. 1. c. 6.

HAVING premiſed thus much concerning *Law univerſal,* it remains to ſay ſomething of that RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT, which is in this Part of the Dialogue

Dialogue propoſed as our *Happineſs*. RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT is intended to expreſs the Term Καλόρθωσις, which *Cicero* tranſlates *recta Effectio*. Καλόρθωμα he tranſlates *Rectum Factum*. See *De Fin.* l. 3. c. 14. p. 242. Now the Definition of a Καλόρθωμα, was Νόμῳ προσταγμα, *a Thing commanded by Law*; to which was oppoſed ἁμάρτημα, *a Sin or Offence*, which was defined Νόμῳ ἀπαγόρευμα, *a Thing forbidden by Law*. Plut. Mor. 1037 C. What *Law* is here meant, which thus commands or forbids, has been ſhewn above.

HENCE therefore may be ſeen the Reaſon, why we have ſaid thus much on the Nature and Idea of *Law univerſal*; ſo intimate being the Union between *this* and *right Conduct*, that we find *the latter* is nothing more than *a perfect Obedience to the former*.

HENCE too we ſee the Reaſon, why in one view it was deemed HAPPINESS, *to be void of Error or Offence*, ἀναμάρτητον εἶναι, as we find it in *Arrian. Epict.* l. 4. c. 8. p. 633. For to be thus *inculpable* was the *neceſſary Reſult of Rectitude of Conduct*, or rather in a manner *the ſame thing with it*.

I cannot conclude this *Note*, without remarking on an elegant Alluſion of *Antoninus* to the *primary* Signification of the Word Καλόρθωσις, that is to ſay, καλὰ ὀρθὸς, *right onwards, ſtraight and directly forwards*. Speaking of the *Reaſoning Faculty*, how, without *looking farther, it reſts contented in its own Energies*, he adds——Καθὸ καλορθώσεις; αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις ὀνομάζονται, τὴν ὀρθότητα τῆς ὁδὸ σημαίνουσαι. ——*For which reaſon are all Actions, of this*

Species, called RECTITUDES, *as denoting the Directneſs of their Progreſſion* RIGHT ONWARDS. l. 5. ſ. 14. So again in the ſame Senſe, ἐυθεῖαν περαίνειν, *to keep on, the ſtraight Road.* l. 5. ſ. 3. l. 10. ſ. 11.

ONE would imagine that our Countryman *Milton* had this Reaſoning in view, when in his 19th Sonnet ſpeaking of his own Blindneſs, he ſays with a becoming Magnanimity,

——— *Yet I argue not*
Againſt Heav'n's Hand or Will; nor bate one jot
Of Heart or Hope; but ſtill bear up, and ſteer
RIGHT ONWARDS.———

The whole Sonnet is not unworthy of Peruſal, being both ſublime and ſimple.

NOTE XXVII. p. 185.——THE MERE DOING WHATEVER IS CORRESPONDENT TO SUCH AN END, EVEN THO' WE NEVER ATTAIN IT——] Thus *Epictetus* in *Arrian*, ſpeaking of Addreſs to Men in Power, and admitting ſuch Addreſs, when juſtified by certain Motives, adds, that ſuch Addreſs ought to be made, without Admiration, or Flattery. Upon this an Objector demands of him, πῶς ἔν τύχω, ὧν δέομαι; *But how then am I to obtain that, which I want?*——The Philoſopher anſwers, Ἐγω δέ σοι λέγω, ὅτι ὡς ΤΕΥΞΟΜΕΝΟΣ ἀπέρχῃ· ἀχὶ δὲ μόνου, ἵνα πράξῃς τὸ σαυτῷ πρέπου; *Did I ever ſay to thee, that thou ſhouldſt go and addreſs, as tho' thou wert to* SUCCEED; *and not rather with this only view, that thou mighteſt* DO THAT, WHICH IS BECOMING THY CHARACTER?——And ſoon after, when

when an Objection is urged from Appearance, and the Opinion of Mankind, he anſwers,——οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι ἀνὴρ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς οὐδὲν ποιεῖ τῆς δόξαι ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τῆ ΠΕΠΡΑΧΘΑΙ ΚΑΛΩΣ; *Knoweſt thou not, that a fair and good Man does nothing for the ſake of Appearance, but for the ſake only of having* DONE WELL AND FAIRLY? *Arr. Epict.* l. 3. c. 24. p. 497, 498. This *Doctrine* indeed ſeems to have been the *Baſis* of the *Stoic Morals*; the Principle, which included, according to theſe Philoſophers, as well *Honour* and *Honeſty*, as *Good* and *Happineſs*. Thus *Cicero*—*Facere omnia, ut adipiſcamur quæ ſecundum naturam ſint*, etſi ea non adſequamur, *id eſſe & honeſtum, & ſolum per ſe expetendum & ſummum bonum Stoici dicunt.* De Fin. l. 5. c. 7. p. 365, 6. To this is conſonant that Sentiment of theirs in *Plutarch*—— Τὴν μὲν φύσιν αὐτὴν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ὁμολογεῖν, ἀγαθὸν——And again——τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, τέλος εἶναι——τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀδιάφορα εἶναι. *Plut. Mor.* 1060. D. E. See below, *Note* XXX. *Socrates* was of the ſame Opinion, as appears from all parts of the *Platonic* and *Xenophontean* Dialogues. Take one Example out of many.—τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖτε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττοι. τὸν δὲ εὖ πρατοντα, μακάριοντε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναί. Gorg. Plat. *p.* 507. Edit. Serr.

NOTE XXVIII. p. 185.—WHAT IF WE MAKE OUR NATURAL STATE THE STANDARD ONLY TO DETERMINE OUR CONDUCT, *&c.*] 'Tis in this ſenſe we find it elegantly ſaid in *Plutarch* by the laſt mentioned Philoſophers---στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν---*that our* NATURAL STATE *and what is conſonant to it, are the* ELEMENTS

of Happineſs,---and juſt before, the ſame *natural State* is called τὸ καθήκον ἀρχὴ, ἡ ὕλη τῆς ἀρετῆς, *the* SOURCE *of moral Office*; *and the* SUBJECT MATTER *of Virtue.* Plut. Mor. 1069. E. F. *Atque etiam illud perſpicuum eſt, conſtitui neceſſe eſſe initium, quod ſapientia, cum quid agere incipiat, ſequatur; idque initium eſſe naturæ accommodatum: nam aliter appetitio, &c.* Cic. Acad. l. 2. c. 8. p. 85, 86. *Initia proponi neceſſe eſſe apta & accommodata naturæ, quorum ex ſelectione Virtus poſſit exiſtere.* De Fin. l. 4. c. 17. p. 316. *Cum vero illa, quæ officia eſſe dixi, proficiſcantur ab initiis naturæ; ea ad hæc referri neceſſe eſt: ut recte dici poſſit, omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiſcamur principia naturæ; nec tamen ut hoc ſit* BONORUM ULTIMUM*—De Fin.* l. 3. c. 6. p. 217.

NOTE XXIX. p. 185.—WE SHOULD NOT WANT A GOOD TO CORRESPOND, *&c.*] *Plutarch* quotes the following Sentiment of *Chryſippus*, who patronized this *Idea of* GOOD—Τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, ὃν αὐλὸς εἰσάγει καὶ δοκιμάζει, συμφωνόταλον εἶναί φησι τῷ βίῳ, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐμφύτων ἅπτεσθαι προλήψεων. Plut. Mor. 1041. E.

NOTE XXX. p. 187.—YET WE LOOK NOT FOR HIS REPUTATION, *&c.*] What *Quintilian* ſays of *Rhetoric*, may with great propriety be tranſferred to *Morality*. *Noſter orator, Arſque a nobis finita*, non ſunt poſita in EVENTU. *Tendit quidem ad victoriam, qui dicit: ſed, cum bene dixit, etiamſi non vincat, id, quod arte continetur, effecit. Nam & gubernator vult ſalvâ nave in portum pervenire: ſi tamen tempeſtate fuerit abreptus, non ideo minus erit gubernator, dicetque notum illud*; dum clavum rectum teneam. *Et medicus ſanitatem ægri petit: ſi tamen*

aut valetudinis vi, aut intemperantiâ ægri, aliove quo caſu ſumma non contingit; dum ipſe omnia ſecundum rationem fecerit, medicinæ fine non excidit. Ita oratori bene dixiſſe, finis eſt. Nam eſt ars ea——in ACTU *poſita, non in* EVENTU. Inſt. Orat. l. 2. c. 17.

NOTE XXXI. p. 187.——HE FOR A SUBJECT HAS THE WHOLE OF HUMAN LIFE, *&c.*] Οὐσία τῦ ἀγαθῦ, προαίρεσις ποιά· τῦ κακῦ προαίρεσις ποιά. Τί ὖν τὰ ἐκτός; Ὕλαι τῇ προαιρέσει, περὶ ἃς ἀναστρεφομένη τύξεται τῦ ἰδίυ ἀγαθῦ ἢ κακῦ. *The Eſſence of* GOOD, *is a peculiar Direction of Mind; and the Eſſence of* EVIL, *is a peculiar Direction alſo. What then are* EXTERNALS? *They ſerve as* SUBJECTS *to the Mind's Direction, from converſing with which it obtains its proper Good or Evil.* Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 29. Again——Αἱ ὕλαι, ἀδιάφοροι· ἡ δὲ χρῆσις αὐτῶν ὐκ ἀδιάφορ☞. *The* SUBJECTS *are indifferent, but not ſo the* USE *of them.* Arr. Epict. l. 2. c. 5.

Thus HORACE:

Non poſſidentem multa vocaveris
Recte beatum; rectius occupat
Nomen beati, qui Deorum
Muneribus SAPIENTER UTI,
Duramque callet pauperiem pati,
Pejuſq; leto flagitium timet:
Non ille, &c.

Od. l. iv. 9.

EVEN the Comic Poet ſeems not to have been unacquainted with this Doctrine:

Ch. *Quid nárrat?* Cl. *Quid ille? míserum se esse.*
Ch. *Míserum? quem minus crédere est?*
Quid rélliqui est, quin hábeat quæ quidem in hómine dicuntúr bona?
Paréntis, patriam incólumem, amicos, génus, cognatos, dívitias:
Atque haéc perinde súnt ut illius ánimus, qui ea pós-sidet:
Qui UTI *scit, ei* BONA; *ílli, qui non útitur recté, mala.*

Heauton. Act. I. S. 2. V. 18.

Vid. Platon. in Euthydemo, p. 281. Edit. Serr. ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δ', ἔφην, ὦ Κλεινία, κινδυνει.

NOTE XXXII. p. 189.—THE END IN OTHER ARTS IS EVER DISTANT, &c.] *Sed in cæteris artibus cum dicitur* Artificiosè, *posterum quodam modo & consequens putandum est, quod illi* ἐπιγεννηματικὸν *appellant; quod autem in quo* Sapienter *dicitur, id* adprimo *rectissime dicitur: quicquid enim a sapiente proficiscitur, id continuo debet expletum esse omnibus suis partibus; in eo enim positum est id, quod dicimus esse expetendum. Nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere, parentes violare, fana depeculari, quæ sunt in effectu: sic timere, sic mærere, sic in libidine esse, peccatum est, etiam sine effectu. Verum ut hæc, non in posteris & in consequentibus, sed in primis continuo peccata sunt: sic ea quæ proficiscuntur a virtute,* SUSCEPTIONE *prima, non* PERFECTIONE, *recta sunt judicanda.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 9. p. 228. Τοῦ ἰδίου τέλους τυγχάνει [ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ] ὅπου ἂν τὸ τοῦ βίου πέρας ἐπιστῇ· οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ὀρχήσεως καὶ ὑποκρίσεως καὶ τῶν τοιούτων

ἀτελὴς γίνεσθαι ἡ ὅλη πρᾶξις, ἐάν τι ἐγκόψῃ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πανλὸς μέρους, καὶ ὅπερ ἂν καλαληφθῇ, πλῆρες καὶ ἀπροσδεὲς ἑαυτῇ τὸ πρότεθὲν ποιεῖ· ὥστε εἰπεῖν, ἐγὼ ἀπέχω τὰ ἐμά. M. Ant. l. 11. ſ. 1. *Et quemadmodum opportunitas (ſic enim adpellemus* εὐκαιρίαν*) non fit major productione temporis (habent enim ſuum modum quæcunque opportuna dicuntur) ſic recta effectio (*καλόρθωσιν *enim ita adpello, quoniam rectum factum* καλόρθωμα*) recta igitur effectio, item convenientia, denique* IPSUM BONUM, *quod in eo poſitum eſt ut naturæ conſentiat, creſcendi acceſſionem nullam habet. Ut enim opportunitas illa, ſic hæc de quibus dixi, non fiunt temporis productione majora: ob eamque cauſam Stoicis non videtur optabilior nec magis expetenda vita beata, ſi ſit longa, quam ſi brevis: utunturque ſimili, ut, ſi cothurni laus illa eſt ad pedem apte convenire, neque multi cothurni paucis anteponerentur, nec majores minoribus: ſic quorum omne bonum convenientiâ atque opportunitate finitur, nec plura paucioribus, nec longinquiora brevioribus anteponentur.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 14. p. 242. See alſo Dio. Laert. l. 7. ſ. 101. M. Ant. l. 6. ſ. 23. l. 3. ſ. 7. Senec. Epiſt. 66.

NOTE XXXIII. p. 191.—RECOLLECT THEN, SAID HE, DO YOU NOT REMEMBER THAT ONE PRE-CONCEPTION, *&c.*] In this, and the ſubſequent Pages, the *general Pre-conceptions of Good* are applied to the *particular Hypotheſis of Good*, advanced in this *Treatiſe*. See before, *p.* 115, 121, 122.

NOTE XXXIV. p. 192.——AND IS THERE ANY TIME OR PLACE, WHENCE RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT MAY BE EXCLUDED?] ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΥ καὶ ΔΙΗΝΕΚΩΣ ἐπί σοί ἐστι, καὶ τῇ παρούσῃ συμβάσει θεοσεβῶς ἐναρέστεῖν, καὶ τοῖς πα-

ῥᾴσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀ δικαιοσύνην προσφέρεσθαι—— M. Ant. l. 7. ſ. 54.

NOTE XXXV. p. 192.——WHERE IT SHALL NOT BE IN HIS POWER TO ACT BRAVELY AND HONESTLY.] Μήκετι οὖν μοι λέγε, πῶς γένηται; ὅπως γὰρ ἂν γένηται, σὺ αὐτὸ θήσεις καλῶς, καὶ ἔσται σοι τὸ ἀποβὰν εὐτύχημα. Arrian. Epict. l. 4. c. 10. p. 650.

NOTE XXXVI. p. 195.——THERE ARE INSTANCES INNUMERABLE OF MEN BAD, AS WELL AS GOOD, &c.] See a long Catalogue of theſe in *Cicero*'s *Tuſculan Diſputations*; *Spartan* Boys; *Barbarian* Sages; *Indian* Wives; *Egyptian* Devotees, &c. &c. The whole Paſſage is worth reading. *Tuſc. Diſp.* l. 5. c. 27. p. 400, 401, &c.

NOTE XXXVII. p. 196.—THIS I WRITE YOU (SAYS HE IN ONE OF HIS EPISTLES) WHILE, &c.] Τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου, ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταῦτα· στραγγουρίαι τε παρηκολουθήκει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη, ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείπουσα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους· ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ καλὰ ψυχὴν χαίρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ—Dio. Laer. l. 10. ſ. 22. *Cum ageremus vitæ beatum & eundem ſupremum diem, ſcribebamus hæc. Tanti autem morbi aderant veſicæ & viſcerum, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem poſſit accedere. Compenſabatur tamen cum his omnibus animi lætitia, quam capiebam memoriâ rationum inventorumque noſtrorum*——Cic. de Fin. l. 2. c. 30. p. 173.

SOON after we have another Sentiment of *Epicurus*, that a *rational Adverſity was better than an irrational*

tional Proſperity. The original Words are—χρεῖττου εἶναι ἐυλογίςως ἀτυχεῖν, ἢ ἀλογίςως ἐυτυχεῖν. Dio. Laert. l. 10. ſ. 135.

NOTE XXXVIII. p. 198. O CRITO, IF IT BE PLEASING TO THE GODS, *&c.*] The three Quotations in this Page are taken from *Plato*; the firſt from the *Crito*, quoted by *Epictetus* at the End of the *Enchiridion*, and in many other Places; the ſecond from the *Apology*, quoted as frequently by the ſame Author; the third, from the *Menexenus* or *Epitaph.* Plat. Opera, tom. 2. p. 248. *Edit. Serran.* ſee alſo *Cic. Tuſcul.* l. 5. c. 12.

NOTE XXXIX. p. 199. IF YOU ARE FOR NUMBERS, REPLIED HE, WHAT THINK YOU OF THE NUMEROUS RACE OF PATRIOTS, *&c.*] *Sed quid duces & principes nominem; cum legiones ſcribat Cato ſæpe alacris in eum locum profectas, unde redituras ſe non arbitrarentur? Pari animo Lacedæmonii in Thermopylis occiderunt: in quos Simonides,*

Dic hoſpes Spartæ, nos te hic vidiſſe jacentes,
Dum ſanctis patriæ legibus obſequimur.

Tuſcul. Diſp. l. 1. c. 42. p. 101.

NOTE XL. *Ibid.*——MARTYRS FOR SYSTEMS WRONG, *&c.*] That there may be a *bigotted Obſtinacy* in favour of what is *abſurd*, as well as a *rational Conſtancy* in adhering to what is *right*, thoſe *Egyptians* above mentioned may ſerve as Examples. *Ægyptiorum morem quis ignoret? quorum imbutæ mentes pravitatis erroribus quamvis carnificinam prius ſubierint, quam ibim aut aſpidem aut felem aut canem aut croco-*

crocodilum violent: quorum etiam ſi imprudentes quidpiam fecerint, pœnam nullam recuſent. Tuſcul Diſp. l. 5. c. 27. p. 402. See before, *Note* XXXVI.

NOTE XLI. p. 200.—CELEBRATED TO SUCH A HEIGHT, IN THE RELIGION, WHICH WE PROFESS, *&c.* 'Tis probable, that ſome Analogies of this ſort induced a *Father of the Church* (and no leſs a one than St. *Jerom*) to ſay of the *Stoics*, who made *moral Rectitude* the ONLY GOOD,——NOSTRO DOGMATI IN PLERISQUE CONCORDANT. *Vid. Menag. in D. Laert.* l. 7. ſ. 101. p. 300. and *Gatak. Præfat. in M. Anton.* See alſo of this *Treatiſe* page 110. and below, *Note* LXIV.

NOTE XLII. p. 201. TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY, *&c.*] TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY is here explained to be LIVING ACCORDING TO SOME ONE SINGLE CONSONANT SCHEME OR PURPOSE; and our GOOD or HAPPINESS is placed in ſuch CONSISTENCE, upon a ſuppoſition that thoſe, who live *inconſiſtently*, and without any ſuch *uniform Scheme*, are of conſequence *miſerable*, and *unhappy*. Τὸ τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων ἅπαξ ἀπέδωκε, τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένως ζώντων κακοδαιμονέντων. Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 171.

THIS CONSISTENCE was called in *Greek* ὁμολογία, in *Latin Convenientia*, and was ſometimes by itſelf alone conſidered as the END. Τὴν ὁμολογίαν λέγουσι τέλος εἶναι. *Stob. Ecl. Ethic.* p. 172. See alſo *Cic. de Fin.* l. 3. c. 6. p. 216. So alſo in the ſame laſt named Treatiſe, c. 7. p. 220.——*Ut enim hiſtrioni*

oni actio, ſaltatori motus, non quivis, ſed certus quidam eſt datus: ſic vita agenda eſt certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus CONVENIENS CONSENTANEUMQUE *dicimus. Nec enim gubernationi aut medicinæ ſimilem ſapientiam eſſe arbitramur, ſed* actioni *illi potius, quam modo dixi, &* ſaltationi; *ut in ipſa* ARTE *inſit,* NON FORIS *petatur* EXTREMUM, *id eſt, artis effectio.*

'TIS upon this Principle we find it a Precept in *Cicero*'s *Offices*———*In primis autem conſtituendum eſt,* quos *nos & quales eſſe velimus, & in* quo genere vitæ——l. 1. c. 32. So likewiſe in the *Enchiridion* of *Epictetus*, c. 33.——Τὰξον τινὰ ἤδη χαρακτῆρα σαυτῷ καὶ τύπον, ὃν φυλάξῃς ἐπί τε σεαυτῷ ὢν, καὶ ἀνθρώποις ἐπιτυγχάνων. *Ordain to thyſelf ſome Character and Model of Life, which thou mayſt maintain both by thyſelf, and when thou art converſant with Mankind.*

SO much indeed was reſted upon this Principle of *Conſiſtence*, that even *to be any thing conſiſtently*, was held better than the *contrary*. Thus *Epictetus.*——Ἕνα σε δεῖ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν· ἢ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν σε δεῖ ἐξεργάζεσθαι τὸ σαυτοῦ, ἢ τὰ ἐκτὸς——*It behoves thee to be* ONE UNIFORM MAN, *either good or bad; either to cultivate thy own Mind, or to cultivate things external.*——Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 15. p. 421. And more fully than this does he expreſs himſelf in a place ſubſequent; where having firſt counſelled againſt that falſe Complaiſance, which makes us, to pleaſe Mankind, forget our proper *Character*, and having recommended as our Duty a Behaviour contrary, he adds——Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀρέσει ταῦτα, ὅλῳ ἀπόκλινον ἐπὶ τὰναυτία· γενοῦ εἷς τῶν κιναίδων, εἷς τῶν μοιχῶν——Διάφορα δ' ἔτω

πρό-

πρόσωπα οὐ μίγνυσι· οὐ δύνασαι καὶ Θερσίτην ὑποκρίνασθαι καὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα—Arr. Epict. l. 4. c. 2. p. 580. *But if what I recommend to thee do not pleaſe, then turn thee totally to all that is contrary; become a profligate of the moſt proſtitute kind——Characters ſo different are not to be blended; thou canſt not act at once* Therſites *and* Agamemnon.

So too HORACE:

——*Quanto* CONSTANTIOR *idem*
In vitiis, tanto levius miſer, ac prior ille
Qui jam contento, jam laxo fune laborat.

Sat. 7. l. 2. v. 18.

See alſo *Characteriſtics*, V. 1. p. 131.

NOTE XLIII. p. 203.——IT IS NOT MERELY TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY; BUT TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY WITH NATURE.] Ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν. Cleanthes in Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 171.—*Congruenter naturæ convenienterque vivere.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 7. p. 221. The firſt Deſcription of our *End* [*to live conſiſtently*] was deemed *defective*, and therefore was this *Addition* made. See *Stobæus* in the Place cited. *Arr. Epict.* l. 3. c. 1. p. 352.

NOTE XLIV. p. 204.——TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY WITH NATURE IS, TO LIVE ACCORDING TO JUST EXPERIENCE OF THOSE THINGS, WHICH HAPPEN AROUND US.] Τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ὅπερ ὁ Χρύσιππος σαφέστερον βουλόμενος ποιῆσαι, ἐξήνεγκε τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, Ζῆν κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων. Stob. Ecl. Ethic. 171. Diog. Laert. l. 7. c. 87. *His verbis*

[ſcil.

[ſcil. *vivere ſecundum naturam*] *tria ſignificari Stoici dicunt. Unum ejuſmodi, vivere adhibentem ſcientiam earum rerum, quæ naturâ evenirent*——De Fin. l. 4. c. 6. p. 286. See alſo the ſame Treatiſe, *l.* 3. *c.* 9. *p.* 227. *l.* 2. *c.* 11. *p.* 113. where 'tis expreſſed—— *Vivere cum intelligentiâ earum rerum quæ naturâ evenirent.*

NOTE XLV. p. 205.--TO LIVE PERPETUALLY SELECTING, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS CONGRUOUS TO NATURE, AND REJECTING WHAT IS CONTRARY, MAKING OUR END THAT SELECTING, AND THAT REJECTING ONLY.] Ὁ τε Ἀυλίπαλρος,——τὸ τέλος κεῖσθαι, Ἐν τῷ διηνεκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάλως ἐκλέγεσθαι μὲν τὰ καλὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλέγεσθαι δὲ τὰ παρα φύσιν, ὑπολαμβάνει. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 2. p. 497. *Edit. Potter.* This Sentiment was ſometimes *contracted*, and expreſſed as follows——τὸ ἐυλογις-εῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς—— ſometimes, more conciſely ſtill, by the ſingle Term τὸ ἐυλογις-εῖν. See *Plutarch* 1071, 1072. *Cicero* joins *this*, and the *foregoing* Deſcriptions of *Happineſs*, together. *Circumſcriptis igitur his ſententiis, quas poſui, & ſi quæ ſimiles earum ſint; relinquitur, ut ſummum bonum ſit, vivere ſcientiam adhibentem earum rerum, quæ naturâ eveniant, ſeligentem quæ ſecundum naturam, & quæ contra naturam ſunt rejicientem, id eſt, convenienter congruenterque naturæ vivere.* De Fin. l. 3. c. 9. p. 227. See alſo *De Fin.* l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. See alſo *Diog. Laert.* l. 7. c. 88.--- *Stob. Ecl. Eth.* 171.

NOTE XLVI. p. 207. TO LIVE IN THE DISCHARGE OF MORAL OFFICES.] Ἀρχέδημος δὲ (τέλος

[τέλος φησὶ] τὸ πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντα ζῆν. Laert. l. 7. c. 88.---Stob. Ecl. Eth. 171.---*Officia omnia—ſervantem vivere.* Cic. de Fin. l. 4. c. 6. p. 286.

Soon after we meet the Phraſes---TO LIVE ACCORDING TO NATURE; TO LIVE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE. Ὁ Ζήνων---τέλος εἶπε, τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν. Laert. l. 7. c. 87.——*Conſentire naturæ; quod eſſe volunte virtute, id eſt, honeſtate vivere*---De Fin. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. Where, as has been already obſerved *page* 174, and in the *Note* likewiſe on the Place, we find the *Lives* according to *Nature* and *Virtue* are conſidered as the *ſame.*

HOWEVER, to make this Aſſertion plainer, (if it be not perhaps ſufficiently plain already) it may not be improper to conſider what Idea theſe *Philoſophers* had of VIRTUE.

IN *Laertius* (where he delivers the Sentiments of *Zeno* and his followers) *Virtue* is called Διάθεσις ὁμολογουμένη, *a conſiſtent Diſpoſition*; and ſoon after, ψυχὴ πεποιημένη πρὸς τὴν ὁμολογίαν παντὸς τοῦ βίου. *A Mind formed to Conſiſtence thro' every Part of Life.* Laert. l. 7. c. 89.

IN *Stobæus* (according to the Sentiments of the ſame School) it is called Διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφωνος αὐτῇ περὶ ὅλου τοῦ βίου. *A Diſpoſition of Mind, conſonant to itſelf throughout the whole of Life.* Ecl. Eth. p. 167.

So

So *Cicero* in his *Laws*—*Conſtans & perpetua ratio vitæ, quæ eſt* VIRTUS.—l. 1. c. 17. p. 55.

So *Seneca* in his 74*th Epiſtle*——VIRTUS *enim* CONVENIENTIA *conſtat: omnia opera ejus cum ipſâ concordant, & congruunt.*

THUS therefore *Conſiſtence* being the Eſſence of *Virtue*, and upon the *Hypotheſis here advanced*, the Eſſence alſo of *Happineſs*; it follows firſt that a *Virtuous* Life will be a *Happy* Life. But if a *Happy one*, then of courſe a Life *according to Nature*; ſince nothing can be *Good*, which is *contrary to Nature*, nor indeed which is not *conſonant*, in ſtricteſt manner, to it.

AND here (as a proper Opportunity ſeems to offer) we cannot but take notice of the great *Similitude of Sentiments*; it may be even ſaid, the *Unanimity* of almoſt all *Philoſophers*, on this important Subject concerning ENDS, and HAPPINESS.

THOSE, whoſe *Hypotheſis* we have followed in this Dialogue, ſuppoſed it to be VIRTUE and CONSISTENT ACTION, and that without regard to *Fortune* or *Succeſs*. But even they, who from their Hypotheſis made *ſome Degree of Succeſs requiſite*; who reſted it not merely on *right Action*, but on a Proportion of *bodily Welfare*, and *good Fortune* concomitant, even theſe made RIGHT ACTION and VIRTUE to be PRINCIPAL.

THUS

THUS *Archytas*, according to the Doctrine of the *Pythagorean* School. Εὐδαιμοσύνα χρᾶσις ἀρετῆς ἐν εὐτυχίᾳ. *Happineſs is the Uſe or Exerciſe of Virtue, attended with external good Fortune.* Opuſc. Mythol. p. 678. Conſonant to this Sentiment, he ſays in the beginning of the ſame Treatiſe, ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ εὐθέως εὐδαίμων ἐξ ἀνάγκας ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ εὐδαίμων, καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ ἐστι. *The good Man is not of neceſſity Happy*; [becauſe upon this Hypotheſis, external Fortune may be wanting;] *but the happy Man is of neceſſity Good*, [becauſe, upon the ſame Hypotheſis, without Virtue was no Happineſs.] *Ibid.* p. 673. Again——Αἰεὶ μὲν γὰρ κακοδαιμονεῖν ἀνάγκα τὸν κακὸν, ἄιτε ἔχοι ὕλαν (κακῶς τε γὰρ αὐτῇ χρέεται) ἄιτε σπανίζοι.----*The bad Man* (ſays he) *muſt needs at all times be miſerable, whether he have, or whether he want, the Materials of external Fortune; for if he have them, he will employ them ill.* Ibid. p. 696. Thus we ſee this Philoſopher, tho' he make *Externals* a *Requiſite* to *Happineſs*, yet ſtill without *Virtue* he treats them as *of no importance*. Again---Δύο δ' ὁδοὶ τέμνουται ἐν τῷ βίῳ· αἱ μὲν σκυθρωποτέρα, ἂν ὁ τλάμων ἐβάδιζεν Ὀδυσσεύς· αἱ δὲ εὐθιεινοτέρα, τὰν ἐπορεύετο Νέστωρ. Τὰν ὦν ἀρετὰν φαμὶ δηλῆσθαι (lege θέλεσθαι, Dorice pro θέλειν) μὲν τάυταν, δύνασθαι δὲ καὶ τήναν. *There are two Roads in Life diſtinct from each other; one the rougher, which the ſuffering* Ulyſſes *went; the other more ſmooth, which was travelled by* Neſtor. *Now of theſe Roads (ſays he) Virtue deſires indeed the latter; and yet is ſhe not unable to travel the former.* Ibid. p. 696. From which laſt Sentiment it appears, that he thought VIRTUE, *even in any Fortune, was capable of producing at leaſt ſome degree of* HAPPINESS.

As

As for the *Socratic* Doctrine on this Subject, it may be ſufficiently ſeen by what is quoted from it, in the Dialogue *pag.* 198, 199. And as the Sentiments, there exhibited, are recorded by *Plato*, they may be called not only *Socratic*, but *Platonic* alſo. However, leſt this ſhould be liable to diſpute, the following Sentiment is taken from *Xenocrates*, one of *Plato*'s immediate Succeſſors in the old *Academy* by him founded. Ξενοκράτης φησὶν, Εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαίαν· ταύτην γὰρ ἑκάστῳ εἶναι Δαίμονα. Xenocrates *held that he was* Eudæmon, *or* HAPPY, *who had a virtuous Mind; for that the Mind was every one's* Dæmon *or* Genius. *Ariſt. Top.* l. 2. c. 6.

HERE we ſee VIRTUE made the *Principle* of HAPPINESS, according to the Hypotheſis of the Dialogue. There is an elegant *Alluſion* in the Paſſage to the *Etymology* of the Word Εὐδαίμων, which ſignifies both [*Happy*] and [*poſſeſſed of a good Genius or Dæmon*;] an Alluſion which in tranſlating 'twas not poſſible to preſerve. See below, *Note* LVIII.

As for the *Peripatetic School*, we find their Idea of HAPPINESS, as recorded by *Laertius*, to be in a manner the ſame with that of the *Pythagoreans*. It was χρῆσις ἀρετῆς ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ—*The Uſe or Exerciſe of Virtue in a complete and perfect Life.* Laert. l. 5. c. 30. We have already, in *Note* XXV, cited the ſame Doctrine (tho' ſomewhat varied in Expreſſion) from the Founder of the *Peripatetics*, in his firſt Book of *Ethics*. So again we learn from from him——ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς καὶ ἐνέργειαι λέγον-

ται τὸ τέλος, *that 'tis certain Actions and Energies, which are to be deemed* THE END. *Ethic. Nic.* l. 1. c. 8.——And again---Ἔστι γὰρ αὕτη ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. *For 'tis the very Rectitude of Action, which is itself the End.* Ibid. l. 6. c. 5. And again, Ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστι.——*Happiness is a certain Energizing.* l. 9. c. 9. And more explicitly than all these Passages in that elegant Simile, *l.* 1. *c.* 8.—Ὥσπερ δὲ ὀλυμπιάσιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρόταλοι στεφανοῦνται, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γάρ τινες νικῶσιν·) οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ΟΙ ΠΡΑΤΤΟΝΤΕΣ ΟΡΘΩΣ ἐπήβολοι γίγνονται. *For as in the* Olympic *Games, not those are crowned, who are handsomest and strongest, but those who combat and contend, (for 'tis from among these come the Victors;) so, with respect to things laudable and good in human Life, 'tis the right Actors only that attain the Possession of them.* Nay, so much did this Philosopher make *Happiness* depend on *right Action*, that tho' he required some Portion of *Externals* to that *Felicity*, which he held *supreme*; yet still 'twas *Honour* and *Virtue* which were its *principal* Ingredients. Thus speaking of the Calamities and external Casualties of Life, which he confesses to be *Impediments* to a *Happiness perfectly complete*, he adds——ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλὸν, ἐπειδάν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γενναότητα ὢν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. Εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ φαῦλα. Τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν· καθάπερ καὶ στρα-

στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα, καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. Εἰ δ' ἔτως, ἆθλιος μὲν ἐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων. *And yet, even in such Incidents, the fair* Principle *of Honour and Virtue shines forth, when a Man with becoming Calmness endures many and great Misfortunes, and that not thro' Insensibility, but being brave and magnanimous. Nay more, if it be true, as we have already affirmed, that 'tis Actions, which are predominant in constituting a happy Life, then can no one be completely miserable, who is happy in his right Conduct, because he will never be the Actor of what is detestable and base. For 'tis our Opinion that the Man, truly wise and good, endures all Fortunes with becoming Decency, and from whatever happens to arise, still frames the fairest Actions; like as the good Commander uses the Army, which he happens to find, after the manner most agreeable to the Rules of War; and the Shoemaker, from such Skins as others provide him, makes a Shoe, the best that can be made from such Materials; and so in the same manner all other Artists beside. But if this be true, then he, who is* happy *in this Rectitude of* Genius, *can in no Instance be truly and strictly* miserable. Eth. Nic. l. 1. c. 10.

As for *Epicurus*, tho' he was an Advocate for *Pleasure*, yet so high was his Opinion of a *wise and right Conduct*, that he thought *rational* Adversity better than *irrational* Prosperity. See Dial. p. 197. Hence too he represented that *Pleasure*, which he esteemed our *Sovereign Happiness*, to be as inseparable from *Virtue*, as *Virtue* was from *that*. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν, ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς, καὶ

δικαίως· οὐδὲ φρονίμως, καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. *'Tis impoſſible to live pleaſurably, without living prudently, and honourably, and juſtly; or to live prudently and honourably and juſtly, without living pleaſurably.* Epic. in Laert. l. 10. ſ. 132.

To conclude the whole, our Countryman *Thomas Hobbes*, though he profeſſedly explodes all this Doctrine concerning *Ends*, yet ſeems inſenſibly to have eſtabliſhed an *End* himſelf, and to have founded it (like others) in a certain ENERGY or ACTION. For thus 'tis he informs us, in his Treatiſe called *Human Nature*, that *there can be no* CONTENTMENT, *but in* PROCEEDING; and *that* FELICITY *conſiſteth*, not *in* HAVING——*but in* PROSPERING. And again, ſome time after, having admitted the Compariſon of *Human Life* to a *Race*, he immediately ſubjoins---*But this* RACE *we muſt ſuppoſe to have no other* GOAL, *nor other* GARLAND, *but being* FOREMOST *and* IN IT.

AND thus much as to the *concurring Sentiments of Philoſophers* on the Subject of *Ends*, here treated.

NOTE XLVII. p. 208.---YET IT IN NO MANNER TAKES AWAY THE DIFFERENCE AND DISTINCNION OF OTHER THINGS.] *Cum enim virtutis hoc proprium ſit, earum rerum quæ ſecundum naturam ſint, habere delectum; qui omnia ſic exæquaverunt, ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent, uti nullâ ſelectione uterentur, virtutem ipſam ſuſtulerunt.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 4. p. 207.

QUID *autem apertius, quam, ſi ſelectio nulla ſit ab iis rebus, quæ contra naturam ſint, earum rerum quæ ſint ſecundum naturam, tollatur omnis ea, quæ quæra-*

tur

tur laudeturque prudentia? Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 9. p. 227.

DEINCEPS *explicatur differentia rerum: quam ſi non ullam eſſe diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Ariſtone; nec ullum ſapientiæ munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter eas res, quæ ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino intereſſet; neque ullum delectum haberi oporteret. Itaque cum eſſet ſatis conſtitutum, id ſolum eſſe bonum quod eſſet honeſtum, & id malum ſolum quod turpe; tum inter hæc & illa, quæ nihil valerent ad beate miſereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quo differrent, eſſe voluerunt, ut eſſent eorum alia æſtimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum.* Ibid. l. 3. c. 15. p. 246.

CÆTERA *autem, etſi nec bona nec mala eſſent, tamen alia ſecundum naturam dicebat, alia naturæ eſſe contraria: iis ipſis alia interjecta & media numerabat.* Acad. l. 1. c. 11. p. 46. See Dial. p. 187.

NOTE XLVIII. p. 208. IT SUPPRESSES NO SOCIAL AND NATURAL AFFECTIONS, *&c.*] As much has been ſaid concerning the STOIC APATHY, or *Inſenſibility with reſpect to Paſſion*, it may not be improper to inquire, what were their real Sentiments on this Subject.

Πάθος, which we uſually render *a Paſſion*, is always rendered by *Cicero*, when ſpeaking as a *Stoic*, *Perturbatio*, *a Perturbation*. As ſuch therefore in the firſt place we ſay it ought always to be treated.

THE Definition of the Term πάθος, as given by theſe Philoſophers, was ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα, tranſlated by *Cicero*, *Appetitus vehementior*. Tuſc. l. 4. c. 9. p. 273. Now this Definition may be more

eaſily explained, if we firſt inquire, what they meant by ὁρμή. Ὁρμὴ they defined to be φορὰ ψυχῆς ἐπί τι, *a Tendency or Motion of the Soul toward ſomething.* Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 175. A πάθος therefore, or *Perturbation* muſt have been, according to their Definition, *a Tendency or Motion of the Soul, which was exceſſive and beyond Bounds.* *Stobæus*, from whom this Definition is taken, in commenting upon it obſerves, ὃ λέγει πεφυκέναι πλεονάζειν, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἐν πλεονάσμῳ ὄσα· ὃ γὰρ δυνάμει, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνεργείᾳ--- that *Zeno* (its Author) *does not call a* Πάθος *ſomething capable by Nature to paſs into Exceſs, but ſomething actually in Exceſs already, as having its Eſſence, not in mere Capacity, but in Actuality.* Ecl. Eth. p. 159.

THERE is another Definition of the ſame Term, which makes it to be ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φυσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις, *a Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to Nature.* D. Laert. l. 7. ſ. 110. *Andronicus Rhodius* adds, to this latter Definition, the Words, δι' ὑπόληψιν κακοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ, *from the Opinion of ſomething Good or Evil.* Περὶ Πάθ. p. 523. So that its whole Idea is as follows. *A Perturbation, or* Stoic *Paſſion, is a Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to Nature, ariſing from the Opinion of ſomething Good or Evil.* Theſe laſt Words, founding the Πάθος or *Perturbation on Opinion*, correſpond to what *Cicero* ſays, where he gives it as the Sentiment of *the Stoic Philoſophers, omnes perturbationes judicio fieri & opinione.* Tuſc. l. 4. c. 7. p. 276. *Laertius* informs us, that they even made *the Perturbations themſelves to be Judgments.* Δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι. *Laert.* l. 7. ſ. 111. He ſubjoins an Inſtance to illuſtrate. Ἥ τε γὰρ φιλαργυρία ὑπόληψίς ἐστι τοῦ τὸ ἀρ-

γύριον καλὸν εἶναι. *For thus* (ſays he) *the Love of Money is the Judgment or Opinion, that Money is a thing good and excellent.* *Plutarch* records the ſame Sentiment of theirs, in a fuller and more ample manner. Πάθος—λόγος πονηρὸς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβών. *A Perturbation is a vitious and intemperate Reaſoning, which aſſumes Vehemence and Strength from bad and erroneous Judgment.* Mor. p. 441. D. To theſe Teſtimonies may be added that of *Themiſtius.* —καὶ οὐ κακῶς οἱ ἀπὸ Ζηνώνος, τὰ πάθη τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς τὸν λόγον διαστροφὰς εἶναι τιθέμενοι, καὶ λόγου κρίσεις ἡμαρτημένας. Themiſt. Paraph. in Ariſtot. de animâ, L. 3. p. 90. b. *Edit. Aldinæ.*

THE Subſtance of what is ſaid above, ſeems to amount to this; that Πάθος, in a *Stoic* Senſe, implied a *Perturbation*, and not a *Paſſion*; and that ſuch *Perturbation* meant *an irrational and violent Motion of the Soul, founded on Opinion or Judgment, which was erroneous and faulty.*

NOW from hence it follows, that THE MAN OF PERFECT CHARACTER (according to their *Hypotheſis*) muſt of neceſſity be ἀπαθὴς, APATHETIC, OR VOID OF PERTURBATION. For ſuch a *Character*, as has been ſhewn, implies *perfect Rectitude of Conduct.* But perfect Rectitude of Conduct implies *perfect Rectitude of Judgment*; and ſuch Rectitude of Judgment *excludes all Error and wrong Judgment:* But if Error and wrong Judgment, then *Perturbation* of conſequence, which they ſuppoſe to be derived *from thence alone.*

THAT *this* was the Senſe, in which they underſtood APATHY, we have *their own* Authority, as

given us by *Laertius*. Φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν, διὰ τὸ ἀνέμπλωτον εἶναι. Laert. l. 7. p. 117. *They ſay the wiſe Man is apathetic, by being ſuperior to Error-- by being ſuperior to* ERROR, if they may be credited themſelves; not, as for the moſt part we abſurdly imagine, *by being ſuperior* to all *Senſe*, and *Feeling*, and *Affection*. The Sentence immediately following the foregoing, looks as if theſe *Philoſophers* had foreſeen, how likely they were to be miſunderſtood. Εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ἀπαθῆ τὸν Φαῦλον, ἐν ἴσῳ λεγόμενον τῷ σκληρῷ καὶ ἀπλήκτῳ— *There is alſo another ſort of Apathetic Man, who is bad; who is the ſame in Character, as the hard and inflexible.* To the ſame Purpoſe *Epictetus*. Οὐ δεῖ γάρ με εἶναι ἀπαθῆ, ὡς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰς σχέσεις τηρεῖν τὰς φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτους, ὡς εὐσεβῆ, ὡς υἱὸν, ὡς ἀδελφὸν, ὡς πατέρα, ὡς πολίτην. FOR I AM NOT TO BE APATHETIC, LIKE a STATUE, *but I am withal to obſerve Relations, both the natural and adventitious; as the Man of Religion, as the Son, as the Brother, as the Father, as the Citizen.* Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 2. p. 359.

IMMEDIATELY before this, he tells us in the ſame Chapter, Πάθος γὰρ ἄλλως οὐ γίνεται, εἰ μὴ ὀρέξεως ἀποτυγχανέσης, ἢ ἐκκλίσεως περιπιπτούσης, *that a Perturbation in no other way ever ariſes, but either when a Deſire is fruſtrated, or an Averſion falls into that which it would avoid.* Where 'tis obſervable, that he does not make either *Deſire* or *Averſion*, Πάθη, or *Perturbations*, but only *the Cauſe* of *Perturbations*, when erroneouſly connected.

AGREEABLY to this, in the ſecond Chapter of the *Enchiridion*, we meet with Precepts about the Con-

Conduct and Management of these two *Affections*—— Not a word is said about lopping off either; on the contrary, *Aversion* we are directed how to employ immediately, and *Desire* we are only ordered to suspend for the present, because we want a proper Subject of fit Excellence to excite it.

To this may be added, what the same Philosopher speaks, in his own Person, concerning himself. *Arr. Epict.* l. 1. c. 21. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἀρκέσθημαι, ἂν ὀρέγωμαι καὶ ἐκκλίνω καλὰ φύσιν——*I, for my part, am satisfied and contented, if I can* DESIRE *and* AVOID *agreeably to Nature.* He did not remain it seems dissatisfied, till he had *eradicated* these *Affections*; but he was satisfied in reducing them to their *natural Use.*

IN *Laertius* we read recorded for a *Stoic* Sentiment, that as the *vitious* Man had his πάθη, or *Perturbations*; so opposed to these, had the *Virtuous* his Εὐπαθείαι, his *Eupathies* or *Well-feelings*, translated by *Cicero Constantiæ.* The *three* chief of these were Βούλησις, WILL, defined ὄρεξις εὔλογος, *rational Desire*; Εὐλάβεια, CAUTION, defined Ἔκκλισις εὔλογος, *rational Aversion*; and Χαρὰ, JOY, defined ἔπαρσις εὔλογος, *rational Exultation.* To these three principal *Eupathies* belonged many *subordinate* Species; such as εὔνοια, ἀγάπησις, αἰδὼς, τέρψις, εὐφροσύνη, εὐθυμία, &c. See *Laert.* l. 7. s. 115, 116. *Andron. Rhod.* περὶ πάθων. *Cic. Tusc.* l. 4. c. 6.

CICERO makes *Cato*, under the Character of a *Stoic*, and in explaining their System, use the following expressions. *Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur, intelligi natura fieri, ut liberi a parentibus amentur: a*

quo initio profectam communem humani generis ſocietatem perſequuntur. De Fin. l. 3. c. 19. The ſame Sentiment of the *Stoics* is recorded by *Laertius.* Φασὶ δὲ (οἱ Στωϊκοὶ) καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὰ τέκνα φιλοστοργίαν φυσικὴν εἶναι αὐτοῖς——*They ſay Parental Affection is natural to them.* l. 7. ſ. 120.

AGAIN, ſoon after, in the ſame Treatiſe *de Finibus. Quodque nemo in ſumma ſolitudine vitam agere velit, ne cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia; facile intelligitur, nos ad conjunctionem congregationemque hominum, & ad naturalem communitatem eſſe natos.* So *Laertius.* Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐδ' ἐν ἐρημίᾳ (φασὶ) βιώσεσθαι ὁ σπουδαῖος· κοινωνικὸς γὰρ φύσει, καὶ πρακτικός. *The virtuous Man* (ſay they, the *Stoics*) *will never be for living in Solitude; for he is by Nature ſocial, and formed for Action,* l. 7. ſ. 123.

AGAIN, *Cicero,* in the above-cited Treatiſe. *Cum autem ad tuendos conſervandoſque homines hominem natum eſſe videamus; conſentaneum eſt huic naturæ, ut ſapiens velit gerere, & adminiſtrare rempublicam; atque ut e natura vivat, uxorem adjungere, & velle ex eâ liberos. Ne amores quidem ſanctos a ſapiente alienos eſſe arbitrantur.——Ut vero conſervetur omnis hominis erga hominem ſocietas, conjunctio, caritas; & emolumenta & detrimenta—communia eſſe voluerunt.* De Fin. l. 3. c. 20, 21.

IN *Epictetus* the *leading Duties,* or *moral Offices of Man,* are enumerated as follows. Πολιτέυεσθαι, γαμεῖν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι, θεὸν σέβειν, γονέων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καθόλου ὑπέχεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, ὁρμᾶν, ἀφορμᾶν, ὡς ἕκαστον τούτων

τέτων δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς πεφύκαμεν. *Arr. Epict.* l. 3. c. 7. p. 386. The ſame Sentiments may be found repeated both in *Stobæus* and *Laertius.*

I SHALL only add one more Sentiment of theſe *Philoſophers*, and that is concerning *Friendſhip.* Λέγυσι δὲ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς σπυδαίοις εἶναι— *They ſay that Friendſhip exiſts among the Virtuous only.* Laert. l. 7. ſ. 124.

THE Sum of theſe *Quotations* appears to be this; that the STOICS, *in the Character of their virtuous Man*, included *rational Deſire*, *Averſion*, and *Exultation*; included *Love* and *parental Affection*; *Friendſhip*, and *a general Charity* or *Benevolence* to *all Mankind*; that they conſidered it as a *Duty*, ariſing from our very *Nature*, not to neglect *the Welfare of public Society*, but to be ever ready, according to our Rank, to act either the *Magiſtrate* or the *private Citizen*; that their APATHY was no more than *a Freedom from Perturbation*, from *irrational* and *exceſſive Agitations of the Soul*; and conſequently that the *ſtrange Apathy*, commonly laid to their Charge, and in the demoliſhing of which there have been ſo many Triumphs,, was an imaginary *Apathy*, for which they were no way accountable.

NOTE XLIX. p. 209. IT REJECTS NO GAIN, NOT INCONSISTENT WITH JUSTICE.] The *Stoics* were ſo far from rejecting Wealth, when acquired fairly, that they allowed *their perfect Man*, for the ſake of enriching himſelf, to frequent the Courts of Kings, and teach Philoſophy for a Stipend. Thus *Plutarch* from a Treatiſe of *Chryſippus*——Τὸν μὲν σοφὸν

σοφὸν καὶ βασιλεύσει συνέσεσθαι φησὶν ἕνεκα χρηματισμοῦ, καὶ σοφιστεύσειν ἐπ' ἀργυρίῳ—*Mor.* p. 1047. F.

So likewiſe the *Stoic Hecato*, in his Treatiſe of *Offices*, as quoted by *Cicero*, *Sapientis eſſe, nihil contra mores, leges, inſtituta facientem, habere rationem rei familiaris. Neque enim ſolum nobis divites eſſe volumus, ſed liberis, propinquis, amicis, maximeque reipublicæ. Singulorum enim facultates & copiæ, divitiæ ſunt civitatis.* De Offic. l. 3. c. 15.

NOTE L. p. 206—UNIVERSALLY AS FAR AS VIRTUE NEITHER FORBIDS NOR DISSUADES, IT ENDEAVOURS TO RENDER LIFE, EVEN IN THE MOST VULGAR ACCEPTATION, AS CHEARFUL, JOYOUS, AND EASY AS POSSIBLE.] *Etenim quod ſummum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, Convenienter naturæ vivere, id habet hanc (ut opinor) ſententiam, Cum virtute congruere ſemper:* cætera autem, quæ ſecundum naturam eſſent, ita legere, ſi ea virtuti non repugnarent. *Cic. de Offic.* l. 3. c. 3.

ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, ſpeaking of the *Stoic* Doctrine concerning the *external Conveniencies*, and common Utilities of Life, delivers their Sentiment in the following Words——ἀλλὰ καὶ δίχα κειμένων ἀρετῆς τε σὺν τούτοις καὶ ἀρετῆς μόνης, μηδέποτ' ἂν τὸν σοφὸν τὴν κεχωρισμένην ἑλέσθαι, εἰ εἴη αὐτῷ δυνατὸν τὴν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων λαβεῖν. *Suppoſing there lay Virtue on the one ſide, attended with theſe Externals, and Virtue on the other ſide, alone by herſelf, the wiſe Man would never chooſe that Virtue, which was deſtitute and ſingle, if 'twas in his Power to obtain that other, which*

which was accompanied with theſe Advantages. Περὶ ψυχ. p. 157.

NOTE LI. p. 209.——NAY, COULD IT MEND THE CONDITION OF EXISTENCE——BY ADDING TO THE AMPLEST POSSESSIONS THE POOREST, MEANEST UTENSIL, IT WOULD IN NO DEGREE CONTEMN, &c.]—*Si ad illam vitam, quæ cum virtute degatur, ampulla aut ſtrigilis accedat, ſumpturum ſapientem eam vitam potius, cui hæc adjecta ſint.*——De Fin. l. 4. c. 12. p. 300.

NOTE LII. p. 210.—COULD IT INDEED CHOOSE ITS OWN LIFE, IT WOULD BE ALWAYS THAT, WHERE MOST SOCIAL AFFECTIONS MIGHT BE EXERTED, &c.] *Itemque magis eſt ſecundum naturam, pro omnibus gentibus (ſi fieri poſſit) conſervandis aut juvandis maximos labores moleſtiaſque ſuſcipere, imitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilio cœleſtium conlocavit, quam vivere in ſolitudinè, non modo ſine ullis moleſtiis, ſed etiam in maximis voluptatibus, abundantem omnibus copiis; ut excellas etiam pulchritudine & viribus. Quocirca optimo quiſque & ſplendidiſſimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic anteponit.* Cic. de Offic. l. 3. c. 5.

NOTE LIII. p. *ibid.*———IT TEACHES US TO CONSIDER LIFE, AS ONE GREAT IMPORTANT DRAMA, WHERE, &c.] Thus *Ariſto* the *Chian*——Εἶναι γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑποκριτῇ τὸν σοφόν· ὃς ἄνλε Θερσίτᾳ ἄνλε Ἀγαμέμνονι τ' πρόσωπον ἀναλάβῃ, ἑκάτερον ὑποκρίνεσθαι πρεπωδέως. *The wiſe Man is like the good Actor; who, whether he aſſume the Character of* Therſites *or* Agamemnon,

memnon, *acts either of the two Parts with a becoming Propriety.* D. Laert. l. 7. ſ. 160.

THIS Compariſon of *Life* to a *Drama* or *Stage-play*, ſeems to have been a Compariſon much approved by Authors of Antiquity. See *Epict. Enchirid.* c. 17. and the Notes of the late learned Editor Mr. *Upton*. See alſo *M. Anton.* l. 12. ſ. 36. and *the Notes of Gataker*. Plat. Gorg. p. 512. T. 1. Ed. Serr.

NOTE LIV. p. 211.——IT ACCEPTS ALL THE JOYS DERIVED FROM THEIR SUCCESS, *&c.* IT FIXES NOT, LIKE THE MANY, ITS HAPPINESS ON SUCCESS ALONE, *&c.*] One of the wiſeſt Rules that ever was, *with reſpect to the Enjoyment of external good Fortune*, is that deliver'd by *Epictetus*; *to enjoy it*, ὡς δέδοται, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον δέδοται, *in ſuch manner as it is given, and for ſuch Time as it is given*, remembring that *neither of theſe Conditions* we have the Power to command. See *Arr. Epict.* l. 4. c. 1. p. 556. See alſo p. 573. of the ſame.

NOTE LV. *Ibid.* ON THE CONTRARY, WHEN THIS HAPPENS, 'TIS THEN IT RETIRES INTO ITSELF, AND REFLECTING ON WHAT IS FAIR, WHAT IS LAUDABLE, *&c.*] See before, p. 322. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει, &c.

NOTE LVI. p. 212. ALL MEN PURSUE GOOD, *&c.*] This is a *Principle* adopted by all the *Stoics*, and inculcated thro' every part of the Diſſertations of *Epictetus*. Take an Example or two out of many. Φύσις δ' αὕτη πανλὸς, τὸ διώκειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, φεύγειν τὸ κακόν——τῦ γὰρ ἀγαθῦ συγγενές ερον ἐδέν. 'Tis the Nature

Nature of every one to purſue GOOD, *and fly Evil—for nothing is more intimately allied to us than* GOOD. Arr. Epict. l. 4. c. 5. p. 606. Again, *l.* 2. *c.* 22. *p.* 313. Πᾶν Ζῶον οὐδενὶ ἔτως οἰκείωται, ὡς τῷ ἰδίῳ συμφέροντι. *To nothing is every* ANIMAL *ſo intimately allied, as to its own peculiar* WELFARE, *and* INTEREST.

So *Cicero. Omnes enim expetimus* UTILITATEM, *ad eamque rapimur, nec facere aliter ullo modo poſſumus.* De Offic. l. 3. c. 28. Platon. Gorg. p. 468. T. 1. Edit. Serr. ibid. p. 499. E.

NOTE LVII. p. 213.——ALL DERIVED FROM EXTERNALS MUST FLUCTUATE, AS THEY FLUCTUATE.] See before, *p.* 126, 130, 133.

NOTE LVIII. *Ibid.*—WHEN WE PLACE THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IN MIND——] DÆMON or GENIUS means every Man's *particular* MIND, and REASONING FACULTY. Δαίμων----ἔτος δέ ἐστιν ἑκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος. M. Anton. l. 5. p. 27. *Genium eſſe uniuſcujuſque animum rationalem; & ideo eſſe ſingulos ſingulorum*—Varro in Fragm. 'Tis from this Interpretation of *Genius*, that the Word, which in *Greek* expreſſes HAPPINESS, is elegantly etymologized to mean A GOODNESS OF GENIUS OR MIND. Εὐδαιμονία ἐστὶ δαίμων ἀγαθός. *M. Anton.* l. 7. ſ. 17. See *Gataker* on the Place. The Sentiment came originally from the old *Academics.* See before, *page* 321.

NOTE LIX. p. 214.—BEHOLD THE TRUE AND PERFECT MAN: THAT ORNAMENT, *&c.*] *Quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam conſtans conficitur*

ficitur perſona ſapientis? Qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honeſtum eſſet, id eſſe ſolum bonum, ſemper ſit neceſſe eſt beatus, vereque omnia iſta nomina poſſideat, quæ inrideri ab imperitis ſolent. Rectius enim appellabitur rex, quam Tarquinius, qui nec ſe nec ſuos regere potuit: rectius magiſter populi, &c. Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 22. p. 269. *Ergo hic, quiſquis eſt, qui moderatione & conſtantia quietus animo eſt, ſibique ipſe placatus; ut nec tabeſcat moleſtiis, nec frangatur timore, nec ſitienter quid expetens ardeat deſiderio, nec alacritate futili geſtiens deliqueſcat; is eſt ſapiens, quem quærimus, is eſt beatus: cui nihil humanarum rerum aut intolerabile ad demittendum animum, aut nimis lætabile ad ecferendum videri poteſt. Quid enim videatur ei magnum, &c.* Tuſc. Diſp. l. 4. c. 17. p. 298.

NOTE LX. p. 215.—WOULD NOT YOUR SYSTEM IN SUCH A CASE A LITTLE BORDER UPON THE CHIMERICAL? *&c.*] *Chryſippus* ſeems to have been ſenſible of this, if we may judge from a Paſſage of his, preſerved in *Plutarch.* Διὸ καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶτε μεγέθες καὶ τῦ κάλλες, πλάσμασι δοκῦμεν ὅμοια λέγειν, καὶ ἃ κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν. *For this reaſon, thro' the exceſſive Greatneſs and Beauty of what we aſſert, we appear to ſay things which look like Fictions, and not ſuch as are ſuitable to* MAN *and* HUMAN NATURE. Mor. 1041. F.

NOTE LXI. p. 216.——IN ANTIENT DAYS, WHEN GREECE, *&c.*] See *Cic. de Invent.* l. 2. c. 1. See alſo *Maximus Tyrius, Diſſ.* 23. *p.* 277. of the late Quarto Edition; and *Xenoph. Memor.* l. 3. c. 10.

NOTE

NOTE LXII. p. 219.——NO WHERE IN ANY PARTICULAR NATURE IS THE PERFECT CHARACTER TO BE SEEN INTIRE.] The *Stoici* themſelves acknowledged, as we learn from *Clemens* of *Alexandria*, that their ὁ σοφὸς, or PERFECT MAN, was *difficult to be found to an exceeding great degree*; δυσεύρετον πάνυ σφόδρα. Strom. p. 438. *Sextus Empiricus* gives it as their Opinion, *that they had never as yet found him*, μέχρι τῦ νῦν ἀνευρέτε ὄντ@ καὶ ἀνλὲς τῦ σοφῦ. Adv. Phyſ. p. 582. Edit. Lipſienſ.

WHAT *Sextus* ſays, ſeems to be confirmed by *Cicero*, who ſpeaking in his *Offices* the Language of a *Stoic*, has the following Expreſſions. *Nec vero, cum duo Decii, aut duo Scipiones, fortes viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius Ariſtideſve juſti nominantur; aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut ab his juſtitiæ, tanquam a* SAPIENTIBUS, *petitur exemplum. Nemo enim horum* SIC SAPIENS *eſt, ut* SAPIENTEM *volumus intelligi. Nec ii, qui ſapientes habiti ſunt, & nominati, M. Cato & C. Lælius, ſapientes fuerunt; ne illi quidem ſeptem: ſed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia ſimilitudinem quandam gerebant, ſpeciemque ſapientum.* De Offic. l. 3. c. 4. Again, in his *Lælius*, ſpeaking of the ſame *conſummate Wiſdom*, he calls it, *Sapientia quam adhuc mortalis nemo eſt conſecutus.*

So too *Quintilian*. *Quod ſi defuit his viris ſumma virtus, ſic quærentibus, an oratores fuerint, reſpondebo, quo modo Stoici, ſi interrogentur, an* SAPIENS *Zeno, an Cleanthes, an Chryſippus, reſpondeant; magnos quidem illos ac venerabiles; non tamen id, quod natura ho-*

minis ſummam habet, conſecutos. Inſt. Orat. l. 12. c. 1. p. 721, 722. Edit. Caper.

So likewiſe *Seneca : Scis, quem nunc bonum virum dicam? Hujus* ſecundæ *notæ. Nam* ille alter *fortaſſe, tanquam phœnix, ſemel anno quingenteſimo naſcitur.* Epiſt. 42.

NOTE LXIII. p. 219.——I MIGHT INFORM YOU OF THE NATURAL PRE-EMINENCE, AND HIGH RANK OF SPECIFIC IDEAS.] See *Cicero* in his *Orator*, near the Beginning. *Sed ego ſic ſtatuo, nihil eſſe in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non, &c. &c.* See alſo the Verſes of *Boethius* before cited, *Note* XVII. p. 295.

NOTE LXIV. p. 220, 221.—AN EXEMPLAR OF IMITATION, WHICH THO' NONE WE THINK CAN EQUAL; YET ALL AT LEAST MAY FOLLOW—AN EXEMPLAR, *&c.*] *Seneca* gives it as a general Confeſſion of the *greateſt* Philoſophers, that the Doctrine they taught, was not *quemadmodum ipſi viverent, ſed* quemadmodum vivendum eſſet. *De vitâ beatâ*, c. 18.

THERE appears indeed to be ONE COMMON REASONING with reſpect to all MODELS, EXEMPLARS, STANDARDS, CORRECTORS, whatever we call them, and whatever the *Subjects*, which they are deſtined to adjuſt. According to this Reaſoning, if a Standard be *leſs* perfect than the Subject to be adjuſted, ſuch Adjuſting (if it may be ſo called) becomes a *Detriment*. If it be but *equally* perfect, then is

is the Adjuſting *ſuperfluous*. It remains therefore that it muſt be *more perfect*, and that to *any Tranſcendence*, *any Accuracy* conceivable. For ſuppoſe a Standard *as highly accurate*, as can be imagined. If the Subjects to be adjuſted have a Nature *ſuitable*, then will they arrive, by ſuch Standard, *to a degree of Perfection*, which thro' a Standard *leſs* accurate they could never poſſibly attain. On the contrary, if the Subjects be not *ſo far* capable, the Accuracy of the Standard will never be a hindrance, why they ſhould not become as *perfect*, as their *Nature* will admit.

IT ſeems to have been from ſome Sentiments of this kind, that the *Stoics* adorned their ὁ σοφὸς, or *perfect Character*, with *Attributes ſo far ſuperior to ordinary Humanity*. Ἐκεῖνος ὄλβιος, ἐκεῖνος ἀπροσδεὴς, ἐκεῖνος αὐτάρκης, μακάριος, τέλειος—*'Twas he was fortunate; 'twas he was above want; 'twas he was ſelf-ſufficient, and happy, and perfect.* Plutarch. Mor. 1068. B. See *Note* LXII.

SOME *Philoſophers* have gone ſo far, as not to reſt ſatisfied with the *moſt perfect Idea of Humanity*, but to ſubſtitute, for our *Exemplar*, even the *ſupreme Being*, GOD HIMSELF. Thus *Plato*, in his *Theætetus*, makes the great Object of our Endeavours, to be ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, *the becoming like to* GOD, *as far as in our power*. He immediately explains, what this Reſemblance is. Ὁμοίωσις δὲ, δικαίου καὶ ὁσίου μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. *It is the becoming juſt and holy, along with Wiſdom or Prudence.* Plat. tom. 1. p. 176. Edit. Serrani. See this Sentiment explained by *Ammonius*, in *V. Voces Porph.* p. 5. See alſo *Ariſtotle*'s *Ethics*, L. 10. C. 8. p. 465.

THE *Goſpel* appears to favour the ſame *Hypotheſis*. *Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in Heaven is perfect.* Matt. v. 48.

WHAT has been above ſaid, will be, 'tis hoped, a ſufficient Apology for the *Tranſcendence* of the Character deſcribed in the *Dialogue*.

NOTE LXV. p. 221. THE PROFICIENCY OF SOCRATES—WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVINCE US—THAT SOME PROGRESS, &c.] See *Diog. Laert.* l. 7. c. 91. p. 420. Τεκμήριον δὲ τὸ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν---τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τὰς περὶ Σωκράτη, καὶ Διογένην, &c.

NOTE LXVI. p. *Ibid.*—NOR WAS THE PRIZE, AS USUAL, RESERVED ONLY TO THE FIRST; BUT ALL, WHO RUN, MIGHT DEPEND UPON A REWARD, HAVING, &c.] *Verum ut tranſeundi ſpes non ſit, magna tamen eſt dignitas ſubſequendi.* Quinct. Inſt. l. 12. c. 11. p. 760. *Exigo itaque a me, non ut optimis par ſim, ſed ut malis melior.* Senec. de Vitâ beatâ, c. 17. Οὐδὲ γὰρ Μίλων ἔσομαι, καὶ ὅμως ἐκ ἀμελῶ τοῦ σώματος· ἐδὲ Κροῖσος, καὶ ὅμως ἐκ ἀμελῶ τῆς κλήσεως· ἐδ' ἁπλῶς ἄλλου τινὸς τῆς ἐπιμελείας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῶν ἄκρων, ἀφιέμεθα. *For neither ſhall I be* Milo, *and yet I neglect not my Body; nor* Crœſus, *and yet I neglect not my Eſtate; nor in general do we deſiſt from the proper Care of any thing, thro' Deſpair of arriving at that which is ſupreme.* Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 2. See alſo *Horat. Epiſt.* 1. l. 1. v. 28, &c.

NOTE

NOTE LXVII. p. 225.——THIS WHOLE UNIVERSE——IS ONE CITY OR COMMONWEALTH—] Ὁ κόσμος ὅτος μία πόλις ἐστὶ——*Arr. Epict.* l. 3. c. 24. p. 486. This was a *Stoic* Doctrine, of which *Epictetus* and the Emperor *Marcus* make perpetual mention. See of the laſt, *l.* 12. *ſ.* 36.

So *Cicero*, *Univerſus hic mundus una civitas communis Deorum atque hominum exiſtumandus.* De Legg. l. 1. c. 7. p. 29. See *De Fin.* l. 3. c. 19. *De Nat. Deor.* l. 2. c. 62.

NOTE LXVIII. p. 227.——HENCE THE MIND TRULY WISE, QUITTING THE STUDY OF PARTICULARS, &c.] The *Platonics*, conſidering SCIENCE as ſomething *aſcertained*, *definite*, and *ſteady*, would admit nothing to be its *Object*, which was *vague*, *infinite*, and *paſſing*. For this reaſon they *excluded* all INDIVIDUALS, or OBJECTS OF SENSE, and (as *Ammonius* expreſſes it,) raiſed themſelves, in their Contemplations, from *Beings particular* to *Beings univerſal*, and which as ſuch, from their own Nature, were *eternal* and *definite*. The whole Paſſage is worth tranſcribing. Εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ φιλοσοφία, γνῶσις πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἢ ὄντα ἐστίν. Ἐζήτησαν ἄν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, τίνα ἂν τρόπον γένωνται τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστήμονες· καὶ ἐπειδὴ εἶδον τὰ καθ' μέρος γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ ὄντα, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄπειρα, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἀϊδίων τε καὶ πεπερασμένων ἐστὶ γνῶσις (τὸ γὰρ γνωστὸν βάλεται ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως περιλαμβάνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον, ἀπερίληπτον) ἀνήγαγον ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μερικῶν ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου, ἀΐδια ὄντα καὶ πεπερασμένα. Ὡς γάρ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων,

Ἐπιστήμη εἴρηται, παρὰ τὸ εἰς Ἐπίστασιν ἡμᾶς καὶ ὅρου τινὰ προάγειν τῶν πραγμάτων· τοῦτο δὲ ποριζόμεθα διὰ τῆς εἰς τὰ καθόλου ἀναδρομῆς. *Ammonius* in his Preface to *Porphyry's Iſagoge*, p. 14. Edit. 8vo.

CONSONANT to this, we learn 'twas the Advice of *Plato*, with reſpect to the *Progreſs* of our *Speculations* and *Inquiries*, when we proceed *Synthetically*, that is to ſay, *from firſt Principles downwards*, that we ſhould *deſcend from thoſe higher Genera, which include many ſubordinate Species, down to the loweſt Rank of Species, thoſe which include only Individuals. But here 'twas his Opinion, that our Inquiries ſhould ſtop, and, as to Individuals, let them wholly alone; becauſe of theſe there could not poſſibly be any Science.* Διὸ μέχρι τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἀπὸ τῶν γενικωτάτων καλίουλας παρεκελεύετο ὁ Πλάτων παύεσθαι——τὰ δὲ ἄπειρά φησιν ἐᾶν· μὴ δὲ γὰρ ἂν πολε γενέσθαι τούτων ἐπιστήμην. Porphyr. Iſagog. c. 2.

SUCH was the Method of *antient* Philoſophy. The Faſhion at preſent appears to be ſomewhat altered, and the Buſineſs of Philoſophers to be little elſe, than the collecting from every Quarter, into voluminous Records, an infinite Number of *ſenſible*, *particular*, and *unconnected* Facts, the chief Effect of which is to excite our Admiration. So that if that well-known Saying of Antiquity be true, *'twas Wonder which induced Men firſt to philoſophize*, we may ſay that Philoſophy now *ends*, whence originally it *began*.

NOTE LXIX. p. 228.——A FACULTY, WHICH RECOGNIZING BOTH ITSELF, AND ALL THINGS ELSE, BECOMES A CANON, A CORRECTOR, AND A STANDARD UNIVERSAL.] See before, p. 162.

In

In *Epictetus*, l. 1. c. 1. p. 6. the Δύναμις λογικὴ or *reaſoning Power*, is called the Power ἡ καὶ αὐτὴν θεωρῆσα, καὶ τ' ἄλλα πάντα. So *Marcus*—Τὰ ἴδια τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς· ἑαυτὴν ὁρᾷ, ἑαυτὴν διαρθροῖ, &c. *The Properties of the reaſoning Soul are, it beholdeth itſelf; it formeth itſelf*, &c. l. 11. c. 1. So again *Epictetus*, —ὑπὲρ μὲν τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ νὴ Δία ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ζῆν, καὶ τῶν συνεργῶν πρὸς αὐτό, ὑπὲρ καρπῶν ξηρῶν, ὑπὲρ οἴνου, ὑπὲρ ἐλαίου εὐχαρίστει τῷ θεῷ· μέμνησο δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τί σοι δέδωκε κρεῖττον ἁπάντων τούτων, τὸ χρησόμενον αὐτοῖς, τὸ δοκιμάζον, τὸ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκάστου λογιούμενον. *For ſeeing, for hearing, and indeed for Life itſelf, and the various Means whch co-operate to its Support; for the Fruits of the Earth, for Wine and Oil, for all theſe things be thankful to God: yet be mindful that he hath given thee ſomething elſe,* WHICH IS BETTER THAN ALL THESE; *ſomething which is to uſe them, to prove them, to compute the Value of each.* Arr. Epict. l. 2. c. 23. p. 321.

NOTE LXX. p. 228.——THAT MASTER-SCIENCE, OF WHAT THEY ARE, WHERE THEY ARE, AND THE END TO WHICH, &c.] See *Arr. Epict.* l. 2. c. 24. p. 337.——See alſo l. 1. c. 6. p. 36. and *Perſ. Satyr.* 3. v. 66.

NOTE LXXI. *Ibid.*——AND NEVER WRETCHEDLY DEGRADE THEMSELVES INTO NATURES TO THEM SUBORDINATE.] See *Arr. Epict.* l. 1. c. 3. p. 21. Διὰ τάυτην τὴν συγγένειαν, οἱ μὲν ἀποκλίναντες, λύκοις ὅμοιοι γινόμεθα, ἄπιστοι καὶ ἐπίβουλοι καὶ βλαβεροί· οἱ δὲ λέουσιν, ἄγριοι καὶ θηριώδεις καὶ ἀνήμεροι· οἱ πλείους δ' ἡμῶν ἀλώπεκες, &c. *Thro' this*

Affinity (he means our Affinity to the Body, or baſer Part) *ſome of us, degenerating, become like Wolves, faithleſs, and treacherous, and miſchievous; others, like Lions, fierce, and ſavage, and wild; but the greater Part turn Foxes, little, fraudulent, wretched Animals. Cum autem duobus modis, id eſt, aut vi aut fraude fiat injuria; fraus, quaſi vulpeculæ, vis, leonis videtur.* Cic. de Offic. l. 1. c. 13. See alſo *Arr. Epict.* l. 2. c. 9. p. 210. In our own Language we ſeem to allude to this *Degeneracy* of Human Nature, when we call Men, by way of reproach, *Sheepiſh, Beariſh, Hoggiſh, Ravenous*, &c.

NOTE LXXII. p. 229.——THAT REASON, OF WHICH OUR OWN IS BUT A PARTICLE, OR SPARK, *&c.*]——αἱ ψυχαὶ μὲν ἔτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ, ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια ἔσαι, καὶ ἀποσπάσματα.—*Arr. Epict.* l. 1. c. 14. p. 81.——ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἑκάστῳ προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ· οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος. *Mar. Ant.* l. 5. ſ. 27. *Humanus autem animus, decerptus ex mente divinâ, cum nullo alio niſi cum ipſo Deo (ſi hoc fas eſt dictu) comparari poteſt.* Tuſc. Diſp. l. 5. c. 13. p. 371.

NOTE LXXIII. *Ibid.*—FIT ACTORS IN THAT GENERAL DRAMA, WHERE THOU HAST ALLOTTED EVERY BEING, GREAT AND SMALL, ITS PROPER PART, *&c.*] See before, *p.* 210. and *Note* LIII. See alſo *Arr. Epict.* l. 3. c. 22. p. 444—Σὺ ἥλιος εἶ· δύνασαι, *&c.* The Paſſage is ſublime and great, but too long to be here inſerted.

NOTE

NOTE LXXIV. p. 230.—ENABLE US TO CURB DESIRE, *&c.* ENABLE US EVEN TO SUSPEND IT, *&c.* BE OUR FIRST WORK TO HAVE ESCAPED, *&c.*] Ἀπόσχου ποτὲ παντελῶς ὀρέξεως, ἵνα ποτὲ κὴ εὐλόγως ὀρεχθῇς. *Abſtain for a time from Deſire altogether, that in time thou mayſt be able to deſire rationally.* Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 13. p. 414. Again the ſame Author—Σήμερον—ὀρέξει οὐκ ἐχρήσαμεν, ἐκκλίσει πρὸς μόνα τὰ προαιρετικά——*To day my Faculty of Deſire I have not uſed at all; my Averſion I have employed with reſpect only to things, which are in my power.* l. 4. c. 4. p. 588. See alſo *Enchir.* c. 2. and *Charact.* V. III. p. 202. *Plat. Gorg.* p. 505. B. Tom. 1. *Edit. Serr.* περὶ δὲ ψυχὴν——

HORACE ſeems alſo to have alluded to this Doctrine:

Virtus eſt, vitium fugere; & ſapientia prima,
Stultitia caruiſſe——Epiſt. 1. l. 1. v. 41.

NOTE LXXV. *Ibid.*——LET NOT OUR LOVE THERE STOP, WHERE IT FIRST BEGINS, BUT INSENSIBLY CONDUCT IT, *&c.*] See *Plat. Symp.* p. 210. tom. 3. Edit. Serrani. Δεῖ γὰρ, ἔφη, τὸν ὀρθῶς ἰόντα ἐπὶ τοῦτο πρᾶγμα, ἄρχεσθαι, &c.

NOTE LXXVI. *Ibid.*——NOT THAT LITTLE CASUAL SPOT, WHERE, *&c.*] See *Arrian. Epict.* l. 1. c. 9. p. 51. *Socrates quidem, cum rogaretur, cujatem ſe eſſe diceret,* Mundanum, *inquit: totius enim mundi ſe incolam & civem arbitrabatur.* Tuſc. Diſp. l. 5. c. 37. p. 427.

NOTE LXXVII. p. 231.—TEACH US EACH TO REGARD HIMSELF, BUT AS A PART OF THIS

THIS GREAT WHOLE; A PART, &c.] Πῶς ἂν λέγεται τῶν ἐκτός τινα κατὰ φύσιν, &c. *In what Senſe then* (ſays the Philoſopher, ſince all is referable to one univerſal Providence) *are ſome things called agreeable to our Nature, and others the contrary? The Anſwer is, They are ſo called, by conſidering ourſelves as detached, and ſeparate from the Whole. For thus may I ſay of the Foot, when conſidered ſo apart, that 'tis agreeable to its Nature, to be clean and free from Filth. But if we conſider it as a Foot, that is, as ſomething not detached, but the Member of a Body, it will behoove it both to paſs into the Dirt, and to trample upon Thorns, and even upon occaſion to be lopped off, for the Preſervation of the Whole. Were not this the caſe, it would be no longer a Foot. Something therefore of this kind ſhould we conceive with reſpect to ourſelves.——What art thou? A Man. If thou conſider thy Being as ſomething ſeparate and detached, 'tis agreeable to thy Nature, in this View of Independence, to live to extreme Age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if thou conſider thyſelf as a Man, and as the Member of a certain Whole; for the ſake of that Whole, it will occaſionally behoove thee, at one while to be ſick, at another while to ſail and riſque the Perils of Navigation, at another while to be in want, and at laſt to die perhaps before thy time. Why therefore doſt thou bear theſe Events impatiently? Knoweſt thou not, that after the ſame manner as the Foot ceaſeth to be a Foot, ſo doſt thou too ceaſe to be longer a Man?* Arr. Epict. l. 2. c. 5. p. 191.

NOTE LXXVIII. p. 231.——IN AS MUCH AS FUTURITY, &c.] Μέχρις ἂν ἄδηλά μοι ᾖ τὰ ἐξῆς, ἀεὶ τῶν εὐφυεστέρων ἔχομαι, πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν.

φύσιν· αὐτὸς γάρ μ' ὁ θεὸς τοιούτων ἐκλεκτικὸν ἐποίησεν· εἰ δέ γε ἤδειν, ὅτι νοσεῖν μοι καθείμαρται νῦν, καὶ ὥρμων ἂν ἐπ' αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πούς, εἰ φρένας ἔιχεν, ὥρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ πηλᾶσθαι. *Arr. Epict.* l. 2. c. 6. p. 195. It appears that the above Sentiment was of *Chryſippus.* In the *tenth Chapter* of the *ſame Book* we have it repeated, tho' in Words ſomewhat different. Διατοῦτο καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ φιλοσοφοὶ, ὅτι, &c. So *Seneca*—*Quicquid acciderit, ſic ferre, quaſi tibi volueris accidere. Debuiſſes enim velle, ſi ſciſſes omnia ex decreto Dei fieri.* Nat. Quæſt. iii. in Præfat.

NOTE LXXIX. p. 232—THAT WE MAY KNOW NO OTHER WILL, THAN THINE ALONE, AND THAT THE HARMONY OF OUR PARTICULAR MINDS WITH THY UNIVERSAL, *&c.*]—— Εἶναι δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὔροιαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἑκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διοικητοῦ βούλησιν. *The Virtue of a happy Man, and the Felicity of Life is this, when all things are tranſacted in Harmony of a Man's Genius, with the Will of Him, who adminiſters the Whole.* Diog Laert. l. 7. c. 88. p. 418. This is what *Epictetus* calls τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν. συνάρμοσαι τοῖς γινομένοις, *to attune or harmonize one's Mind to the things, which happen.* Diſſ. l. 2. c. 14. p. 242.

NOTE LXXX. *Ibid.* YET SINCE TO ATTAIN THIS HEIGHT—IS BUT BARELY POSSIBLE, *&c.*] See before, *page* 215, *&c.* See alſo *Notes* LX. and LXII.

NOTE LXXXI. p. 233.---SUCH AS TO TRANSFORM US INTO SAVAGE BEASTS OF PREY, SULLEN, *&c.*] See before, *Note* LXXI. NOTE

NOTE LXXXII. p. 233. THAT ANIMATING WISDOM, WHICH PERVADES, AND RULES THE WHOLE, &c.] *This Power* is called by the Emperor *Marcus*——τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας διήκουλα λόγον, καὶ——οἰκονομοῦνλα τὸ πᾶν. l. 5. ſ. 32.

NOTE LXXXIII. *Ibid.*——THAT MAGIC DIVINE, WHICH, &c.]——καὶ τὸ χάσμα ὃν τῷ λέονλι, καὶ τὸ θηλητήριον, καὶ πᾶσα κακεργία, ὡς ἄκανθα, ὡς βόρεορ, ἐκείνων ἐπιγεννήμαλα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ καλῶν· μὴ ὖν αὐλὰ ἀλλότρια τύτυ, ὃ σέβεις, φανλάζυ· ἀλλὰ τὴν πάνλων πηγὴν ἐπιλογίζυ. M. Ant. l. 6. ſ. 36.—See alſo l. 4. ſ. 44. l. 3. ſ. 2. Ὥσπερ γὰρ αἱ κωμῳδίαι (φησὶν) ἐπιγράμμαλα γελοῖα φέρυσιν, ἃ καθ' ἑαυλὰ μέν ἐσι φαῦλα, τῷ δὲ ὅλῳ ποιήμαλι χάριν τινὰ προσῆθησιν· ἕτως ψέξειας ἂν αὐλὴν ἐφ' ἑαυλῆς τὴν κακίαν, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἐκ ἄχρησός ἐσι. Chryſip. apud Plutarch. p. 1065. D.

Οὐδέ τι γίγνεσθαι ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, Δαίμων,
Οὔτε καθ' αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον, οὔτ' ἐπὶ πόντῳ,
Πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζυσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις.
Ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίσασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι,
Καὶ κοσμεῖν τὰ ἄκοσμα· καὶ ἐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἔσιν.
Ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν ἅπανλα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,
Ὥσθ' ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάνλων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόνλων. forſ. ἐόνλα.

Cleanthis Hymn. apud Steph. in Poeſi Philoſ. p. 49, 50.

[THE Reader will obſerve that the fourth of the above Verſes is ſupplied by the *Miſcell. Obſervationes Criticæ*,

Criticæ, Vol. VII. from a Manuſcript of *Voſſius* at *Leyden.*]

NOTE LXXXIV. p. 234---WITH THESE MAY OUR MINDS BE UNCHANGEABLY TINGED, *&c.*] —βάπτεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ ψυχὴ—M. Ant. l. 5. ſ. 16.

NOTE LXXXV *Ibid.*———WITH A RESERVE, *&c.*] μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως. See *Epict. Enchirid.* c. 2. *M. Ant.* l. 4. ſ. 1. l. 5. ſ. 20. *Seneca* tranſlates it, *cum exceptione.* See *De Beneficiis*, l. 4. ſ. 34.

NOTE LXXXVI. *Ibid.*—NEVER MISS WHAT WE WOULD OBTAIN, OR FALL INTO THAT WHICH WE WOULD AVOID, *&c.*] μήτε ὀρεγόμενον ἀποτυγχάνειν, μήτ' ἐκκλίνοντα περιπίπτειν. Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 12. p. 404.

NOTE LXXXVII. p. 235.——CONDUCT ME, THOU, *&c.*]

Ἄγε δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἡ πεπρωμένη,
Ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένος.
Ὡς ἕψομαι γ' ἄοκνος· ἢν δέ γε μὴ θέλω,
Κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι.

Cleanthes in Epict. Ench. c. 52.

Thus tranſlated by *Seneca:*

Duc me, parens, celſique dominator poli,
Quocunque placuit: nulla parendi mora eſt:

Adſum

Adſum impiger, fac nolle : comitabor gemens,
Maluſque patiar, quod bono licuit pati.

Epiſt. 107.

NOTE LXXXVIII. p. 236. 'TIS HABIT, REPLIED HE, IS ALL IN ALL. 'TIS PRACTICE AND EXERCISE, WHICH CAN ONLY, *&c. &c. to the End of the Paragraph.*]——Ἀλλὰ πολλῆς ἔχει χρείαν παρασκευῆς καὶ πόνε πολλοῦ καὶ μαθημάτων. Τί οὖν; ἐλπίζεις, ὅτι τὴν μεγίστην τέχνην ἀπὸ ὀλίγων ἕξειν ἀπολαβεῖν;——*But* (ſays one, with reſpect to the virtuous Character) *there is need of much Preparation, of much Labour and Learning. And what? Doſt thou expect it ſhould be poſſible* (anſwers the Philoſopher) *to obtain, by little Pains, the chiefeſt* GREATEST ART? *Arr. Epict.* l. 1. c. 20. p. 111. Ἄφνω δὲ τὰ ῥώμη γίνεται, οὐδὲ γενναῖος ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ δεῖ χειμασκῆσαι, παρασκευάσασθαι, καὶ μὴ εἰκῆ προσπηδᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ μὴ αὐτῷ προσήκοντα. *No robuſt and mighty Animal is complete at once; nor more is the brave and generous Man. 'Tis neceſſary to undergo the ſevereſt Exerciſe and Preparation, and not raſhly plunge into things, which are no way ſuitable.* Ejuſd. Diſſert. l. 1. c. 2. p. 18. See alſo the ſame *Author*, l. 1. c. 15. p. 86. l. 2. c. 14. p. 243. *Sed ut nec medici, nec imperatores, nec oratores, quamvis artis præcepta perceperint, quidquam magna laude dignum ſine uſu & exercitatione conſequi poſſunt : ſic officii conſervandi præcepta traduntur illa quidem (ut facimus ipſi ;) ſed rei magnitudo uſum quoque exercitationemque deſiderat.* Cic. de Offic. l. 1. c. 18. ἡ δ' ΗΘΙΚΗ ἐξ ΕΘΟΥΣ περιγίνεται· ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε—Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 1.

NOTE LXXXIX. p. 236. NOTHING IS TO BE HAD GRATIS, *&c.*] προῖκα δὲ οὐδὲν γίνεται. *Arr. Epict.* l. 4. c. 10. p. 653. The ſame Sentiment is often repeated by the ſame Author.

NOTE XC. p. 241.——WE ARE ALL GOVERNED BY INTEREST, *&c.*] See of the *Dialogue*, p. 212, 246. See alſo *Notes* LVI. and XCII.

NOTE XCI. p. 243.——'TIS A SMOAKY HOUSE.——Καπνός ἐστι· ἀπέρχομαι. *M. Ant.* l. 5. c. 29. See *Arr. Epict.* l. 1. c. 25. p. 129.

NOTE XCII. *Ibid.* IS A SOCIAL INTEREST, *&c.*] As the STOICS, above all Philoſophers, oppoſed *a lazy inactive Life*, ſo they were perpetually recommending a proper regard to the *Public*, and encouraging the Practice of every *ſocial* Duty. And tho' they made the *original Spring* of every particular Man's Action, to be *Self-love*, and the proſpect of *private Intereſt*; yet ſo *intimately united* did they eſteem this *private* Intereſt with the *public*, that they held it *impoſſible* to promote the *former*, and not at the ſame time promote the *latter*. Τοιαύτην φύσιν τῷ λογικῷ ζώῳ κατεσκεύασεν, ἵνα μηδενὸς τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν δύνηται τυγχάνειν, εἰ μή τι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ὠφέλιμον προσφέρηται· οὕτως οὐκέτι ἀκοινώνητον γίνεται, τὸ πᾶν ἁυτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖν. *God hath ſo framed the Nature of the rational Animal, that it ſhould not be able to obtain any private Goods, if it contribute not withal ſome thing profitable to the Community. Thus is there no longer any thing* UNSOCIAL, IN DOING ALL THINGS FOR THE SAKE OF SELF. *Arr. Epict.* l. 1. c. 19. p. 106.

THE

THE *Peripatetic* Doctrine was much the ſame. Πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν, καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, κοινῇ τ' ἂν πᾶσι εἴη τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν, δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει. *Were all to aim jointly at the fair Principle of Honour, and ever ſtrive to act what is faireſt and moſt laudable, there would be to every one in common whatever was wanting, and to each Man in particular of all Goods the greateſt, if Virtue deſerve juſtly to be ſo eſteemed. So that the good Man is neceſſariiy a* FRIEND *to* SELF: *For by doing what is laudable, he will always himſelf be profited, as well as at the ſame time be beneficial to others.* Ethic. Nicom. l. 9. c. 8.

NOTE XCIII. p. 243.—IF SO, THEN HONOUR AND JUSTICE ARE MY INTERESTS, *&c.*] Thus *Cicero*, after having ſuppoſed a *ſocial common Intereſt* to be the *natural* Intereſt of Man, ſubjoins immediately——*Quod ſi ita eſt, una continemur omnes & eadem lege naturæ. Idque ipſum ſi ita eſt, certe violare alterum lege naturæ prohibemur.* De Offic. l. 3. c. 6.

NOTE XCIV. *Ibid.*——WITHOUT SOME PORTION OF WHICH NOT EVEN THIEVES, *&c.*]—*Cujus (ſc. Juſtitiæ) tanta vis eſt, ut ne illi quidem, qui maleficio & ſcelere paſcuntur, poſſint ſine ulla particula juſtitiæ vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is ſibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum. Ille autem qui archi-*

archipirata dicitur, niſi æquabiliter prædam, &c. De Offic. l. 2. c. 11.

——Ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀνάγκη, Φυσικῆς οὔσης τῆς κοινωνίας, εἶναι φύσει καὶ τὰ δίκαια, δι' ὧν ἐστιν ἡ κοινωνία. Οἱ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον συνέχει τὴν κοινωνίαν, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδικωτάτων εἶναι δοκούντων· οὗτοι δέ εἰσιν οἱ λῃσταί· οἷς ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία ὑπὸ δικαιοσύνης σώζεται τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Διά τε γὰρ τὸ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀλλήλους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τιμᾶν τὸ κρεῖττον δοκοῦν, καὶ τὸ τὰ συκείμενα φυλάττειν, καὶ διὰ τὸ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀσθενεστέροις, διὰ ταῦτα ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους αὐτοῖς κοινωνία συμμένει· ὧν πᾶν τἐναντίον εἰς ὃς ἀδικοῦσι ποιοῦσιν. *'Tis neceſſary,* SOCIETY *being natural, that* JUSTICE *ſhould be natural alſo, by which Society exiſts. For that Juſtice holds Society together, is evident in thoſe, who appear of all the moſt unjuſt, ſuch I mean as Robbers or Banditti, whoſe Society with each other is preſerved by their Juſtice to each other. For by not aſpiring to any unequal Shares, and by never falſifying, and by ſubmitting to what appears expedient, and by juſtly guarding the Booty amaſſed together, and by aſſiſting their weaker Companions, by theſe things it is, that their Society ſubſiſts; the contrary to all which they do by thoſe, whom they injure.* Alex. Aphrod. περὶ ψυχ. p. 156. Edit. Ald. See alſo *Plat. de Repub.* l. 1. p. 351. tom. 11. *Edit. Serrani.*

NOTE XCV. p. 245. WHAT THEN HAVE I TO DO, BUT TO ENLARGE VIRTUE INTO PIETY? NOT ONLY HONOUR, *&c.*]

ALL manner of Events, which any way affect a Man, ariſe either from within *himſelf*, or from *Cauſes independent*. In the former caſe, he maintains an *active* Part; in the latter, a *paſſive*. The *active* Part of his Character ſeems chiefly to be the Care of VIRTUE, for 'tis Virtue which teaches us what we are to *act* or *do*; the *paſſive* Part ſeems to belong more immediately to PIETY, becauſe by this we are enabled to *reſign* and *acquieſce*, and *bear* with a manly Calmneſs whatever befals us. As therefore we are framed by Nature both to *act* and to *ſuffer*, and are placed in a Univerſe, where we are perpetually compelled to both; neither *Virtue* nor *Piety* is *of itſelf* ſufficient, but to paſs becomingly thro' Life, we ſhould participate of *each*.

SUCH appears to have been the Sentiment of the wiſe and good *Emperor*.——ἀνῆκεν ὅλον ἑαυτὸν, δικαιοσύνῃ μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ ἐνεργούμενα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμβαίνουσι, τῇ τῶν ὅλων φύσει. Τί δ' ἐρεῖ τις, ἢ ὑπολήψεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἢ πράξει κατ' αὐτοῦ, δὸ' εἰς νοῦν βάλλεται, δύο τούτοις ἀρκούμενος, αὐτὸς δικαιοπραγεῖν τὸ νῦν πρασσόμενον, καὶ φιλεῖν τὸ νῦν ἀπονεμόμενον ἑαυτῷ——*He* (the perfect Man) *commits himſelf wholly to* JUSTICE, *and the* UNIVERSAL NATURE; TO JUSTICE, *as to thoſe things which are done by himſelf; and in all other Events, to the* NATURE OF THE WHOLE. *What any one will ſay, or think about him, or act againſt him, he doth not ſo much as take into conſideration; contented and abundantly ſatisfied with theſe two things, himſelf* TO DO JUSTLY *what is at this inſtant doing, and to* APPROVE

PROVE *and* LOVE, *what is at this inſtant allotted him.* M. Anton. l. 10. ſ. 11. Πάντα ἐκεῖνα, ἐφ' ἃ διὰ περιόδου ἔυχῃ ἐλθεῖν, ἤδη ἐχεῖν θύνασαι, ἐὰν μὴ σαυτῷ φθονῇς· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν, ἐὰν πᾶν τὸ παρελθὸν καταλίπῃς, καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐπιτρέψῃς τῇ προνοίᾳ, καὶ τὸ παρὸν μόνον ἀπευθύνῃς πρὸς ΟΣΙΟΤΗΤΑ καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗΝ· ὁσιότητα μὲν, ἵνα φιλῇς τὸ ἀπονεμόμενον· σοὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἡ φύσις ἔφερε, καὶ σὲ τούτῳ· δικαιοσύνην δὲ, ἵνα ἐλευθέρως καὶ χωρὶς περιπλοκῆς λέγῃς τε τἀληθῆ, καὶ πράσσῃς τὰ κατὰ νόμον καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν——*All thoſe things, at which thou wiſheſt to arrive by a road round about, thou mayſt inſtantly poſſeſs, if thou doſt not grudge them to thyſelf; that is to ſay, in other words, if every thing paſt thou intirely quit, if the future thou truſt to Providence, and the preſent alone thou adjuſt according to* PIETY *and* JUSTICE: *according to Piety, that ſo thou mayſt approve, and love what is allotted, (for whatever it be, 'twas Nature brought it to thee, and thee to it;) according to Juſtice, that ſo thou mayſt generouſly and without diſguiſe both ſpeak the Truth, and act what is conſonant to* [the general] *Law, and the real Value of things.* M. Ant. l. 12. c. 1. *See alſo* l. 7. c. 54. *and* Plato's Gorgias, *p.* 507. *Tom.* 1. *Edit. Serr.* καὶ μὴν ὅγε σώφρων. κ. τ. λ.

NOTE XCVI. p. 245.——I HAVE AN INTEREST WHICH MAY EXIST, WITHOUT ALTERING THE PLAN OF PROVIDENCE; WITHOUT MENDING, &c.] Παιδεύεσθαι——τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μανθάνειν ἔχασ-α ὕτω θέλειν, ὡς, &c. *To be inſtructed——that is to ſay, to learn ſo to will all things, as in fact they happen. And how do they happen? As He, who ordains them, hath ordained. Now he hath ordained that there ſhould be Summer and Winter, and Plenty*

and Famine, and Virtue and Vice, and all manner of Contrarieties, for the Harmony of the Whole; and to each of us hath He given a Body, and its Members, and a Fortune, and certain Aſſociates. Mindful therefore of this Order, ought we to come for Inſtruction, not indeed how we may alter what is already eſtabliſhed, (for that neither is permitted us, nor would it be better ſo to be;) but how, while things continue around us, juſt as they are, and as is their Nature, we may ſtill preſerve our Judgment in harmony with all that happens. Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 12. p. 74.

NOTE XCVII. p. 246. WHO WOULD BE UNHAPPY? WHO WOULD NOT, IF HE KNEW HOW, ENJOY ONE PERPETUAL FELICITY, *&c.*] ——τούτης (ſc. εὐδαιμονίας) γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντες πάντα πράττομεν. *'Tis for the ſake of Happineſs, we all of us do all other things whatever.* Ethic. Nicom. l. 1. c. 12. *ſub. fin.*——See before, of the Dialogue *pages* 212, 241. and *Notes* LVI and XCII. *Plat. Protag.* p. 358. T. 1. *Ed. Serr.*

NOTE XCVIII. *Ibid.*——IF IT HAPPEN TO BE ERRONEOUS, 'TIS A GRATEFUL ERROR, WHICH I CHERISH, *&c.*] Εἰ δὲ ἐξαπατηθέντα τινὰ ἔδει μαθεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπροαιρέτων οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐγὼ μὲν ἤθελον τὴν ἀπάτην ταύτην, ἐξ ἧς ἤμελλον εὐρόως καὶ ἀταράχως βιώσεσθαι. *Were a Man to be deceived, in having learnt concerning Externals, that all beyond our Power was to us as nothing; I, for my own part, would deſire a Deceit, which would enable me for the future to live tranquil and undiſturbed.* Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 4. p. 27.

NOTE

NOTE XCIX. p. 247.——WHEN WE ARE ONCE, SAID HE, WELL HABITUATED TO THIS ——MORAL SCIENCE, THEN LOGIC AND PHYSICS BECOME TWO PROFITABLE ADJUNCTS, &c.] *Ad eaſque virtutes, de quibus diſputatum eſt, Dialecticam etiam adjungunt & Phyſicam, eaſque ambas virtutum nomine adpellant: alteram, quod habeat rationem ne cui falſo adſentiamur, neve, &c.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 21. p. 265.

THE THREEFOLD DIVISION of PHILOSOPHY into *Ethics*, *Phyſics*, and *Logic*, was commonly received by moſt Sects of Philoſophers. See *Laert.* l. 7. c. 39. See alſo *Cicero* in his Treatiſe *de Legibus*, l. 1. c. 23. and in his *Academics*, l. 1. c. 5. *Fuit ergo jam accepta a Platone philoſophandi ratio triplex, &c.* Plutarch de Placit. Philoſ. p. 874.

ADVERTISEMENT

IT IS The following Notes, chiefly taken
from Greek Manuscripts, are added
partly to explain, partly to give the Reader
a Specimen of certain Works, valuable for
their Rarity, as well as for their own Me-
rits. The Author has likewise added an Im-